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My  dissertation   addresses   the  question   “do  desires  provide   reasons?”      I  present   two  
independent  lines  of  argument  in  support  of  the  conclusion  that  they  do  not.    The  first  
line   of   argument   emerges   from   the   way   I   circumscribe   the   concept   of   a   desire.  
Complications   aside,   I   conceive  of   a  desire   as   a  member  of   a   family  of   attitudes   that  
have   imperative   content,   understood   as   content   that   displays   doability-­‐‑conditions  
rather   than   truth-­‐‑conditions.     Moreover,   I  hold   that   an  attitude  may  provide   reasons  
only  if  it  has  truth-­‐‑evaluable  content.    Insofar  as  desires  lack  truth-­‐‑evaluable  content,  I  
hold   that   the   content   of   a   desire   has   the  wrong   kind   of   logical   structure   to   provide  
reasons.      My   second   line   of   argument   claims   that   even   if   a   desire   did   have   truth-­‐‑
evaluable  content,  it  would  not  follow  that  desires  provide  reasons.    This  is  because  a  
desire  has  no  more  rational  significance  than  a  guess  or  coin-­‐‑flip.    My  argument  relies  
on  what  I  call  the  non-­‐‑substitutability  principle,  the  thesis  that  (all  things  being  equal)  
one   cannot   substitute   something   that   lacks   rational   significance,   relative   to   some  
attitude,  A,   for   something   that   has   rational   significance,   relative   to  A,   and   leave   the  
rational  standing  of  A  unchanged.    For  example,  one  cannot  substitute  the  guess  that  P  
 
 
(i.e.,   something   that   lacks   rational   significance   relative   to   the   belief   that   P)   for   the  
perception  that  P  (i.e.,  something  that  is  rationally  significant  relative  to  the  belief  that  
P)   without   altering   the   rational   standing   of   the   belief.      I   argue   that   when   the   non-­‐‑
substitutability  principle   is  applied   to  a  desire   that  gives   rise   to  an   intention,   it   turns  
out   that   one   can   always   substitute   a   guess   or   coin-­‐‑flip   (i.e.,   something   that   lacks  
rational   significance   relative   to   the   intention)   for   the   desire,   without   altering   the  
rational   standing   of   the   intention.   I   take   this   to   show   that   desires   are   not   rationally  
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1.1.    Providing  Reasons    
What   (if   any)   is   the   rational   significance   of   desire?   The   present   investigation   will   go   some  
distance   towards   answering   this   question.   The   answer   I   ultimately   arrive   at   is   that   a   desire  
constitutes  a   type  of  selection  procedure   for  deciding  between  competing  courses  of  action  or  
between  action  and   inaction.     As   such,  desires  may  be   said   to  guide  our  actions.     However,   I  
claim   that   it   remains   unestablished   that   the   type   of   guidance   that   a   desire   provides   is  
appropriately  described   as   “rational”.     On   the   contrary,   I   argue   that  we  have  good   reason   to  
think   that,   in   terms   of   its   rational   significance,   a   desire   is   no   better   than   a   random   selection  
procedure,  such  as  a  coin-­‐‑flip  or  guess.    The  significance  of  this  conclusion,  and  how  I  arrived  at  
it,  will  become  clearer  in  the  chapters  that  follow.  In  this  introduction,  I  will  attempt  to  provide  
some  background  and  context  for  what  is  to  come  by  defining  some  key  terms,  circumscribing  
my  primary  areas  of  concern,  and  offering  a  brief  overview  of  each  chapter.  
   Let  us  begin  by  getting  clear  on  what  it  means  for  an  attitude  to  provide  an  agent  with  a  
reason.    We  may  distinguish  between  two  different  senses  in  which  an  attitude,  X,  may  provide  





(A1)  X  provides  us  with  a  reason  to  adopt  Y  by  putting  us  in  touch  with  a  consideration  that  
speaks  in  favour  of  adopting  Y.  
  
(A2)   X  provides  us  with  a   reason   to   adopt  Y  by   constituting  a   consideration   that   speaks   in  
favour  of  adopting  Y.        
  
The  difference  between  (A1)  and  (A2)  is  the  difference  between  the  perceptual  appearance  that  
it  is  raining  outside  giving  one  a  reason  to  believe  that  it  is  raining  outside,  and  the  fact  that  one  
has  the  perceptual  appearance  that  there  is  a  pink  elephant  in  the  corner  of  the  room  giving  one  
a  reason  to  check  oneself  into  a  hospital.     In  the  first  case,  the  perceptual  appearance  provides  
one   with   a   reason   by   putting   one   in   touch   with   a   consideration   that   is   independent   of   the  
perceptual  appearance  itself  and  which  speaks  in  favour  of  adopting  the  belief  that  it  is  raining  
outside—namely,   the   fact   that   it   is   raining   outside.      The   fact   that   it   is   raining   outside   is  
independent  of  the  perceptual  appearance  of  it  raining  outside  in  the  sense  that  it  would  obtain  
(and   constitute   a   reason   to   believe   that   is   raining   outside)   even   if   one   did   not   have   the  
perceptual  appearance  in  question.    By  contrast,  the  fact  that  one  has  the  perceptual  appearance  
of  a  pink  elephant  in  the  corner  of  the  room  does  not  put  one  in  touch  with  some  independent  
consideration   in   favour  of  adopting   the   intention   to  check  oneself   into  a  hospital.     Rather,   the  
perceptual  appearance  itself  constitutes  the  relevant  consideration.      
Significantly,   when   an   attitude   provides   one   with   a   reason   in   the   sense   described   in  




perceptual   appearance   that   it   is   raining   provides   one   with   a   reason   to   believe   it   is   raining  
because  it  purports  to  put  one  in  touch  with  a  mind-­‐‑independent  fact—namely,  the  fact  that  it  is  
raining.      If,   following   Franz   Brentano,   we   assume   that   psychological   states   are   distinctive  
because   they   have   the   property   of   intentionality   or   aboutness,1   then  we   can   say   that  when   a  
psychological  state  provides  one  with  reasons  in  the  sense  described  in  (A1),  it  is  doing  so  qua  
psychological  state  (i.e.,  in  virtue  of  being  a  state  with  the  property  of  aboutness).    By  contrast,  
when  an  attitude  provides  one  with  a  reason  in  the  sense  described  in  (A2),  it  does  not  do  so  qua  
psychological  state.    Rather,  it  provides  one  with  a  reason  in  the  very  same  way  that  any  old  fact  
might.    For  example,  the  fact  that  I’m  bleeding  profusely  gives  me  a  reason  to  check  myself  into  
the  hospital   in  the  very  same  sense  that  having  the  perceptual  appearance  that  there  is  a  pink  
elephant  gives  me  a  reason  to  check  myself  into  the  hospital.  If  this  is  right,  and  given  that  the  
former  lacks  the  property  of  aboutness,  it  follows  that  the  latter  does  not  provide  reasons  in  the  
relevant   sense   in   virtue   of   the   fact   that   it   has   the   property   of   aboutness.      Hence,   only   (A1)  
describes  a  type  of  rational  significance  that  is  unique  to  psychological  states.2    
I   take  it   to  be  relatively  uncontroversial   that  a  desire  may  provide  reasons  in  the  sense  
described  by  (A2).    For  example,  the  fact  that  I  have  a  compulsive  desire  to  wash  my  hands  for  a  
                                                
1 Brentano [1874: 88-89]. 
 
2 The distinction is not meant to be exclusive, at least not in the sense that an attitude can provide reasons in one 
sense or the other, but not both.  For example, the perceptual appearance of a pink elephant provides one with both a 
 
2 The distinction is not meant to be exclusive, at least not in the sense that an attitude can provide reasons in one 
sense or the other, but not both.  For example, the perceptual appearance of a pink elephant provides one with both a 
pro tanto reason to believe that there is a pink elephant and a pro tanto reason to check oneself into a hospital. 
However, when the perceptual appearance of a pink elephant provides one with a pro tanto reason to believe there is 
a pink elephant, it is doing so qua psychological state; but when it provides a pro tanto reason to check oneself into a 
hospital, it is doing so qua fact. Qua psychological state, a perceptual appearance is a truth-value bearer (or, if you 
prefer, a bearer of veridicality conditions); qua fact, it is a truth-maker (or a determiner of veridicality). Since a 
perceptual appearance may play the role of both a veridicality bearer and a veridicality determiner, it may provide 
reasons in both senses. But each sense will be relative to its respective role.  Thanks to an anonymous commentator 





sixth  time  may  give  me  a  reason  to  wash  my  hands  for  a  sixth  time  if  I  believed  that  doing  so  
would  free  me  of  the  unpleasant  burden  my  compulsive  desire  embodies,  even  if  I  believe  that  
there  is  nothing  to  be  gained  from  washing  my  hands  for  a  sixth  time  (i.e.,  apart  from  the  fact  
that  it  would  satisfy  my  compulsive  desire).    As  with  the  perceptual  appearance  that  there  is  a  
pink   elephant   in   the   corner   of   the   room,  my   compulsive   desire   does   not   provide  me  with   a  
reason  to  wash  my  hand  by  putting  me  in  touch  with  a  consideration  that  speaks  in  favour  of  
my  washing  my  hands   that   is   independent  of   the  desire   itself.     What   remains  controversial   is  
the   thesis   that   a   desire   provides   reasons   in   the   sense  described   by   (A1).      This   is   the   sense   of  
providing  reasons  with  which  this  dissertation  will  be  concerned.    In  short,  I  wish  to  investigate  
whether  a  desire  provides  reasons  qua  psychological  state.    
  
1.2.    Cognitivism  about  Desire  
According   to   one  widely  discussed   contemporary   theory   of   desire,   a   desire   provides   reasons  
because   a   desire   represents   the   desired   outcome   as   good   or   as   something   that   ought   to   be  
brought  about.     Following  David  Velleman,   I  will   refer   to   this   theory  of  desire  as  cognitivism.3  
One  of  the  central  motivations  for  accepting  cognitivism  comes  from  an  attempt  to  make  sense  
of  a  certain  aspect  of  our  ordinary  linguistic  practice;  namely,  the  fact  that  the  specification  of  a  
desire  is  often  taken  to  be  a  satisfactory  answer  to  the  questions:  “Why  did  you  ϕ?”,  “Why  are  
                                                
3 Velleman [1992].  See and Cf.: Brunero [2009]; Tenenbaum [2006].  Velleman conceives of cognitivism as a 
version of the guise of the good theory of desires, the claim that intentional action is “directed at outcomes regarded 
sub specie boni: under the guise of the good”([1992: 3]). Cognitivism is identified with those versions of the guise 
of the good theory that claim or entail that desires provide reasons in favour of bringing about the desired outcome 
because desires represent the desired outcome as good. The present notion of cognitivism should not be confused 
with moral cognitivism, understood as the claim that moral statements are apt for truth or falsity (e.g., Boyd [1988] 





you  ϕ-­‐‑ing?”,  and  “Why  are  you  going  to  ϕ?”4    For  example,  saying  that  I  want  a  glass  of  water  
is   typically   taken   to   be   a   satisfactory   answer   to   the   question   “why   are   you   going   to   the  
kitchen?”   If   we   conceive   of   being   asked   “why?”   as   a   request   for   reasons5,   then   the   fact   that  
citing  a  desire  is  typically  taken  to  be  a  satisfactory  answer  to  the  question  “why?”  suggests  that  
desires   provide   reasons,   or   so   the   argument   goes.   Hence,   if   cognitivism  were   true,   it   would  
provide   us  with   a   straightforward  way   of  making   sense   of   a   significant   part   of   our   ordinary  
reason-­‐‑giving  practice.  
A  second  reason  cognitivism  may  be  deemed  attractive  is  because  it  is  consistent  with  a  
longstanding   philosophical   conception   of   human   beings   as   fundamentally   rational   agents,  
understood  as  agents  that  act  for  (or  for  what  are  believed  to  be)  reasons.    Putatively,  there  are  
cases  in  which  an  agent  does  act  for  reasons,  such  as  when  an  agent  is  motivated  to  perform  an  
action  by   the  belief   that  she   is  morally  or  rationally  obligated   to  perform  it.     For  example,   if   I  
adopt  the  intention  not  to  cheat  on  my  taxes  because  I  believe  I  have  a  moral  obligation  not  to  
cheat   on  my   taxes,  my   reasons   for   adopting   the   intention  not   to   cheat   on  my   taxes   seems   to  
correspond  with   the   relevant   belief   about  what   constitutes  my  moral   obligations.      However,  
there  also  seem  to  be  cases  in  which  I  am  motivated  not  by  a  belief  that  I  am  morally  obligated  
to  perform  a  certain  course  of  action,  but  by  a  desire.    For  example,  I  may  be  motivated  to  buy  
vanilla  ice  cream  by  a  desire  to  buy  vanilla  ice  cream  and  yet  fail  to  believe  that  I  am  morally  (or  
otherwise)  obligated  to  buy  vanilla  ice  cream.    This  means  that  if  we  wish  to  preserve  the  idea  
                                                
4 For discussion, see: Anscombe [2000: 70ff.]. 
 
5 Here and henceforth, I am using the word “reason” to mean justificatory reason.  There has been a great deal of 
discussion in the action theory literature of the difference between justificatory reasons and explanatory reasons.  
This distinction is typically taken to be similar, if not identical, to the distinction between normative and motivating 
reasons.  I will not attempt to add my own analysis of justificatory reasons, or of the difference between justificatory 




that  human  beings  always  act  for  or  in  the  light  of  reasons,  then  we  cannot  only  consider  those  
cases  in  which  an  agent  is  motivated  by  the  belief  that  she  is  morally  or  rationally  obligated  to  
bring  about  some  outcome.  We  must  also  consider  those  cases  in  which  she  is  motivated  by  a  
desire.    Thus,  if  we  held  that  desiring  to  bring  about  some  outcome  provided  one  with  a  reason  
to   bring   about   that   outcome,   we   would   be   allowed   to   preserve   the   idea   that   human   beings  
always  act   for  reasons,  even   in   those  cases   in  which  their  actions  are  based  on  a  desire  rather  
than  on  a  belief.        However,   if  we  deny  that  desires  provide  reasons,   then  there  seems  to  be  a  
large  subset  of  our  everyday  actions   that  are  performed  for  no  reason.  This,   in   turn,   seems   to  
cast  doubt  on  the  conception  of  human  beings  as  fundamentally  rational  agents.    
The   preceding  pair   of  motivations   for   adopting   cognitivism   is  meant   to   be   suggestive  
rather   than  exhaustive.      I  do  not  mean   to   imply   that  cognitivism  is   the  only  or  even   the  most  
effective  way  of  achieving  the  desiderata  alluded  to  above.    Rather,  I  wish  to  illustrate  that  the  
sort  of   reasons   for  which  one  may  find  cognitivism  attractive  range   from  the  quotidian   to   the  
highly   theoretical.     Given   the   range   of   possible  motivations   for   thinking   that   desires   provide  
reasons,   the   question   of  whether   or   not   they   do  warrants   close,   patient   investigation.   This   is  
what   I   attempt   to  do   in   this  dissertation.      The  present   investigation  will   be   for   the  most  part  
restricted   to   those   desires   that   entail   a   disposition   to   act.   This   is   because   I   am   primarily  
interested   in   the  kind  of  desire   that  may  potentially   feature   in   the   aetiology  of   an   intentional  
action.6   One   implication   of   this   restriction   is   that   I   will   not   be   concerned   with   what   Tony  
Milligan  refers  to  as  a  “helpless  desire”,  understood  as  a  desire  that   is  directed  at  an  outcome  
                                                
6 Strawson [1994] suggests that it is best to keep the notion of a desire distinct from the notion of a disposition to 
act.  However, the considerations he cites in support of this recommendation only have force if we are interested in 





“we  cannot  do  anything  to  bring  about.”7  Examples  of  helpless  desires  include  the  desire  to  fly  
like  a  bird,  to  alter  the  past,  or  that  the  sun  shines  at  some  remote  date  in  the  future.8      
I  will   refer   to   anyone  who  denies   that   a   desire   represents   its   object   as   good   as   a  non-­‐‑
cognitivists.    While  it  is  in  principle  possible  for  one  to  be  a  non-­‐‑cognitivist  in  the  present  sense  
and  yet  affirm  that  desires  provide  reasons  (i.e.,  if  one  thought  that  desires  provide  reasons  by  
some  means   besides   representing   their   object   as   good),   I   am  not   aware   of   any   theorists  who  
both   embrace   non-­‐‑cognitivism   and   also   affirm   that   desires   provide   reasons.     Moreover,   it   is  
difficult  to  imagine  what  a  plausible  version  of  such  a  position  would  look  like.    Nevertheless,  I  
will  not  be  making  the  assumption  that  the  non-­‐‑cognitivist  is  committed  to  denying  that  desires  
provide   reasons.      The   point   of   contention   between   the   cognitivist   and   the   non-­‐‑cognitivist   is  
whether  or  not  desires  represent  their  object  as  good.    However,  if  the  non-­‐‑cognitivist  is  able  to  
successfully  show  that  a  desire  does  not  represent  its  object  as  good,  this  would  block  the  most  
widely  discussed  contemporary  strategy  for  arguing  that  desires  provide  reasons.     Hence,  it  is  
only  as   a  potential  objection   to   the   claim   that  desires  provide   reasons   that  non-­‐‑cognitivism   is  
presently  of  interest  to  us.    
  
1.3.    The  Guise  of  the  Good  Theory  
The  cognitivist  conception  of  desire  is  typically  regarded  as  a  version  of  the  guise  of  the  good  
theory  (henceforth,  GG  theory).    Sergio  Tenenbaum  defines  GG  theory  as  “the  view  that  desire  
                                                
7 Milligan [2007: 310]. 
 




(or   perhaps   intention,   or   intentional   action)   always   aims   at   the   good.”9   According   to   the  
cognitivist,  a  desire  aims  at   the  good   in  virtue  of   the   fact   that  a  desire   represents   its  object  as  
good.    However,  it  may  be  argued  that  representing  something  as  good  is  not  the  only  way  in  
which  a  desire  may  be  said  to  aim  at  the  good.  If  this  is  right,  then  it  should  be  possible  to  buy  
into   GG   theory   without   buying   into   cognitivism.      Nevertheless,   most   contemporary   GG  
theorists   are  also   cognitivists.     Consequently,   I  will  be   treating   cognitivism  and  GG   theory  as  
more  or  less  interchangeable.  
In   its   Aristotelian   formulation,   GG   theory   is   widely   taken   to   include   a   claim   about  
desires.      In   this   regard,   the   following   passage   is   typically   taken   by   action   theorists   to   be  
representative  of  Aristotle’s  view:  
 
The object of desire and the object of wish is either good or the apparent good. (Eudemian 
Ethics [1235b26-27], Italics mine)10 
  
                                                
9 Tenenbaum [2010: 3]. 
 
10 It has become all but standard for contemporary GG theorists to cite the following passage from Aristotle’s De 
Anima as the locus classicus of GG theory: “It is the object of desire which produces movement, but this is either the 
good or the apparent good” (De Anima, III.10 [433a28-29]).  For example, Matthew Boyle and Douglas Lavin cite 
this passage at the very beginning of their recent paper, “Goodness and Desire”.  However, I have opted to set this 
passage aside since it identifies the “object of desire”, as opposed to desires themselves, as that which moves an 
agent, and this subtlety of phrasing introduces a number of vexed issues which continue to be hotly debated among 
Aristotle scholars.  For readers with interests in this subject matter, the Greek word translated as “desire” is orekton, 
and the Greek word translated as “wish” is boulêton.  According to John Cooper [1999: 241-242] and Jessica Moss 
[2010: 65], Aristotle uses orekton (orexis) as a generic designation for any desire, while boulêton (boulêsis) is used 
to refer to distinctively rational motivations.  Since I lack the necessary expertise to evaluate the exegetical claims of 
Cooper and Moss, I do not wish to either endorse or impugn their interpretation. I present their reading, not to settle 
the question of what Aristotle is actually committed to saying, but rather as an example of what Aristotle is taken to 






The  claim  that  the  good  is  the  object  of  desire  was  later  codified  by  the  Scholastics  in  the  slogan:  
quid   appetitur,   appetitur   sub   specie   boni   (whatever   is   desired   is   desired   under   the   guise   of   the  
good).   I  will   refer   to   the  version  of  GG   theory   that   includes   the   claim   that  desire   aims   at   the  
good  as  the  Desire  Thesis.      
Some   contemporary   GG   theorists   have   given   up   on   defending   the   Desire   Thesis   in  
favour  of   simply   saying   that   intention   (or   intentional   action)   aims  at   the  good.      For   example,  
Joseph  Raz  [2010]  identifies  GG  theory  with  the  following  three  propositions:  
  
(1) Intentional actions are actions performed for reasons, as those are seen by the agents. 
 
(2) Specifying the intention that makes an action intentional identifies central features of the 
reason(s) for which the action is performed. 
 
(3) Reasons for action are such reasons by being facts that establish that the action has some 
value.11 
  
Raz  then  goes  on  to  emphasise  that  he  “remains  noncommittal  about  the  relations  of  intentions  
and  desires,  and  will  therefore  not  discuss  desires”.12    This  shift  away  from  discussing  desires—
traditionally   taken   to  be  one  of   the  central  concerns  of  GG  theory—has  come  about   largely   in  
response  to  criticisms  of  the  Desire  Thesis,  such  as  those  advanced  by  David  Velleman.13  Since  
the  present  investigation  is  concerned  with  the  rational  significance  of  desire,  I  will  not  consider  
those  versions  of  GG  theory  that  do  not  include  the  Desire  Thesis.      
                                                
11 Raz [2010: 111]. 
 
12 Raz [2010: 112]. 
 
13 Velleman’s criticisms of GG theory are directed at the Desire Thesis.  For example, in the introduction of his 
widely discussed paper, “The Guise of the Good”, he describes the rationale behind GG theory as follows: “The 
reason is that he acts intentionally only when he acts out of a desire for some anticipated outcome, and in desiring 





Since   beliefs   and   judgements   are   typically   taken   to   be   the   paradigm   examples   of  
psychological   states   that  provide   reasons,   some   theorists  have  sought   to  establish   that  desires  
provide   reasons   by   arguing   that   desires   are   a   type   of   belief   or   judgement.14   Specifically,   the  
desire  to  bring  about  P  is  equated  with  the  belief  or  judgement  that  it  is  good  to  bringing  about  
P.    Since  the  belief  or  judgement  that  it  is  good  to  bringing  about  P  is  just  the  kind  of  thing  that  
could  provide  one  with  a  reason  to  bring  about  P,  this  view  allows  us  to  make  sense  of  the  claim  
that  desires  provide  reasons.    
   More   recently,   a   few   GG   theorists   have   equated   a   desire   with   a   special   kind   of  
perceptual  appearance  of  the  good.15    Since  a  perceptual  appearance  is  also  widely  regarded  as  
an  example  of  an  attitude  that  provides  reasons,  the  equation  of  a  desire  to  a  type  of  perceptual  
appearance  also  potentially  allows  us  to  make  sense  of  the  claim  that  desires  provide  reasons.    
However,   the   identification   of   a   desire   with   a   perceptual   appearance   rather   than   a   belief   is  
significant   because   it   imposes   an   important   restriction   on   what   we   can   plausibly   take   to   be  
entailed  by  the  claim  that  desires  provide  reasons.    Some  theorists—most  notably  Peter  Railton  
and  Kieran  Setiya—have  taken  the  claim  that  desires  provide  reasons  to  entail  that  desires  are  
reason-­‐‑responsive.16    However,  if  we  were  to  adopt  the  view  that  a  desire  is  a  type  of  perceptual  
appearance,  then  there  is  no  reason  to  assume  that  the  entailment  holds.    There  are  two  senses  
in   which   an   attitude   may   be   reason-­‐‑responsive—a   descriptive   sense   and   a   normative   sense.    
From  a  purely  descriptive  perspective,  there  are  indeed  circumstances  in  which  a  desire  may  be  
                                                
14 For a defence of this view, see Price [1998]. 
 
15 For example: Stampe [1987], Oddie [2005], and Tenenbaum [2007]. 
 





plausibly  described  as  reason-­‐‑responsive.  For  example,  suppose  that  I  desire  to  take  a  swig  from  
what  appears  to  be  a  refreshing  bottle  of  apple  juice,  but  (upon  closer  inspection)  is  revealed  to  
be  a  bottle  of  vinegar.    Upon  discovering  that  it  is  vinegar  rather  than  apple  juice  in  the  bottle,  I  
may  lose  my  desire  to  take  a  swig.    Moreover,  perceptual  appearances  may  be  said  to  be  reason-­‐‑
responsive   in   a   similarly   limited   sense.      For   example,   a   shadowy   object   in   the   corner   of  my  
bedroom  may  appear  to  be  a  person,  until  I  remember  that  it  is  actually  a  lamp,  at  which  point  
it  quickly  ceases  to  “look”  like  a  person.      
However,   pace   the   preceding   observations,   it   is   also   true   that   desires   (like   perceptual  
appearances)  are  notoriously  recalcitrant  in  the  face  of  countervailing  reasons.  I  may  continue  to  
desire   to   have   a   cigarette   even   after   I   learn   that   it   is   bad   for   my   health,   and   no   amount   of  
reminders  from  my  doctor  about  the  dangers  of  large  amounts  of  deep  fried  or  fatty  foods  may  
suffice  to  silence  my  desire  to  partake  in  them.17  Hence,  from  a  purely  descriptive  point  of  view,  
desires  often  fail  to  be  reason-­‐‑responsive.    Thus,  the  claim  that  desires  are  reason-­‐‑responsive  is,  
from   a   purely   descriptive   perspective,   not   always   true.      Moreover,   there   is   no   categorical  
difference   in   this   respect   between   a  desire   or  perceptual   appearance,   on   the   one  hand,   and   a  
belief,  on  the  other,  since  there  may  be  cases  in  which  a  belief  is  not  reason-­‐‑responsive  (such  as  
when  a  belief  is  held  in  an  irrationally  dogmatic  way).    
I   believe   that   the   more   philosophically   interesting   question   is   whether   desires   are  
reason-­‐‑responsive  in  a  normative  sense.    It  is  with  regards  to  this  question  that  the  claim  that  a  
desire   is  a  type  of  perceptual  appearance  and  the  claim  that  a  desire   is  a  type  of  belief  pull   in  
opposing  directions.    Normatively  speaking,  beliefs  are  reason-­‐‑responsive  in  the  sense  that  we  
                                                




would  hold  an  agent   liable   to  rational  criticism  if  she   failed   to  revise  her  beliefs   in   the   face  of  
what   she   acknowledges   to   be   conclusive   contravening   evidence.      The   same   is   not   true   of  
perceptual   appearances.      For   example,   suppose   a   partially   submerged   stick   perceptually  
appears  bent  to  me.    Even  after  I  have  been  presented  with  what  I  acknowledge  to  be  conclusive  
contravening  evidence,  I  am  not  liable  to  rational  criticism  if  I  continue  to  have  the  perceptual  
appearance  of  it  being  bent.    Hence,  there  is  a  normative  sense  in  which  perceptual  appearances  
are   not   reason-­‐‑responsive.      Consequently,   if   we   take   a   desire   to   be   a   type   of   perceptual  
appearance,  we  are  left  without  any  motivation  for  thinking  that  desires  are,  from  a  normative  
point   of   view,   reason-­‐‑responsive.  Moreover,   this   appears   consistent   with   how  we   ordinarily  
conceive  of  and  talk  about  desires.  For  example,  I  may  decide  to  give  up  smoking  because  I  take  
myself  to  have  conclusive  reasons  for  thinking  it  is  bad  for  my  health,  and  yet  continue  to  have  
the  desire  for  a  cigarette  all  the  same.    The  mere  fact  that  my  desire  to  have  a  cigarette  persists  
does   not   make   me   liable   to   rational   criticism.   This   suggests   that   desires   are   not   reason-­‐‑
responsive   in   the  normatively   significant   sense   that  beliefs  or   judgements  are;  an  agent   is  not  
ipso-­‐‑facto  deemed  irrational  because  his  desires  fail   to   line  up  with  what  he  believes  (or  takes  
there  to  be  conclusive  evidence  for  holding)  to  be  good.18    
The  preceding  observations  suggest  that  Setiya  mischaracterises  the  GG  theorists  when  
he  describes  her  as  being  committed  to  the  following  principle:      
  
                                                
18 Another way that this point may be put would be to say that a desire is not an example of what Scanlon [1998] 
calls a “judgement-sensitive attitude”, understood as the “class of attitudes for which reasons…can sensibly be 





When someone wants to X, or wants it to be the case that P, they want it for a reason, and 
reasons for desire must be respects in which the object of desire is seen as good.19 
  
Here,  Setiya  portrays  the  GG  theorist  as  being  committed  to  the  claim  that  an  agent  always  has  
a   reason   for   her   desires.   However,   according   to   those   who   equate   desires   to   perceptual  
appearances,   it   is  not  only   false,  as  a  psychological  claim,   that  desires  are  always  had  for  and  
responsive  to  reasons,  but  even  more  significantly,  that  we  do  not    require  that  desires  be  had  
for   or   be   responsive   to   reasons.     On   this   view,   it  would  be  no  more   appropriate   to   require   a  
reason  for  a  desire  than  it  would  be  to  require  a  reason  for  a  perceptual  appearance.    In  light  of  
these  considerations,  I  will  not  be  assuming  that  those  who  are  committed  to  saying  that  desires  
provide  reasons  are  also  committed  to  saying  that  there  may  be  reasons  for  a  desire.    While  the  
claims  are  consistent  with  each  other,  the  former  does  not  entail  the  latter.  
  
1.4.    Overview  
The   remaining   chapters   of   this   dissertation   form   a   set   of   inter-­‐‑supporting   essays   in   which   I  
criticise  and  offer  an  alternative  to  the  cognitivist  conception  of  desire.    In  chapter  2,  I  introduce  
an   alternative   interpretation   of   the   direction   of   fit   metaphor   to   that   offered   by   Elizabeth  
Anscombe.    I  begin  by  arguing  that  the  Anscombe  interpretation  is  ill-­‐‑suited  for  the  purpose  for  
which  it   is  typically  employed  by  GG  theorists—namely,  to  make  sense  of  the  idea  that  desire  
aims  at   the  good   in  a   sense   that   is   roughly  analogous   to  how  belief   aims  at   the   truth.      I   then  
advance  my   own   interpretation   of   the   direction   of   fit  metaphor,  which   I   refer   to   as   the   two-­‐‑
                                                




content  interpretation.    Specifically,  I  argue  that  those  attitudes  that  display  a  belief-­‐‑like  direction  
of  fit  do  so  in  virtue  of  having  what  I  call  indicative  content,  and  that  those  attitudes  that  display  
a  desire-­‐‑like  direction  of  fit  do  so  in  virtue  of  having  what  I  call  imperative  content.    I  conclude  by  
offering   a   diagnostic   test   for   determining   the   correctness   conditions   of   an   attitude   with  
imperative   content.   I   demonstrate   that   when   this   test   is   applied   to   desire,   we   arrive   at   the  
conclusion   that  desires  do  not   aim  at   the  good.     The  arguments  of   chapter   2   are  meant   to  go  
some   distance   towards   answering   the   question:  How   are   we   to   conceive   of   the   direction   of   fit   of  
desire?  
   In  chapter  3,  I  attempt  to  further  situate  the  two-­‐‑content  interpretation  in  the  context  of  
the   contemporary   discussion   of   Anscombe-­‐‑inspired   forms   of   GG   theory.      I   begin   with   an  
analysis  of   the  two  most  widely-­‐‑discussed  strategies  for  unpacking  Anscombean  GG  theory—
namely,   the   thesis   that   a   desire   is   a   type   of   belief   and   the   thesis   that   a   desire   is   a   type   of  
perception.    I  argue  that,  contrary  to  expectation,  the  two  dominant  interpretations  of  direction  
of   fit—those   associated   with   Anscombe   and   Michael   Smith,   respectively—are   actually  
consistent  with  the  equation  of  a  desire  with  a  belief  or  perception.  I  take  this  to  be  symptomatic  
of  the  fact  that  both  Anscombe’s  and  Smith’s  interpretations  fail  to  get  at  the  heart  of  the  matter,  
as   far   as   the   direction   of   fit   analysis   is   concerned.      In   this   regard,   both   of   the   dominant  
interpretations   of   direction   of   fit   stand   in   contrast   to   the   two-­‐‑content   interpretation.   The  
arguments  of   chapter  3  attempt   to  answer   the  question:  How   is   the   analysis   of  direction  of   fit   on  
offer  in  this  dissertation  importantly  different  from  and  preferable  to  the  dominant  interpretations?  
   In   chapter   4,   I   argue   that   there   are   two   distinct   kinds   of   rational   significance   that   an  




and  the  second,  which  I  refer  to  as  rational  support,   is  displayed  by  perception.     I  consider  and  
respond   to   an   objection   to   my   claim   that   there   are   two   kinds   of   rational   significance.      In  
response  to  these  objections,  I  argue  that  the  distinctive  rational  significance  displayed  by  belief  
is   tied   to   the   fact   that   a   belief   is   an   attitude   that  may   be   had   for   reasons  while   a   perceptual  
appearance  is  not.    Getting  clear  on  the  rational  significance  of  belief  is  important  for  assessing  
the  claim  that  a  desire  has  the  same  rational  significance  as  the  belief  that  the  desired  outcome  is  
good.    In  this  respect,  chapter  4  provides  a  framework  for  my  assessment  of  David  Velleman’s  
criticisms  of  cognitivism  in  chapter  5.    The  arguments  in  chapter  4  attempt  to  go  some  distance  
towards   answering   the   question:   How   are   we   to   understand   the   difference   between   the   rational  
significance  of  belief  and  rational  significance  of  perceptual  appearances?  
   In  chapter  5,   I  argue  that  David  Velleman’s  widely-­‐‑discussed  objections  to  cognitivism  
fail   to   establish   their   conclusion.      I   begin   by   summarising   two   sets   of   objections   found   in  
Velleman’s   paper,   “The   Guise   of   the   Good”:   the   first   directed   at   the   version   of   cognitivism  
inspired  by  Donald  Davidson,  and  the  second  directed  at  the  version  of  cognitivism  inspired  by  
Elizabeth  Anscombe.    I  argue  that  both  sets  of  objections  fail  because  they  saddle  the  cognitivist  
with  commitments  she  need  not  have.    In  the  process  of  so  doing,  I  argue  that  the  cognitivist  is  
most  plausibly  and  charitably  seen  as  committed  to  the  claim  that  a  desire  has  the  same  kind  of  
rational  significance  displayed  by  a  perceptual  appearance.  The  arguments  in  chapter  5  attempt  
to  answer  the  question:  What  is  the  most  plausible  way  of  understanding  the  cognitivist  version  of  the  
claim  that  desires  provide  reasons?  
     In   chapter   6,   I   argue   that   a   desire   has   no   more   rational   significance   than   a   random  




its   rationally   import,   a   desire   has   more   in   common   with   a   coin-­‐‑flip   or   guess   than   with   a  
perceptual  appearance.  At  first  pass,  this  may  seem  like  an  unattractive  conclusion.    However,  I  
attempt   to   show   that   this   conclusion   is   made   palatable   by   the   fact   that   the   kind   of   rational  
significance   displayed   by   perceptual   appearances   is,   strictly   speaking,   unnecessary   in   the  
practical  sphere.    As  such,  the  fact  that  a  desire  is  of  little  or  no  rational  significance  should  be  
no  cause  for  alarm.    The  arguments  in  chapter  6  attempt  to  go  some  distance  towards  answering  
the  question:  Are  desires  rationally  significant?  




2     
DIRECTION  OF  FIT  





2.1.    Introduction     
The  Guise  of  the  Good  Theory  of  Desires  (GG  theory)  is  the  thesis  that  desires  aim  at  the  good.20  
According   to   the   version   of  GG   theory   that   derives   its   primary   inspiration   from   the  work   of  
Elizabeth  Anscombe,  the  claim  that  a  desire  aims  at  the  good  is  taken  to  entail  the  following  set  
of  claims:  
  
I. A  desire  aims  at  the  good  because  a  desire  represents  the  desired  outcome  as  good.  
  
II. A  desire  is  correct  only  if  the  desired  outcome  is  good  because  a  desire  aims  at  the  good.  
  
III. A  desire  has  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind  fit  because  the  world  is  incorrect  or  subject  to  revision  when  
there   is   a  mismatch   between   the  world   and  what   is   desired,   and   a   belief   has  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑
                                                
20 Philosophers who have held a view recognisably similar to GG theory include Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, 




world   fit   because   the   belief   is   incorrect   or   subject   to   revision  when   there   is   a  mismatch  
between  what  is  believed  and  the  world.      
  
IV. The  aim  of  a  desire  explains,  is  explained  by,  or  is  otherwise  linked  to  the  fact  that  it  has  
world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind  fit,  and  the  aim  of  a  belief  explains,  is  explained  by,  or  is  otherwise  linked  
to  the  fact  that  it  has  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world  fit.  
  
I  will  refer  to  the  conjunction  of  the  four  preceding  claims  as  Anscombean  GG  theory.    Much  of  
the   contemporary   interest   in  Anscombean  GG   theory   stems   from   the   fact   that   it   provides   us  
with  a   framework  for  making  sense  of  how  a  desire  may  provide  a  reason  for  bringing  about  
the  desired   outcome.21  According   to   (I),   a   desire   aims   at   the   good   in   virtue   of   the   fact   that   it  
represents   the  desired  action  as  good.22      In   cases   in  which  a  desire   represents  matters  as   they  
truly  are,  the  desire  puts  the  desiring  agent  in  touch  with  a  consideration  that  speaks  in  favour  
of  bringing  about  the  desired  outcome—namely,  the  fact  that  the  outcome  in  question  is  good.    
Hence,   a   desire   may   provide   the   desiring   agent   with   a   reason   to   bring   about   the   desired  
outcome.  
In  this  chapter,  I  will  be  offering  a  critique  of  Anscombean  GG  theory.    My  aim  will  be  
both  critical  and  constructive.    On  the  critical  side  of  things,  I  argue  that  (III)  is  an  unsatisfactory  
way  of  understanding  the  direction  of   fit  metaphor.     Moreover,   I  argue  that   there   is  a   tension  
                                                
21  See section 1.1 of the introduction of this dissertation for a clarification of what I mean by “providing reasons” in 
the present context. 
  
22  There are two different accounts of why desires entail representations of the good currently found in the literature: 
(i) because desires involve beliefs or judgements of the good (e.g., Price [1989]; Byrne and Hájek [1997]), or (ii) 




between   (I),   (III)   and   (IV).   On   the   constructive   side   of   things,   I   advance   an   alternative  
interpretation  of  the  direction  of  fit  metaphor  to  that  offered  by  Anscombe,  which  I  refer  to  as  
the   two-­‐‑content   interpretation.     One   advantage   that   the   two-­‐‑content   interpretation  has   over   the  
Anscombe   interpretation   is   that   the   former   provides   us  with   the   resources   necessary   to   hold  
that  two  attitudes  with  the  same  direction  of  fit  may  have  different  correctness  conditions.      
  
  
2.2.    The  Anscombe  Interpretation    
In  §32  of  Intention,  Anscombe  employs  an  example  comparing  a  shopping  list  and  a  detective'ʹs  
record  to  illustrate  two  different  ways  in  which  our  words  (written  or  spoken)  may  relate  to  the  
world.    She  writes:  
 
Let us consider a man going round a town with a shopping list in hand.  Now it is clear that 
the relation of this list to things he actually buys is one and the same whether his wife gave 
him the list or it is his own list; and that there is a different relation when a list is made by a 
detective following him about.  If he made the list itself, it was an expression of an 
intention; if his wife gave it to him, it has the role of an order.  What then is the identical 
relation to what happens, in the order and the intention, which is not shared by the record? 
It is precisely this: if the list and the things that the man actually buys do not agree, and if 
this and this alone constitutes a mistake, then the mistake is not in the list but in the man's 
performance...; whereas if the detective's record and what the man actually buys do not 
agree, then the mistake is in the record.23 
 
Let  us  refer  to  the  example  discussed  here  as  the  shopping  list  example.    Anscombe  notes  that,  in  
the   case   of   the   shopping   list,   the   task   is   to   get   the  world   (the   items  purchased)   to  match  our  
words  (the  shopping  list),  while  in  the  case  of  the  detective'ʹs  record,  the  task  is  to  get  the  word  
                                                





(the  detective'ʹs  record)  to  match  the  world  (the  items  purchased).    In  the  terminology  of  speech  
act  theorists,  the  former  is  an  example  of  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑word  fit,  and  the  latter  of  word-­‐‑to-­‐‑world  fit.24  
   Significantly,  Anscombe  sees  an   intention   (i.e.,   a   certain   type  of  attitude)  and  an  order  
(i.e.,  a  certain  type  of  speech  act)  as  standing  in  the  same  logical  relation  to  the  man'ʹs  actions.    
By  her  lights,  it  does  not  matter  if  we  see  the  shopping  list  as  an  expression  of  an  intention  (on  
the  part   of   the  man)   or   as   an  order   (on   the  part   of   his  wife);   in   either   case,   the   shopping   list  
displays  the  same  direction  of  fit.     Thus,  Anscombe  takes  the  observation  that  our  words  may  
relate  to  the  world  in  two  very  different  ways  as  also  applicable  to  attitudes.    This  idea  has  been  
taken   up   by   several   theorists   in   moral   psychology   and   the   philosophy   of   mind,   where   a  
distinction   is   often   drawn   between   attitudes   that   display  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world   fit   and   attitudes   that  
display  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind  fit.    Huw  Price  summarises  the  central  intuition  behind  the  direction  of  fit  
analysis  of  attitudes  as  follows:    
 
Beliefs have a 'mind-to-world' direction of fit; they aim at fitting the world, at being true.  
Desires, on the other hand have a 'world to mind' direction of fit; we aim to change the 
world to fit desires, and not vice versa.25   
 
The   standard   way   of   unpacking   the   direction   of   fit   metaphor,   which   builds   on   Anscombe’s  
shopping  list  example,  is  in  terms  of  whether  an  attitude  or  the  world  is  deemed  to  be  incorrect  
or  subject  to  revision  when  there  is  a  lack  of  correspondence  between  the  two.    According  to  this  
approach,  what  it  means  for  a  belief  to  have  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world  fit  is  that  the  belief  is  deemed  to  be  
incorrect   or   subject   to   revision   when   there   is   a   mismatch   between   the   world   and   what   is  
                                                
24 The expression “direction of fit” seems to have been first used John Searle, who employed it to describe the two 
different ways in which words may relate to the world, as highlighted by Anscombe (See: Searle [1985]). 




believed.  By  contrast,  what  it  means  for  a  desire  to  have  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind  fit   is  that  the  world  is  
deemed  to  be   incorrect  or  subject   to  revision  when  there   is  a  mismatch  between  that  which   is  
desired  and  the  world.    Call  this  the  Anscombe  interpretation.      
   Unfortunately,  the  Anscombe  interpretation  seems  to  conflate  the  claim  that  an  attitude  
has  a  certain  direction  of   fit  with   the  claim  that  an  attitude  has  certain  correctness  conditions.    
There   is   widespread   agreement   that   cognitive   attitudes   like   hypothesising   that  P,   supposing  
that   P,   and   pretending   that   P   have   the   same   direction   of   fit   as   believing   that   P.      All   four  
attitudes   represent   things   as   being   a   certain   way.   However,   while   believing   that   P   and  
hypothesising  that  P  are  plausibly  thought  of  as  incorrect  or  subject  to  revision  if  it  is  not  true  
that  P,  the  same  cannot  be  said  of  the  attitudes  of  supposing  and  pretending  that  P.    Although  
supposing   that   P   and   pretending   that   P   represent   things   as   being   a   certain   way,   neither   is  
necessarily  incorrect  or  subject  to  revision  if  P  is  false.    Consequently,  if  we  assume,  in  keeping  
with  the  Anscombe  interpretation,  that  an  attitude  has  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world  fit  only  if  it  is  incorrect  or  
subject  to  revision  when  there  is  a  mismatch  between  the  attitude  and  the  world,  then  we  seem  
forced  to  deny  that  supposing  and  pretending  have  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world  fit.         In  order  to  avoid  this  
difficulty,  there  may  be  a  temptation  to  weaken  the  notion  of  “incorrectness”  implicated  by  the  
Anscombe   interpretation  so   that   it   can  plausibly  be  applied   to   the  attitudes  of   supposing  and  
pretending.     However,   there  does   not   seem   to   be   any  plausible   sense   in  which  pretending   is  
incorrect  if  things  turn  out  to  be  different  from  how  they  are  pretended  to  be.    On  the  contrary,  





The   preceding   observation   suggests   a   possible   diagnosis   of   where   the   Anscombe  
interpretation  goes  wrong.    To  say  that  a  particular  attitude  has  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world  fit  is  not  yet  to  
say   anything   about  when   that   attitude   is   incorrect   or   subject   to   revision.     Whether   or   not   an  
attitude   is   incorrect  or   subject   to   revision   seems   tied   to   its   aim,   and  not   to   its  direction  of   fit.    
Hence,  a  belief   is  correct  only   if   the  proposition  believed  is   true  because  belief  aims  at   truth.26    
Since  the  attitude  of  pretending,  by  contrast,  does  not  aim  at  the  truth,  it  is  not  correct  only  if  the  
proposition  pretended   is   true.      In  order   to  avoid   this  difficulty,  we  need  to  make  sense  of   the  
direction  of  fit  metaphor  in  a  way  that  preserves  the  distinction  between  saying  that  an  attitude  
has   a   certain   aim   (and   consequently,   certain   correctness   conditions)   and   the   claim   that   an  
attitude   has   a   particular   direction   of   fit.      I   submit   that   the   Anscombe   interpretation   is  
unsatisfactory  because  it  falls  short  in  precisely  this  respect.    
Putting   aside   the   above   difficulty   with   the   Anscombe   interpretation,   there   is   an  
additional  problem  with  Anscombean  GG  theory  that  I  wish  to  highlight.  When  the  claim  that  a  
desire  represents   the  desired  action  as  good   is  combined  with   the  Anscombe   interpretation,   it  
seems   to   follow   that   a   desire   has   mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world   fit.      Recall,   according   to   Anscombean   GG  
theory,  a  desire   is  correct  only   if   the  desired  action   is  good.  This  suggests   that   it   is   the  desire,  
rather   than   the  world,   that   is   incorrect  or   subject   to   revision   if   the  desired  action   is  not  good.    
For  example,  suppose  I  desire  to  kick  a  puppy.     Suppose  further  that   it  would  not  be  good  to  
kick   a   puppy.      Under   such   circumstances,   we   certainly  would   not   wish   to   say   that   it   is   the  
world—that  is,  the  fact  that  it  would  not  be  good  to  kick  a  puppy—that  is  at  fault  and  should  be  
revised  to  suit  my  desire.    Rather,  it  is  my  desire  to  kick  a  puppy  that  should  be  revised,  given  
                                                





up,  or  be  left  unsatisfied.    If  this  is  right,  then  the  Anscombe  interpretation  entails  that  the  desire  
to  kick  a  puppy  has  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world  fit.      
From   the   point   of   view   of   the   Anscombean   GG   theory,   the   above   conclusion   is  
problematic   since   it   links   the   aim  of   a  desire   to   the   fact   that   it   has  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world   fit.     Recall,  
according   to   (I),   a   desire   aims   at   the   good   in   virtue   of   the   fact   that   it   represents   the   desired  
outcome  as  good.  Moreover,  we   just  observed   that  a  desire  has  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world   fit   in  virtue  of  
the  fact  that   it  represents  the  desired  outcome  as  good.     This  means  that  a  desire  both  aims  at  
the  good  and  has  the  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  it  represents  the  desired  outcome  
is  good.    Hence,  the  fact  that  a  desire  aims  at  the  good  is  connected  to  the  fact  that  it  has  mind-­‐‑
to-­‐‑world   fit—to  wit,   it   has   both   properties   in   virtue   of   the   fact   that   it   represents   the   desired  
outcome  as  good.  The  end  result  is  that,  contra  (IV),  the  aim  of  a  desire  is  linked  to  the  fact  that  
it   has   mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world   fit,   rather   than   to   the   fact   that   it   has   world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind   fit.   This   is   a   very  
surprising  and  unhappy  result.  One  would  have  expected  that  the  feature  in  virtue  of  which  a  
desire  aims  at  the  good  be  identified  with  or  closely  linked  to  the  feature  in  virtue  of  which  it  
has   a   different   direction   of   fit   to   belief.   This   is   precisely   the   view   to  which   (IV)   commits   the  
advocate  of  Anscombean  GG  theory.  But  if  the  present  objection  is  right,  the  feature  in  virtue  of  
which  a  desire  aims  at   the  good   turns  out   to  be  exactly   the  same   feature   in  virtue  of  which  a  
desire  has  the  same  direction  of  fit  as  belief;  namely,  the  fact  that  a  desire  represents  the  desired  







2.3.    The  Independence  Thesis       
The  preceding  analysis   calls   attention   to   two   shortcomings   in  Anscombean  GG   theory.      First,  
the   Anscombe   interpretation   of   the   direction   of   fit   metaphor   is   unable   to   accommodate   the  
intuition   that   attitudes   such   as   supposing   and   pretending   have   the   same   direction   of   fit   as  
belief.    Second,  when  the  Anscombe  interpretation  is  combined  with  (II),  it  does  not  only  have  
the  unhappy  consequence  that  a  desire  has  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world  fit,  but  also  that  it  has  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world  
fit  in  virtue  of  the  very  same  property  in  virtue  of  which  it  aims  at  the  good.  The  end  result  is  
that  the  claim  that  desires  aim  at  the  good  cannot  satisfy  the  requirements  of  (IV),  according  to  
which   the   aim  of   a  desire   is   linked   to   the   fact   that   it   has  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind   fit.      In   light   of   these  
difficulties   with   Anscombean   GG   theory—and   with   the   Anscombe   interpretation   of   the  
direction  of   fit  metaphor,   in  particular—I  wish   to  propose  an  alternative   interpretation  of   the  
notion  of  direction  of  fit,  one  that  (i)  preserves  the  intuition  that  the  aim  of  a  desire  is  something  
that  explains,  is  explained  by,  or  otherwise  linked  to  the  fact  that  it  has  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind  fit,  and  
(ii)  is  able  to  accommodate  the  intuition  that  attitudes  like  supposing  and  pretending  have  the  
same  direction  of  fit  as  belief.  To  this  end,  I  claim  that  attitudes  with  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world  fit  have  a  
different  type  of  content  (in  a  sense  soon  to  be  specified)  to  attitudes  with  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind  fit.    I  
will  refer  to  this  interpretation  of  the  direction-­‐‑of-­‐‑fit  metaphor  as  the  two-­‐‑content  interpretation.      
Before  we  embark  on  a  detailed  discussion  of   the   two-­‐‑content   interpretation,   it  will  be  
helpful  to  address  a  few  terminological  issues.  Typically,  an  assertion  is  defined  as  a  speech  act  
in  which  a  proposition   is   represented  as  being   true.27      It   is  widely  held   that  an  assertion  may  
                                                





share  the  same  propositional  content  as  an  attitude,  such  as  belief,  hope  or  doubt.    For  example,  
the  assertion  that  Goldbach’s  conjecture  is  true  has  the  same  propositional  content  as  the  belief  
that  Goldbach’s  conjecture   is   true.     Moreover,  an  agent  may  use   the  assertion  that  Goldbach’s  
conjecture   is   true   to   express   her   belief   that   Goldbach’s   conjecture   is   true.         I  will   refer   to   an  
assertion  that  expresses  a  belief  of  the  agent  making  the  assertion  as  a  sincere  assertion.    There  are  
cases  in  which  an  agent  makes  a  putative  assertion,  but  in  which  the  putative  assertion  does  not  
express  one  of  the  speaker’s  beliefs.    I  will  refer  to  such  putative  assertions  as  insincere  assertions.    
Significantly,  to  say  that  a  putative  assertion  is  insincere,  in  the  present  sense,  is  not  to  say  that  
it   is  somehow  infelicitous.     Whether  an  insincere  assertion  is   infelicitous  will  depend  on  other  
factors,  such  as   the  context  of  utterance.     For  example,   if  an   insincere  assertion   is  made   in   the  
context  of  a  theatrical  performance,  the  fact  that  it  does  not  express  a  belief  of  the  speaker  does  
not   immediately  render   the  assertion   infelicitous.     However,   in  a  context   in  which  an  agent   is  
asked   to   give   her   honest   opinion   on   a   matter,   it   would   be   infelicitous   for   her   to   make   an  
insincere  assertion.      
An   assertion  may   be   codified   in   a   sentence   (written,   spoken,   or   signed)   by  which   the  
asserted  proposition   is   conveyed.      I  will   refer   to  particular   tokens  of   such  written,   spoken,  or  
signed  sentences  as  utterances.    Two  or  more  different  utterances  may  be  used  to  assert  the  same  
proposition.    For  example,  the  utterances  “It  is  raining  today”  and  “Es  regnet  heute”  may  both  
be  used  to  assert  the  proposition  ‘it  is  raining  today’.    By  necessity,  I  will  be  employing  written  
sentences  to  express  the  various  propositions  discussed  in  this  paper.    However,  it  is  important  
to  keep  in  mind  that  these  written  sentences  will  be  merely  standing  proxy  for  the  propositions  




quotation   marks   to   indicate   when   I’m   talking   about   the   utterance   “It   is   raining   today”   and  
single  quotation  marks  to  indicate  that  I  am  referring  to  the  proposition  ‘it  is  raining  today’.  
   In   addition   to   assertoric   utterances,   there   are   also   non-­‐‑assertoric   utterances,   such   as  
questions   and   commands.      Assertions,   questions,   and   commands   differ   in   their   illocutionary  
force.28      However,   it   is   sometimes   assumed   that   utterances   with   different   illocutionary   force  
may  have  the  same  propositional  content.  For  example,  consider  the  following  three  utterances:  
     
   (A):   “The  office  door  is  shut.”  
   (B):     “Is  the  office  door  shut?”  
   (C):   “Shut  the  office  door!”      
  
It   is   sometimes   held   that   (A),   (B),   and   (C)   share   the   same   propositional   content;   namely,   the  
proposition:   'ʹthe   office  door   is   shut'ʹ.29      The  difference   between   the   three  utterances  has   to  do  
with   the   illocutionary   force   with   which   this   single   proposition   is   expressed,   with   the  
proposition  being  asserted  in  (A),  questioned  in  (B),  and  commanded  in  (C).    Since,  according  to  
                                                
28 See and Cf. Searle and Vanderveken [1985]. 
 
29 While this is not a view I endorse, it is nevertheless one that I wish to accommodate. However, it is worth noting 
that, among philosophers who specialise in the semantics of questions, the dominant view is that the content of a 
question is identical to or to be understood in terms of its answerhood conditions, where “answerhood conditions” is 
taken to refer to the set of all possible answers, true answers, partial answers, etc. According to this view, which we 
may refer to as Hamblin question-semantics, a question picks out a set of propositions, rather than a single 
proposition (see: Hamblin [1973] and Karttunen [1977]. For overview of the relevant literature, see: Groenendijk 
and Stokhof [1997], Higginbotham [1996], and Ginzburg [1996]).  Thus, many philosophers would reject the claim 
that (A) and (B) share the same propositional content.  Insofar as such philosophers are committed to saying that (A) 
and (B) have different types of content, I would consider them allies since, as will soon become clear, I wish to 
make a similar claim.  However, in order to make my account appealing to the widest possible audience, I will 
attempt to set things up in a way that is neutral between the assumption that (A) and (B) have the same propositional 
content and Hamblin question-semantics. Similarly, there is a growing number of theorists who reject the claim that 
(A) and (C) share the same propositional content (e.g., Chellas [1971], Vranas [2008; 2010], Warnock [1976], and 





this   view,   it   is   possible   to   vary   the   force   of   an   utterance   while   keeping   the   content   fixed,   it  
follows  that  content  and  force  are  independent  features  of  an  utterance.    I  will  refer  to  this  view  
as  the  independence  thesis.30        
  
2.4.    Motivating  Illocutionary  Content  
There   are   two   features   of   the  notion  of   content  presupposed  by   the   independence   thesis   that  
makes   it   less   than   ideal   for   our   present   purposes.   First,   the   independence   thesis   relies   on   a  
notion   of   content   that   leaves   the   logical   properties   of   an   utterance   underspecified.      This   is  
because   a   complete   characterisation   of   the   logical   properties   of   an   utterance—including   the  
specification   of   the   various   deductive   inferences   for   which   a   particular   utterance   may   be  
employed—is  at  least  partly  determined  by  the  sentence’s  illocutionary  force.  Recall,  according  
to   the   independence   thesis,   (A),   (B),   and   (C)   all   have   the   same   content:   the   proposition   ‘the  
office  door  is  shut’.    If  we  assume  that  this  content  is  sufficient  to  determine  the  logical  character  
of   all   three   utterances,   then   it   would   follow   that   (A),   (B),   and   (C)   should   be   logically  
interchangeable,  despite  their  contrasting  illocutionary  force.     But  this  does  not  seem  to  be  the  
case.  For  example,  the  following  is  a  valid  deductive  inference:  
  
   (A1):   “The  office  door  is  shut.”  
   (A2):   “If  the  office  door  is  shut,  then  Professor  Smith  is  away.”  
   (A3):   “Therefore,  Professor  Smith  is  away.”  
  
                                                




However,  neither  of  the  following  appears  to  be  a  valid  deductive  inference:  
  
   (B1):   “Is  the  office  door  shut?”  
   (B2):   “If  the  office  door  is  shut,  then  Professor  Smith  is  away.”  
   (B3):   “Therefore,  Professor  Smith  is  away.”  
and  
   (C1):   “Shut  the  office  door!”  
   (C2):   “If  the  office  door  is  shut,  then  Professor  Smith  is  away.”  
   (C3):   “Therefore,  Professor  Smith  is  away.”  
    
The  problem  with  (B1)-­‐‑(B3)  and  (C1)-­‐‑(C3)  is  that  in  both  cases,  the  initial  premise  fails  to  satisfy  
the  antecedent  of  the  conditional  specified  in  the  second  premise  ((B2)  and  (C2),  respectively).    
This  leaves  us  without  any  basis  for  inferring  the  consequent  of  the  conditional,  as  specified  in  
(B3)  and   (C3),   respectively.  Moreover,   the   failure  of   (B1)  and   (C1)   to   satisfy   the  antecedent  of  
(B2)  and   (C2)   is  directly  due   to   their   illocutionary   force.      (B1)  and   (C1)  both   fail   to   satisfy   the  
antecedent  of  (B2)  and  (C2)  precisely  because  they  fail  to  depict  the  proposition  ‘the  office  door  
is   shut’   as   true.      In   fact,   (B1)   and   (C1)   are   both   perfectly   consistent   with   the   falsity   of   the  
proposition  ‘the  office  door  is  shut’.  The  same,  of  course,  cannot  be  said  of  (A1),  which  is  clearly  
inconsistent   with   the   falsity   of   the   proposition   ‘the   office   door   is   shut’.      Thus,   although  
according   to   the   independence   thesis,   (A1),   (B1),   and   (C1)   share   the   same   content,   (A1)   is  
logically   inconsistent  with   the  negation  of   the  proposition   ‘the  office  door   is   shut’,  while   (B1)  




shut’.      Given   that   the   only   difference   between   (A1),   (B1),   and   (C1)   has   to   do   with   their  
illocutionary  force,  it  follows  that  illocutionary  force  makes  a  logical  difference.    The  end  result  
is  that  if  we  aspire  to  have  a  complete  characterisation  of  the  logical  properties  of  an  utterance,  
then  we  must  take  into  consideration  its  illocutionary  force.    
   The   notion   of   content   that   interests   me   in   the   present   investigation   is   one   that  
corresponds  with  a  complete  characterisation  of   the   logical  properties  of  an  utterance—to  wit,  
one  that  includes  illocutionary  force.  As  such,  I  will  not  be  presupposing  the  notion  of  content  
implicated  by  the  independence  thesis.    To  avoid  confusion,  and  in  order  to  emphasise  that  the  
notion   of   content   currently   at   play   is   one   that   includes   illocutionary   force,   I  will   employ   the  
expression   “illocutionary   content”   as   an   umbrella   term   for   the   notion   of   content   that  
corresponds   with   a   logically   complete   characterisation   of   (A),   (B),   and   (C).      There   are   three  
distinct   types   of   illocutionary   content   that   are   relevant   to   the   present   discussion:   indicative  
content  (e.g.,  ‘the  office  door  is  shut’),  interrogative  content  (e.g.,  ‘is  the  office  door  shut?’),  and  
imperative  content  (e.g.,  ‘shut  the  office  door!’).    According  to  the  present  view,  just  as  a  sincere  
assertion  expresses  the  attitude  of  believing,  so,  too,  does  a  sincere  question  express  the  attitude  
of   wondering   and   a   sincere   request   expresses   an   attitude   of   wanting.   Moreover,   just   as   an  
assertoric  utterance  may  be  used   to  convey   indicative  content,  an   interrogative  utterance  may  
be   used   to   convey   interrogative   content   and   an   imperative   utterance  may   be   used   to   convey  
imperative   content.     Hence,   the   illocutionary   content   of   an   utterance   or   attitude   corresponds  
with   that   which   distinguishes   a   case   of   believing   or   asserting   from   a   case   of   wondering   or  




   Having   such   a   notion   of   content   is   generally   important   because  we   assess   an   agent’s  
rational  standing  in  light  of  the  illocutionary  content  of  their  utterances  and  attitudes,  and  not  in  
terms  of   the  propositional   content  of   their  utterances   and  attitudes.      For   example,   if   an  agent  
believes   or   sincerely   asserts   that   the   office   door   is   shut,  we   take   them   to   have   or   express   an  
attitude   that   is   inconsistent  with   being   agnostic   about  whether   or   not   the   office  door   is   shut.    
Thus,  if  an  agent  were  to  adopt  both  an  attitude  of  belief  and  an  attitude  of  agnosticism  towards  
the  office  door  being  shut  (assuming  that  such  a  combination  of  doxastic  attitudes  is  possible),  
we   would   deem   them   guilty   of   irrationality.      However,   consider   the   case   of   an   agent   who  
wonders   if   the   office   door   is   shut.      Such   an   agent   has   an   attitude   that  may   be   expressed   by  
sincerely  asking  if  the  office  door  is  shut.    Unlike  the  agent  who  believes  or  sincerely  asserts  that  
the  office  door  is  shut,  the  agent  who  wonders  or  sincerely  asks  if  the  office  door  is  shut  has  or  
expresses   an   attitude   that   is   consistent  with   being   agnostic   about   the   office   door   being   shut.    
Such  an  agent  would  is  not  liable  to  rational  criticism  for  simultaneously  having  both  attitudes.    
However,  according  to  the  independence  thesis,  wondering  if  the  office  door  is  shut,  sincerely  
asking   if   the  office  door   is   shut,   believing   that   the  office  door   is   shut,   and   sincerely   asserting  
that  the  office  door  is  shut  all  have  the  same  propositional  content:  namely,  the  proposition  ‘the  
office  door  is  shut’.    Thus,  we  could  not  hope  to  evaluate  an  agent’s  rational  standing  by  simply  
considering  the  propositional  content  of  their  utterances  or  attitudes.    We  must  look,  instead,  to  
the  illocutionary  content  of  an  agent’s  utterances  and  attitudes.  
   The  notion  of  illocutionary  content  is  also  of  specific  importance  to  the  task  of  providing  
an   adequate   characterisation   of   the   differing   directions   of   fit   of   beliefs   and   desires.      If   we  




may  view  a  desire  as  akin  to  a  self-­‐‑issued  command  that  one  bring  about  some  outcome.     On  
this   view,   a   desire   has   the   same   illocutionary   content   as   an   imperative   utterance:   namely,  
imperative   content.      By   contrast,   a   belief,   as   we   have   already   observed,   has   the   same  
illocutionary   content   as   an   assertoric   utterance:   namely,   indicative   content.      In   order   for   an  
attempt  to  make  sense  of  the  direction  of  fit  metaphor  to  be  adequate,  it  must  not  only  account  
for  the  fact  that  beliefs  and  desires  have  different  directions  of  fit,  but  it  must  also  account  for  
the  fact  that  a  belief  has  the  same  direction  of  fit  as  the  attitudes  of  supposing  and  pretending.    
   With   respect   to   the   immediately   preceding   point,   I   believe   that   the   two-­‐‑content  
interpretation   is   superior   to   the   Anscombe   interpretation.      According   to   the   two-­‐‑content  
interpretation,   beliefs   have   the   same   direction   of   fit   as   the   attitudes   of   supposing   and  
pretending  because  all  three  have  indicative  content,  while  desires  have  the  same  direction  of  fit  
as  wishes  and  hopes  because  all  three  have  imperative  content.    Insofar  as  indicative  content  is  
truth-­‐‑evaluable,   the   present   view   entails   that   beliefs,   supposings,   and   pretendings   all   have  
truth-­‐‑evaluable  illocutionary  content.    However,  what  sets  the  attitude  of  belief  apart  from  the  
attitudes  of  supposing  and  pretending  is  that  a  belief  is  correct  only  if  its  illocutionary  content  is  
true.     This   is  what   it  means  to  say  that  belief  aims  at   truth.  On  the  present  account,  since   it   is  
possible  for  a  supposing  or  pretending  to  represent  matters  in  a  way  that  they  are  not,  it  is  also  
possible   for   their   illocutionary   content   to  be   false.     However,   it  does  not   follow   from   the   fact  
that   the   illocutionary   content   of   a   supposing   or   pretending   is   false   that   either   attitude   is  
incorrect  or  subject  to  revision.    This  is  what  it  means  to  say  that  supposing  and  pretending  do  
not   aim   at   truth.      Hence,   the   present   framework   is   able   to   preserve   the   distinction   between  




2.5.    Desires,  Wishes,  and  Wants  
The  truism  that  there  are  other  attitudes—such  as  hypothesising  or  pretending—that  share  the  
same   direction   of   fit   as   belief   is   often   overlooked   or   ignored.      However,   most   theorists,   if  
pressed,  would   agree   that   it   is   a   truism.      Likewise,   it   is   relatively   uncontroversial   that   other  
attitudes—such  as  wishing  or  wanting—share  the  same  direction  of  fit  as  desire.  However,  it  is  
not  obvious  that  there  is  a  sharp  distinction  between  our  quotidian  conception  of  a  desire  and  
our  quotidian  conception  of  a  want  or  wish.     In  fact,  there  are  contexts  in  which  the  terms  are  
treated  as   synonymous.  For  example,   saying   that  one  wants   to  visit  Spain,   that  one  wishes   to  
visit  Spain,  and  that  one  desires  to  visit  Spain  may  all  be  taken  to  express  the  same  attitude.      
   Nevertheless,  it  does  not  follow  from  the  fact  that  a  distinction  is  not  already  part  of  our  
pre-­‐‑theoretical  conception  that  there  is  no  distinction  to  be  made  or  worth  making.    In  order  to  
facilitate  greater  conceptual  clarity  and  ease  of  philosophical  analysis,   I  propose   the   following  
theoretical  operationalization  of   the  words  “want”,   “desire”  and  “wish”.      I  will  use   the  word  
“want”   (and   its   various   cognates)   as   a   generic   term   for   all   attitudes   with   world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind   fit.    
Attitudes  with  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind  fit  are  often  referred  to  as  conative  attitudes.    However,  this  label  
may   be   misleading   since   the   word   conative   literally   refers   to   motivational   or   volitional  
attitudes,  and  some  attitudes  with  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind  fit  are  not  properly  regarded  as  motivational  
or  volitional.  For  example,   if   I  want   it   stop  raining  or   I  want   the  West   Indies   team  to  win   the  
cricket  Test  Match,  I  have  an  attitude  with  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind  fit.    However,  these  attitudes  may  not  
motivate  me  to  act  or  change  my  behaviour  in  any  way.    Thus,  the  set  of  attitudes  picked  out  by  




“conative  attitude”.     For   this  reason,   I  will  use  the  word  “want”  as  opposed  to  the  expression  
“conative  attitude”  as  my  generic  term  for  all  attitudes  with  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind  fit.     
   I  will  use  the  label  “desire”  to  refer  to  cases  of  wanting  that  are  directed  at  outcomes  an  
agent   believes   she   can   bring   about   directly   via   the   deliberate   exercise   of   her   agency.31      I  will  
refer  to  any  outcome  an  agent  may  bring  about  directly  via  the  deliberate  exercise  of  her  agency  
as  doable.     Hence,  a  desire   is  a  case  of  wanting  in  which  the  outcome  wanted  is  believed  to  be  
doable.    According  to  the  present  stipulation,  one  may  desire  to  have  a  glass  of  wine  (assuming  
that  one  believes  that  having  a  glass  of  wine  is  an  outcome  one  may  bring  about  directly  via  the  
deliberate  exercise  of  one’s  agency),  but  one  may  not  desire  that  it  stop  raining  or  that  the  West  
Indies  cricket  team  win  the  Test  Match  (assuming  that  one  believes  that  stopping  the  rain  and  
making  the  West  Indies  cricket  team  win  are  not  outcomes  one  may  bring  about  directly  via  the  
deliberate   exercise  of  one’s   agency).  By   contrast,   I  will   be  using   the   label   “wish”   to   refer   to   a  
case   of  wanting   that   is   directed   at   an   outcome   that   an   agent   believes   she   cannot   bring   about  
directly  via  the  deliberate  exercise  of  her  agency.    According  to  the  present  stipulation,  an  agent  
may  wish  that  it  stop  raining  or  that  the  West  Indies  cricket  team  win  the  Test  Match,  but  she  
                                                
31 In this respect, my usage of the word “desire” loosely corresponds with that of Velleman [1992: 17].  However, 
while Velleman uses the word “desire” to refer to cases of wanting that are directed at outcomes an agent believes to 
be attainable (where “attainable” is defined as “a possible future outcome”), I use the word “desire” to pick out cases 
of wanting that are directed at outcomes an agent believes she can bring about directly via the deliberate exercise of 
her agency.  On my usage of the term, an agent who wants it to stop raining (but who believes that stopping the rain 
is not an outcome she can bring about) does not have a desire.  She has a wish.  By contrast, according to 
Velleman’s taxonomy, an agent who wants it to stop raining still counts as having a desire, so long as she believes 
that the rain stopping is a possible future outcome. Hence, although my way of distinguishing between desires and 
wishes is similar to Velleman’s, the two taxonomies carve up the space of attitudes with world-to-mind fit 




may  not  wish  to  have  a  glass  of  wine  (assuming  that  she  believes  that  having  a  glass  of  win  is  
an  outcome  she  may  bring  about  directly  via  the  deliberate  exercise  of  her  agency).32    
   With   the  preceding   terminological  distinction   in  place,  we  may  now   see   that   the   two-­‐‑
content   interpretation   allows   us   to   consistently   hold   that   desires   and   wishes   have   the   same  
direction  of  fit,  and  yet  deny  that  they  share  the  same  correctness  conditions.  To  this  end,  I  hold  
that  desires  and  wishes  both  have  imperative  content.    As  such,  it  follows  from  the  two-­‐‑content  
interpretation   that   they   have   the   same   direction   of   fit.      However,   I  maintain   that   a   desire   is  
correct  only  if  the  outcome  desired  is  one  the  agent  can  bring  about  directly  via  the  exercise  of  
her  own  agency.    In  short,  a  desire  is  correct  only  if  the  outcome  desired  is  doable.    For  example,  
suppose  that  it  is  not  doable  for  me  to  walk  across  the  River  Thames.    To  wit,  my  walking  across  
the   Thames   is   not   an   outcome   I   can   bring   about   directly   via   the   deliberate   exercise   of   my  
agency.    If  I  were  to  desire  to  walk  across  the  Thames  (a  desire  I  could  have  only  if  I  also  had  the  
false  belief   that  walking  across   the  Thames   is  doable),   then  my  desire  would  be   incorrect.  By  
contrast,  a  wish  may  be  correct  even  if  the  outcome  wished  for  is  not  doable.    For  example,  if  I  
wished  that  I  could  walk  across  the  Thames  (a  case  of  wanting  that  counts  as  a  wish  because  I  
had   the   true   belief   that   walking   across   the   Thames   is   not   doable),   then   my   wish   may   be  
nevertheless  correct.    Hence,  my  desire  and  my  wish  have  different  correctness  conditions  even  
though  they  have  the  same  direction  of  fit.    The  end  result  is  that  the  two-­‐‑content  interpretation  
allows  us  to  preserve  the  distinction  between  saying  that  two  attitudes  have  the  same  direction  
of  fit  and  saying  that  they  have  the  same  correctness  conditions.  
                                                
32 It bears repeating that the present terminological stipulation, while largely inspired by our quotidian usage of the 
words “desire” and “wish”, is not meant to exactly mirror said usage.  Rather, it aims to introduce a level of 





2.6.    Presuppositions  and  Illocutionary  Implications  
At  the  end  of  the  previous  section,  I  suggest  that  what  distinguishes  a  desire  from  a  wish  is  that  
the  former  is  correct  only  if  the  outcome  wanted  is  doable.    This  introduces  a  puzzle.  How  can  
we  consistently  affirm  that  a  desire  is  correct  only  if  the  desired  action  is  doable  and  yet  deny  
that   a   desire   represents   its   object   as   doable?      After   all,   if   one   were   to   hold   that   a   desire  
represents   its   object   as  doable,   then   there   is   an  obvious   and   intuitive   sense   in  which  a  desire  
gets  things  wrong  if  the  desired  action  is  not  doable.  Simply  put,  the  desire  represents  matters  
incorrectly.    However,  if  we  hold  that  a  desire  does  not  represent  its  object  as  doable,  then  we  
seem  to  be  left  with  no  basis  for  saying  that  a  desire  gets  things  wrong  if  the  desired  outcome  is  
not  doable.    If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  grant  that  a  desire  does  represent  the  desired  outcome  as  
doable,   then   we   seem   forced   to   conclude   that   desires   have   indicative   content   after   all.   My  
strategy  for  solving  this  puzzle  is  to  argue  that  a  desire  presupposes  (in  a  sense  to  be  specified  
momentarily)  that  its  object  is  doable,  and  may  therefore  be  described  as  correct  only  if  its  object  
is   doable.      This  will   allow  me   to   say   that   a   desire   is   correct   only   if   its   object   is   doable,   even  
though  a  desire  does  not  represent  its  object  as  doable.    
In   non-­‐‑technical   terms,   a   presupposition   is   defined   as   information   that   is   assumed   or  
taken   for   granted   by   an   individual   or   utterance.33      For   example,   suppose   I  were   to  make   the  
following  sincere  assertion:  
                                                
33 Describing a presupposition as an “assumption” is potentially controversial, if by “assumption” we mean the 
assumption of an agent.  Theories of presupposition may be divided into pragmatic and semantic.  According to the 
standard pragmatic theory, presuppositions are tied to the attitudes of a particular agent.  For example, according to 
Stalnaker [1974], an utterance presupposes a proposition because the speaker took the proposition for granted when 
she made the utterance. By contrast, according to the standard semantic theory, presuppositions are tied to sentences, 
rather than to the attitudes of an agent. For example, according to one interpretation of Strawson [1950], an utterance 






(E1):   “Usain  Bolt  has  won  the  100  meters  once  again.”  
  
In  so  doing,  I  may  plausibly  be  said  to  presuppose  that  the  following  propositions  are  true:  
  
(E2)   ‘There  is  a  (salient  and  identifiable)  Usain  Bolt.’    
(E3)   ‘There  is  a  (salient  and  identifiable)  100  meters.’  
(E4)   ‘Usain  Bolt  has  won  the  100  meters  at  least  once  before.’  
  
The  technical  notion  of  a  presupposition  that  I  wish  to  introduce  here  aims  to  mirror  the  results  
of   the  non-­‐‑technical  notion.  Thus,   I  wish   to  preserve   the   intuition   that   (E1)  presupposes   (E2),  
(E3),  and  (E4).     However,   the   technical  notion  derives  much  of   its   theoretical  motivation  from  
Frege’s   observation   “[t]hat   the   name   ‘Kepler’   denotes   something   is   just   as   much   a  
presupposition  for  the  assertion  ‘Kepler  died  in  misery’  as  for  the  contrary  assertion.”34    Within  
Frege’s  framework,  a  presupposition  is  conceived  of  as  a  definedness  condition,  a  requirement  
for   an   expression   to   have   a   truth-­‐‑value.      Strawson   takes   up   this   idea   by   defining   a  
presupposition  along  the  following  lines:  
  
                                                                                                                                                       
meaningful, or have a truth-value. The present use of the word “assume” is not an attempt to take a stand on this 
debate but is rather meant to convey the general significance of the quotidian usage of the word.  
 





Definition  2.1  (Strawsonian  Presupposition):  
Sentence  X  presupposes  sentence  Y  IFF  Y  is  true  whenever  X  is  true  or  false.35  
  
Significantly,   Strawson   is   primarily   concerned  with  when   one   sentence   presupposes   another.    
As   such,   he   is   interested   in   offering   a   semantic   theory   of   presuppositions.      I   do   not  wish   to  
impugn   either   the   need   for   or   the   prospects   of   having   a   successful   semantic   theory   of  
presuppositions.      However,   at   present,   I   am   interested   in   utterances   and   attitudes,   not  
sentences.  Consequently,   I  am  not   interested   in  offering  a  semantic   theory  of  presuppositions.    
Nonetheless,   I   wish   to   incorporate   the   central   intuition   behind   the   Frege-­‐‑Strawson   approach  
into  my  own  by  claiming  that   if   the  truth  of  a  certain  proposition  is  presupposed  (rather  than  
asserted)  by  an  utterance,  then  it  should  be  implied  (in  some  sense)  by  both  the  utterance  and  
its  negation.    
The   Frege-­‐‑Strawson   intuition   that   I   wish   to   incorporate   into   my   utterance-­‐‑oriented  
account   may   be   summarised   as   follows.      On   the   one   hand,   saying   that   an   utterance,   X, 
presupposes  some  proposition,  Y,  means  that  an  agent  who  utters  X  can  be  expected  to  believe  
Y.    This  suggests  that  if  Y  is  presupposed  by  X,  then  Y  should  be  implied  (in  some  sense)  by  X.    
On  the  other  hand,   insofar  as  a  presupposed  proposition   is  not  asserted  by  an  utterance,   then  
accepting  the  proposition(s)  asserted  by  an  utterance  should  not  be  a  prerequisite  for  accepting  
a   presupposed   proposition.   This   means   that   whatever   property   of   an   utterance   in   virtue   of  
which   it   implies   a   presupposed   proposition   should   be   equally   effective   in   giving   rise   to   the  
relevant   implication   even   if   one  were   to   reject   all   the   propositions   that   the   utterance   asserts.    
                                                





Thus,   the   implication   should   also   hold   if   one   were   to   make   an   utterance   that   was   like   the  
original   utterance   in   every   respect   except   that   all   of   the   propositions   asserted   in   the   original  
utterance   were   now   denied.      Otherwise   one   would   be   justified   in   concluding   that   the  
proposition  was  a  member  of  the  set  of  propositions  asserted  by  the  original  utterance,  in  which  
case  it  would  fail  to  qualify  as  a  presupposed  proposition.  The  end  result  is  that  Y  may  be  said  
to  be  presupposed  by  X  if  and  only  if  X  implies  Y  and  ¬X  implies  Y.  I  will  refer  to  this  technical  
conception  of  a  presupposition  as  an  agential  presupposition.36  
It   is   important   to   get   clear   on   the  notion  of   implication   at  play   in   the   current   context.    
Specifically,  classic  semantic  entailment  seems  ill  suited  for  our  present  purposes.    Firstly,  if  we  
model  the  present  notion  of  an  “implication”  on  classic  semantic  entailment,   then  X  implies  Y  
just   in   case   it   is   impossible   for   X   to   be   true   and   Y   to   be   false.      However,   since   I   will   be  
considering   utterances   and   attitudes   that   are   not   truth-­‐‑evaluable   (or,   to   be   more   precise,  
utterances  and  attitudes  whose  illocutionary  content  is  not  truth-­‐‑evaluable),  the  classic  notion  of  
semantic  entailment  will  not  do  for  present  purposes.     Secondly,  according  to  classic  semantic  
entailment,  if  X  implies  Y  and  ¬X  implies  Y,  then  it  follows  that  Y  is  a  tautology.    This  is  a  very  
unhappy  result  since  it  would  follow  from  our  definition  of  an  agential  presupposition  that  all  
                                                
36 Survival under negation is widely regarded as the most important diagnostic test of a presupposition.  A 
presupposition that passes the negation-embedding test is said to be “projected” under negation-embedding.  
However, projection under negation-embedding is typically seen as falling short of a necessary condition for 
something to count as a presupposition because there are circumstances in which presuppositions fail to project. 
Indeed, attempting to explain why presuppositions sometimes fail to project is one of the central problems in 
presupposition theory. The notion of presupposition presently on offer departs from the standard picture since it 
takes passing the negation-embedding test to be both necessary and sufficient for a proposition to be presupposed by 
an utterance or attitude.  This is largely due to the fact that the current technical account of a presupposition does not 
exploit the notion of “projection” that exercises so much of presupposition theory.  I believe I am allowed to get 
away with this because I am presently concerned with the presuppositions of an agent, as indicated by her utterances 
and attitudes, rather than with the presuppositions of a sentence. Consequently, the problem of projection failure 
simply fails to arise in the present context. It is also worth noting that, because agential presuppositions are 
concerned with utterances and attitudes, it bears a number of similarities to Stalnaker’s pragmatic conception of a 
presupposition (Stalnaker [1972; 1973; 1974; 1998]). See and Cf. Bas van Fraassen [1968]. For an excellent 




presuppositions  are  tautologies.      In  order  to  avoid  the  above  difficulties,   I  wish  to  appeal   to  a  
notion  of   implication  that   is  both  broader  and  weaker  than  classic  semantic  entailment.      I  will  
refer  to  this  notion  of  implication  as  an  illocutionary  implication  (i-­‐‑implication),  which  I  define  
as  follows:  
  
Definition  2.2  (Illocutionary  Implication):  
X  i-­‐‑implies  Y  IFF  an  utterance  of  X  indicates  that  the  speaker  believes  Y.37  
  
Illocutionary  implication  is  broader  than  classic  semantic  entailment  since  it  has  application  not  
only   to   utterances   with   truth-­‐‑conditions   (i.e.,   ones   with   indicative   content),   but   also   to  
utterances  with  doability-­‐‑conditions  (i.e.,  ones  with  imperative  content).    It  is  also  weaker  than  
the   classic   semantic   entailment   since   it   does   not   track   what   propositions   are   entailed   by   an  
utterance,  but  what  an  utterance  indicates  that  a  speaker  believes.38  With  the  broader  notion  of  
an  i-­‐‑implication  in  hand,  we  may  now  define  an  agential  presupposition  as  follows:    
  
Definition  2.3  (Agential  Presupposition):  
X  presupposes  Y  IFF  X  i-­‐‑implies  Y  and  ¬X  i-­‐‑implies  Y.  
  
                                                
37 See and Cf. Beaver [2001: 15]. 
 
38 The notion of an utterance indicating what the speaker means is here deliberately left vague in order to remain as 
ecumenical as possible. The reader is therefore free to unpack the notion in terms of her preferred theoretical 
account. I believe it would be particularly fruitful to consider the present account of a presupposition in light of 
Stalnaker’s notion of a pragmatic presupposition.  However, I will not attempt to do that here since it would take us 
too far afield from our present concerns.  For a discussion of Stalnaker’s pragmatic conception, see: Stalnaker [1972, 
1973, 1974, 1998].  Like Stalnaker’s notion of a pragmatic presupposition, my notion of an agential presupposition 




Definition  2.3  provides  us  with  a  diagnostic   test   for  determining   if   a  particular  proposition   is  
agentially  presupposed  by  an  utterance.    On  the  current  view,  X  presupposes  Y  just  in  case  X  i-­‐‑
implies  Y  and  there  is  some  Z  such  that  Z  is  formed  by  embedding  X  under  a  negation  operator,  
and  Z  i-­‐‑implies  Y.    Hence,  we  may  determine  if  a  proposition  that  is  i-­‐‑implied  by  an  utterance  is  
agentially   presupposed   by   that   utterance   by   first   embedding   the   illocutionary   content   of   the  
utterance   under   a   negation   operator,   and   then   checking   to   see   if   the   i-­‐‑implication   still   holds.    
Call  this  the  negation-­‐‑embedding  test.  For  example,  if  we  embed  (E1)  under  the  negation  operator  
we  arrive  at  (E1*):  
  
   (E1*)   “Usain  Bolt  has  not  won  the  100  meters  once  again.”    
     
According  to  the  negation-­‐‑embedding  test,  if  (E2)-­‐‑(E4)  are  i-­‐‑implied  by  both  (E1)  and  (E1*),  then  
(E2)-­‐‑(E4)  are  agentially  presupposed  by  (E1).    An  examination  of  (E1)  and  (E1*)  reveals  that  both  
i-­‐‑imply  (E2)-­‐‑(E4).     That  is  to  say,  an  utterance  of  (E1),  as  well  as  an  utterance  of  (E1*),  indicate  
that  the  speaker  believes  the  propositions  (E2),  (E3),  and  (E4).    Consequently,  (E2),  (E3),  and  (E4)  
all  pass   the  negation-­‐‑embedding   test.      It   follows   that   (E2)-­‐‑(E4)  are  agential  presuppositions  of  
(E1).  Contrast  this  with  the  proposition  (E5):  
  





It  is  clear  that  (E1*)  does  not  i-­‐‑imply  (E5),  since  an  utterance  of  (E1*)  would  not  indicate  that  the  
speaker  believes  (E5).    Consequently,  (E5)  fails  the  negation-­‐‑embedding  test;  it  is  not  an  agential  
presupposition  of  (E1).    
 
2.7.    Desires,  the  Doable,  and  the  Good  
Let  us  now  return  to   the  question  of  how  a  desire  may  be  correct  only   if   the  desired  action   is  
doable   even   though   a   desire   does   not   represent   its   object   as   doable.      The   first   step   towards  
solving   this   puzzle   is   to   register   that   imperative   utterances   also   have   presuppositions.   For  
example,  consider  the  following  imperative  utterance:    
  
   (F1):   “Shut  the  office  door!”  
  
(F1)  has  the  following  putative  presuppositions:  
  
   (F2):   ‘There  is  an  (salient  and  identifiable)  office  door.’  
(F3):   ‘The  office  door  is  open.’  
  
It  should  be  obvious  that  an  utterance  of  (F1)  indicates  that  the  speaker  believes  (F2)  and  (F3).  
We  may   therefore   conclude   that   (F1)   i-­‐‑implies   (F2)   and   (F3).     However,   it   is  not   immediately  
clear   that   (F1)   is  a   candidate   for   the  negation-­‐‑embedding   test.     After  all,   I  have  been   insisting  
that  imperative  content  is  not  truth-­‐‑evaluable.    How  then  are  we  to  characterise  the  negation  of  




negation  of,  for  instance,  a  command  to  ϕ  in  terms  of  a  command  to  refrain  from  ϕ-­‐‑ing.    Hence,  
we  may  form  the  negation  of  (F1)  by  embedding  it  under  a  “do  not”  operator,  in  order  to  form  
(F1*):  
  
   (F1*):   “Do  not  shut  the  office  door!”  
  
We  may  now  ask   if   (F1*)   i-­‐‑implies   (F2)   and   (F3).      That   is   to   say,  would   an  utterance  of   (F1*)  
indicate   that   the   speaker   believes   (F2)   and   (F3)?      Since   it   would   be   pointless   to   command  
someone  not  to  shut  the  office  door  if  there  were  no  (salient  and  identifiable)  office  door  and  if  
the  office  door  were  not  open,  an  utterance  of  (F1*)  does  indicate  that  the  speaker  believes  (F2)  
and   (F3).      Consequently,   (F2)   and   (F3)   both   pass   the   negation-­‐‑embedding   test   for   imperative  
utterances,  and  are  therefore  agential  presuppositions  of  (F1).      
   With   the   just   introduced   theoretical   apparatus   for   determining   the   agential  
presuppositions  of  an   imperative  utterance  now  in  hand,  we  may  ask   if   the  command  to  shut  
the  office  door  agentially  presupposes  that  shutting  the  office  door  is  doable.    In  response  to  this  
question,  I  submit  that  the  set  of  propositions  that  must  be  true  in  order  for  shutting  the  office  
door   to  be  doable   is   always  a   subset  of   the   set  of  propositions  agentially  presupposed  by   the  
command  to  shut  the  office  door.     Or,  to  put  the  same  point  more  generally  and  in  terms  of  a  
conditional,   if   a   certain   proposition  must   be   true   in   order   for   an   imperative   utterance   to   be  
doable,  then  that  imperative  utterance  agentially  presupposes  that  proposition.  Let  Y  stand  for  a  
proposition,   X   stand   for   an   imperative   utterance,   and   ¬X   stand   for   the   imperative   utterance  




always  agentially  presupposes  a  proposition  that  must  be  true  in  order  for  the  imperative  to  be  
doable  may  be  demonstrated  by  the  following  argument:  
  
(1) If  Y  must  be  true  for  X  to  be  doable,  then  X  i-­‐‑implies  Y.  (Premise  defended  below)  
  
(2) If  Y  must  be  true  for  X  to  be  doable,  then  ¬X  i-­‐‑implies  Y.  (Premise  defended  below)  
  
(3) If  Y  must  be  true  for  X  to  be  doable,  then  X  i-­‐‑implies  Y  and  ¬X  i-­‐‑implies  Y.  (From  (1)  and  (2))  
  
(4) If  X  i-­‐‑implies  Y  and  ¬X  i-­‐‑implies  Y,  then  X  agentially  presupposes  Y.  (From  Definition  2.3)    
  
(5) If  Y  must  be  true  for  X  to  be  doable,  then  X  agentially  presupposes  Y.  (From  (3)  and  (4))  
  
Premise  (1)  rests  on  the  intuition  that  it  would  be  pointless  to  command  someone  to  perform  an  
action  they  could  not  perform.    As  such,  a  sincere  imperative  utterance  would  indicate  that  the  
speaker  believes  that  the  imperative  is  doable.    Since  A  i-­‐‑implies  B  just  in  case  an  utterance  of  A  
would  indicate  that  the  speaker  believed  B,  a  sincere  imperative  utterance  always  i-­‐‑implies  that  
the   imperative   is   doable.   Premise   (2)   rests   on   the   intuition   that   it   would   be   pointless   to  
command   someone   to   refrain   from   performing   an   action   that   they   could   not   perform.      For  
example,  it  would  be  pointless  to  issue  the  command,  “Do  not  shut  the  office  door!”  if  it  was  not  
possible   to   shut   the   office   door.   If   this   intuition   is   right,   then   ¬X   always   i-­‐‑implies   those  




follow  from  (1),  (2),  and  the  definition  of  an  agential  presupposition,  as  specified  in  (4).    We  may  
therefore  conclude  that  the  set  of  propositions  that  must  be  true  for  an  imperative  utterance  to  
be  doable  is  always  as  subset  of  the  set  of  propositions  that  are  agentially  presupposed  by  that  
imperative  utterance.39  
Let   us   conclude   the   present   section   by   considering   the   question   of   whether   a   desire  
agentially  presupposes  that  the  desired  action  is  good.    If  the  GG  theorist  is  going  to  claim  that,  
for  example,  the  command  to  shut  the  office  door  agentially  presupposes  that  shutting  the  office  
door  is  good,  then  she  will  need  to  show  that  (F4),  or  some  comparable  proposition,  passes  the  
negation-­‐‑embedding  test  for  (F1):      
  
   (F4):   It  is  good  to  shut  the  office  door.  
  
However,  in  order  to  pass  the  negation-­‐‑embedding  test  for  (F1),  (F4)  must  be  i-­‐‑implied  by  both  
(F1)  and  (F1*).      
  
   (F1):   “Shut  the  office  door!”  
   (F1*):   “Do  not  shut  the  office  door!”  
                                                
39 It is worth noting that the claim that a desire (or more accurately, its illocutionary content) agentially presupposes 
that the outcome desired is doable is not the counterpart to (nor is it offered as a substitute for) the GG theorist’s 
claim that desire aims at the good.  According to the GG theorist, desire aims at the good in roughly the sense that 
belief aims at the truth.  The GG theorist therefore relies on an analogy between desire and belief or between the 
practical and the theoretical.  By contrast, I am committed to no such analogy.  On the contrary, one of the goals of 
this dissertation will be to argue that the practical and theoretical spheres are disanalogous in ways that problematize 
the heavy reliance on analogies of which the GG theorist is guilty.  Moreover, this allows me to sidestep the worry 
that the doable does not (and could not) play the same role for desire that truth plays for belief.  Even if this were 
true, this would not count, in the least, against my claim that a desire agentially presupposes that the desired 
outcome is doable.  My claim that a desire agentially presupposes that the desired outcome is doable is based on the 
fact that the doable passes the negation embedding test, not on an alleged analogy between desire and belief.  Thus, 





But   this   is   clearly   not   the   case.      Even   if   a   sincere   utterance   of   (F1)   indicates   that   the   speaker  
believes  (F4)—a  claim  that  strikes  me  as  dubious—a  sincere  utterance  of  (F1*)  certainly  does  not  
indicate   that   the   speaker   believes   (F4).      Therefore,   it   follows   from   the   definition   of   an   i-­‐‑
implication  that  (F1*)  does  not  i-­‐‑imply  (F4).    (F4)  therefore  fails  the  negation-­‐‑embedding  test  for  
(F1).  
   The   preceding   results   fits   hand   in   glove   with   my   characterisation   of   a   desire   as   an  
instance  of  wanting   in  which   the  outcome  wanted   is  believed   to  be  doable.     According   to   the  
presupposition   analysis,   a   desire   is   correct   only   if   the   outcome  desired   is   doable   because   the  
imperative   that   constitutes   its   illocutionary   content   indicates   that   the   person  with   the   desire  
believes  that  it  is  doable.    This  comports  with  my  stipulation  that  a  desire  only  counts  as  such  if  
the  outcome  desired   is  believed  to  be  doable.      It   immediately   follows  from  my  definition  of  a  
desire  that  desiring  to  bring  about  P  always  implicates  the  belief  that  P   is  doable,  and  the  fact  
that  an  agent  has  a  desire  may  safely  be  taken  to  indicate  that  the  agent  believes  P  to  be  doable.    
It  also  immediately  follows  from  my  definition  of  a  desire  that  the  illocutionary  content  of  the  
desire   to  bring  about  P   i-­‐‑implies   that  P   is  doable.  Given  my  characterisation  of   the  aim  of  an  
attitude  as  a   condition  whose  satisfaction   is  necessary   for   the  attitude   to  be  correct,   it   follows  
that  the  aim  of  a  desire  (i.e.,  the  doable)  is  intimately  connected  both  to  what  makes  a  desire  a  
desire  (i.e.,  the  fact  that  a  want  only  counts  as  a  desire  if  the  outcome  wanted  is  believed  to  be  
doable)   and   to   that   in   virtue   of  which   a  desire   has  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind   fit   (i.e.,   the   fact   that   it   has  
imperative  content).    However,  it  bears  repeating  that  there  remains  a  gap  between  saying  that  




conditions)  and  saying  that  it  is  correct  only  if  it  is  doable  (which  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  it  
aims  at  the  doable),  just  as  there  is  a  gap  between  saying  that  an  attitude  has  indicative  content  
(which  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  it  has  truth  conditions)  and  saying  that  it  is  correct  only  if  is  
true   (which   is   equivalent   to   saying   that   it   aims   at   the   truth).         Thus,   according   the   view  
presently   on   offer,   the   distinction   between   the   aim   and   direction   of   fit   of   an   attitude   is  
preserved.  
  
2.8.    Conclusion  
In   this   chapter,   I   have   set   out   to   accomplish   two   things.      First,   to   show   that   the   two-­‐‑content  
interpretation   is   superior   to   the  Anscombe   interpretation  because   it   allows  us   to  preserve   the  
distinction  between  saying   that  an  attitude  has  a  certain  direction  of   fit  and  saying   that   it  has  
certain  correctness  conditions.  According  to   the  two-­‐‑content   interpretation,  desires  and  beliefs  
have   different   directions   of   fit   because   they   have   different   kinds   of   illocutionary   content:  
indicative   content   in   the   case   of   the   former,   and   imperative   content   in   the   case   of   the   latter.    
However,  a  belief  is  correct  only  if  it  is  true,  not  because  it  has  indicative  content,  but  because  it  
aims   at   the   truth.   Consequently,   the   two-­‐‑content   interpretation   preserves   the   distinction  
between  saying  that,  for  example,  a  belief  has  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world  fit  and  saying  that  a  belief  aims  at  
the  truth.    Second,  I  have  attempted  to  provide  both  a  theoretical  framework  for  making  sense  
of  how  an  attitude  that  lacks  indicative  content  could  nevertheless  have  correctness-­‐‑conditions.  
Third,  I  have  offered  a  diagnostic  test  for  determining  the  correctness  conditions  of  an  attitude  




Moreover,   we   have   observed   that   when   the   negation-­‐‑embedding   test   is   applied   to   both   the  
doable  and  the  good,  only  the  former  passes  the  test.    




3     
DESIRE  AS    
BELIEF  OR  PERCEPTION  




3.1.    Introduction  
Anscombe  posits  that  “truth  is  the  object  of  judgement,  and  good  the  object  of  ‘wanting’”.40    In  
this  chapter,  I  will  consider  the  two  most  common  strategies  for  unpacking  Anscombe’s  thesis.    
They  are   the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis,   the  claim   that   the  desire   to  bring  about  P   is  an   instance  of  
believing  that  it   is  good  to  bring  about  P,  and  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Thesis,   the  claim  that  the  
desire  to  bring  about  P  is  an  instance  of  perceiving  that  it  is  good  to  bring  about  P.    What  both  
of   these   approaches   have   in   common   is   that   they  posit   that   desiring   to   bring   about  P   entails  
representing   it   as   good   to   bring   about   P.   One   putative   objection   to   the   Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief   and  
Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Theses   is   that  a  desire  cannot  be  a  kind  of  belief  or  perception  because  a  
desire   has   a   different   direction   of   fit   to   a   belief   and  perceptual   appearance.  However,   in   this  
chapter,   I   argue   that   the   two   most   widely   discussed   interpretations   of   the   direction-­‐‑of-­‐‑fit  
metaphor—that  of  Anscombe  and  Michael  Smith,  respectively—are  actually  consistent  with  the  
Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  or  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Theses.    I  claim  that  this  is  symptomatic  of  the  fact  that  
                                                




these  interpretations  fail  to  get  at  the  key  intuition  that  the  direction  of  fit  metaphor  is  meant  to  
capture—namely,   that   the   attitude   of   desire   displays   a   different   logical   structure   to   that   of  
belief.     The   two-­‐‑content   interpretation   (introduced   in  chapter  2)   is  presented  as  an  attempt   to  
take  this  intuition  seriously.    Unlike  the  Anscombe  and  Smith  interpretations,  it  entails  that  both  
the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief   and  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception   Theses   are   false.   If   successful,   the   arguments   in  
this  chapter  will  establish  that  the  two-­‐‑content  interpretation  is  superior  to  the  those  offered  by  
Anscombe   and   Smith,   not   only   because   it   is   immune   to   the   problems   (highlighted   in   this  
dissertation)   that   plague   these   competing   interpretations,   but   also   because   it   comes   closer   to  
capturing  the  central  intuition  motivating  the  direction  of  fit  analysis.    Moreover,  since  the  two-­‐‑
content  interpretation  entails  the  falsity  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  and  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Thesis,  
the  arguments  in  this  chapter  also  attempt  to  establish  that  both  are  at  odds  with  the  direction  
of  fit  analysis  when  it  is  correctly  understood.    
  
3.2.  The  (Broadly)  Anscombean  View  
I  wish   to  begin,   in   the  present   section,  by  clarifying  what   I   refer   to  as   the  Broadly  Anscombean  
View:  the  thesis  that  the  good  is  the  object  of  desire  in  a  sense  roughly  analogous  to  how  truth  is  
the  object  of  belief.      I  suggest  that  while   it   is  a  view  that  Anscombe  herself  does  not  explicitly  





When  Anscombe   claims   that   “truth   is   the  object   of   judgement,   and  good   the  object   of  
‘wanting’”,  her  use  of   the  word   'ʹwant'ʹ   (as  opposed  to  the  word   'ʹdesire'ʹ)   is  not  accidental.     She  
actually  has  something  significantly  different  from  our  ordinary  conception  of  a  desire  in  mind:    
  
‘Wanting’ may of course be applied to the prick of desire at the thought or sight of an 
object, even though a man then does nothing towards getting the object. . . . The wanting 
that interests us, however, is neither wishing nor hoping nor feeling nor desire, and cannot 
be said to exist in a man who does nothing towards getting what he wants. (Italics mine)41  
  
Anscombe'ʹs  claim  that  wanting,  as  she  understands  the  term,  does  not  apply  to  an  agent  who  
does   nothing   towards   getting  what   he  wants,   suggests   that   her   notion   of  wanting  may   have  
more   in  common  with  an   intention   than  with  a  desire,  as   the   term   is  ordinarily  understood.42    
According   to   the   pre-­‐‑philosophical   conception   of   a   desire,   one   may   desire   to   bring   about   P  
without  intending  to  bring  about  P  or  doing  anything  to  bring  it  about  that  P.     For  example,  I  
may  desire  to  purchase  a  flat  screen  television  and  yet  fail  to  act  on  my  desire  because  I  believe  
that   purchasing   a   flat   screen   television   is   outside   my   budget.43      Thus,   our   pre-­‐‑philosophical  
conception   of   a   desire   does   not   require   that   the   desiring   agent   take   steps   to   bring   about   the  
desired  outcome  in  order  to  count  as  desiring  it.      
                                                
41 Anscombe [2000: 67-68]. 
 
42 As will soon become clear, Anscombe’s notion of wanting also differs from my usage of the term in chapter 2, 
section 2.5. 
 
43 In at least this respect, the pre-philosophical conception of a desire seems closer to Davidson's notion of a pro-
attitude than to Anscombe's notion of wanting, since the latter requires that the agent takes steps towards getting 
what she wants while the former does not.  By Davidson's lights, one may have two conflicting pro-attitudes and yet 
only act upon one of them.  This suggests that one may have a pro-attitude towards some X even though one has 
taken no steps towards bringing about X. Moreover, on the Davidsonian account, the pro-attitude one fails to act on 
may still count as something one desired to do.  However, by Anscombe's lights, the pro-attitude one fails to act on, 




   A  significant  feature  of  our  pre-­‐‑philosophical  conception  of  a  desire  is  that  it  is  possible  
to  have  a  pair  of  desires  that  one  recognises  to  be  mutually  exclusive—such  that  acting  on  one  
desire  precludes  acting  on  the  other—without  being  liable  to  rational  criticism.  For  example,   I  
may  desire   to   leave  work  early   (because   I  have  a  headache)  and   I  may  also  desire   to  work   late  
(because  I  hope  to  secure  a  promotion),  where  these  represent  mutually  exclusive  desires  (i.e.,  
acting  on  the  first  precludes  the  possibility  of  acting  on  the  second,  and  vice  versa).    Of  course,  I  
am   liable   to   rational   criticism   if   I   intend   to  both   leave  work   early   and   leave  work   late,  while  
recognising  that  these  are  mutually  exclusive  intentions.    However,  merely  having  inconsistent  
desires   does   not   make   one   liable   to   rational   criticism.   By   contrast,   if   we   buy   into   the  
Anscombean   view   that   wanting   already   involves   an   intention   to   bring   about   the   desired  
outcome,   then  my  wanting   to   both   leave  work   early   and   leave  work   late   already  makes  me  
liable  to  rational  criticism.    Thus,  Anscombe’s  notion  of  wanting  has  very  different  implications  
for  when  an  agent  is  liable  to  rational  criticism  than  does  our  pre-­‐‑philosophical  conception  of  a  
desire.  Moreover,   on   the  Anscombean   view,   it   does   not  make   sense   to   say   I  wanted   to   leave  
work  early  (because  I  have  a  headache)  and  that  I  also  wanted  to  work  late  (because  I  hoped  to  
secure  a  promotion),  if  I  ultimately  decide  to  work  late  rather  than  leave  work  early.    Given  that  
I  never  acted  on  my  desire   to   leave  work  early,   it   follows   that   (by  Anscombe'ʹs   lights)   I  never  
really  wanted  to  leave  work  early.44      
   The  preceding  considerations  suggest  that  Anscombe'ʹs  notion  of  wanting  is  closer  to  our  
ordinary  conception  of  an  intention  than  our  ordinary  conception  of  a  desire.    But  if  this  is  right,  
                                                
44 Furthermore, the conception of desire that I am interested in allows for the possibility that I may continue to want 
to bring about P even after I have adopted some incompatible intention. For example, we can imagine that my 





one   may   very   well   wonder   why   Anscombe   did   not   just   say   that   the   good   is   the   object   of  
intention,   instead   of   saying   that   the   good   is   the   object   of   wanting.      This   question   seems  
particularly  perplexing  since  it  is  not  clear  what  attitude  Anscombe  could  be  referring  to  other  
than  an  intention.    One  suggestion  is  that  Anscombe  actually  has  in  mind  a  subset  of  intentions;  
namely,   intentions   that   are   formed   in   response   to   a   desire.      On   the   present   suggestion,  
Anscombe  uses  the  word  “wanting”  to  describe  a  hybrid  state,  one  that  entails  the  presence  of  
both  a  desire  to  bring  about  P  and  an  intention  to  bring  about  P.     Arguably,  only  some  of  our  
intentions   are   formed   in   response   to   a  desire.      For   example,   suppose   I   adopt   the   intention   to  
bring  about  P  not  because  I  desire  to  bring  about  P,  but  because  I  believe  it  is  my  duty  to  bring  
about  P.  In  such  a  case,  it  would  hardly  seem  appropriate  to  say  that  I  wanted  to  bring  about  P.  
If   this   is   right,   then   by   restricting   herself   to   cases   in  which   an   agent  wants   to   bring   about  P,  
Anscombe   ipso   facto   restricts  herself   to   intentions   that  are   formed  in  response   to  a  desire.  One  
motivation   for   such   a   restriction   is   that   it   allows   her   to   zero   in   on   desires   that   an   agent   acts  
upon.    This  would  be  an  attractive  move  if  one  thought  that  the  desires  an  agent  acts  upon  are  
importantly  different  from  the  desires  that  an  agent  has  not  yet  acted  upon  or  fails  to  act  upon.    
For  example,  one  may  think  that  an  agent  is  rationally  or  morally  criticisable  for  the  former  in  
ways   in  which   one   is   not   rationally   or  morally   criticisable   for   the   latter,   and   that   the   former  
therefore  deserve  special  consideration.      
   My   aim,   here,   is   not   to   argue   that   Anscombe’s   conception   of   wanting   ought   to   be  
rejected  because  if   fails  to  correspond  with  our  pre-­‐‑philosophical  conception,  nor  is   it   to  insist  
that  the  pre-­‐‑philosophical  conception  of  a  desire  is  somehow  preferable  to  Anscombe'ʹs  notion  of  




Anscombe’s   notion   of   wanting.   Rather,   it   is   to   register   that   there   are   important   differences  
between  the  two  conceptions.    However,  among  those  who  advocate  a  guise  of  the  good  theory  
of   desires,   this   difference   often   seems   to   go   unrecognised.      For   example,   Stampe   [1987],  
Tenenbaum  [2003],  and  Setiya   [2007]  all   take  some  version  of  Anscombe'ʹs  claim  that  “good   is  
the  object  of  wanting”  to  apply  to  desires  that  fall  short  of  being  intended.45    This  is  suggested  
by   the   fact   that   such   thinkers   typically   assume   that  Anscombe'ʹs   claim   applies   to   the   kind   of  
desires  at  play  in  cases  of  weakness  of  the  will.    
   On  the  standard  description  of  weakness  of  the  will—e.g.,  that  found  in  the  discussions  
of  Donald  Davidson—the  weak-­‐‑willed  agent  has  two  conflicting  or  mutually  exclusive  desires,  
only  one  of  which  corresponds  with  her  all-­‐‑things-­‐‑considered  judgement.    Moreover,  the  weak-­‐‑
willed   agent   ultimately   acts   on   the   desire   that   is   at   odds   with   her   all   things   considered  
judgement.    For  example,  consider  the  case  in  which  an  agent,  Chen,  who  has  the  desire  to  have  
a   slice  of   chocolate   cake  and  a  desire   to   stick   to  his  diet.     However,  only  one  of  his  desires—
namely,  his  desire   to   stick   to  his  diet—corresponds  with  what  he   judges   to  be  best,   all   things  
considered.    On  the  standard  conception,  should  Chen  decide  to  have  the  slice  of  chocolate  cake  
anyway,  he  would  be  guilty  of  weakness  of  the  will.    But  if  we  assume  that  the  kind  of  desire  at  
play   in   cases  of  weakness  of   the  will   entails   taking   steps   to  bring  about   the  desired  outcome,  
then  it  follows  that  Chen  never  really  had  conflicting  desires.     On  the  contrary,  the  desire  that  
corresponds   with   his   all   things   considered   judgement—viz.,   the   desire   to   stick   to   his   diet—
would  not  count  as  a  desire  at  all.    This  suggests  that,  unlike  Anscombe'ʹs  notion  of  wanting,  the  
conception  of  desires  typically  assumed  to  be  in  play  in  discussions  of  weakness  of  the  will   is  
                                                




one   that   does   not   require   that   the   agent   take   steps   to   bring   about   the   desired   outcome.    
Moreover,  given  that  most  GG  theorists  are  interested  in  the  conception  of  desire  that  they  take  
to  be  involved  in  cases  of  weakness  of  the  will—i.e.,  cases  in  which  an  agent  finds  herself  with  
conflicting   desires—it   follows   that   they   are   not   interested   in   the   conception   of   wanting   that  
requires   that   the   agent   take   steps   towards   getting   what   she   wants—i.e.,   the   conception   of  
wanting  that  we  find  in  Anscombe.  
While   I   stand   behind   the   reading   of   Anscombe   just   adumbrated—one   that   sees  
Anscombe'ʹs  notion  of  wanting  as  different   from  the  notion  of  desire   typically  presupposed   in  
discussions   of   weakness   of   the   will—this   dissertation   is   primarily   concerned   with   the  
conception  of  desire   that   features   in   the   standard  discussions  of  weakness  of  will,   and  which  
roughly  corresponds  with  our  pre-­‐‑philosophical  conception.    I  wish  to  explore  the  possibility  of  
extending   Anscombe'ʹs   analysis   of   wanting   to   the   conception   of   desire   that   features   in  
discussions   of  weakness   of   the  will   and   that   roughly   corresponds  with   our  pre-­‐‑philosophical  
conception—i.e.,  a  conception  of  desire  that  does  not  require  that  the  agent  take  steps  towards  
getting  what   she   desires.  However,   I  will   flag   the   fact   that   I   do   not  wish   to   attribute   such   a  
position  to  Anscombe  herself  by  referring  to  the  thesis  that  the  good  is  the  object  of  desire  (in  
the   non-­‐‑intention-­‐‑involving   sense)   as   the   Broadly   Anscombean   View.         While   not   a   view   that  
Anscombe  herself  advocates   (at   least   in  print),   the  Broadly  Anscombean  View  draws   its   chief  







3.3.  The  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis  
The  most  widely  discussed  way  of  unpacking  the  Broadly  Anscombean  view  is  in  terms  of  the  
Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis.    John  Collins  defines  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis  as  “the  thesis  that  desire  
is  a  particular  kind  of  belief—that  to  desire  A  is  simply  to  believe  that  A  would  be  good.”46    We  
may  distinguish  between  weak  and  strong  versions  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis;  the  claim  that  
some   desires   are   beliefs   and   the   claim   that   all   desires   are   beliefs,   respectively.      But   this  
distinction,  while  significant  in  its  own  right,  will  have  little  bearing  on  the  present  discussion.    
This  is  because  we  are  only  concerned  with  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis  as  a  means  of  unpacking  
the  Broadly  Anscombean  View;  namely,   the  claim  that  the  good  is   the  object  of  desire.     When  
we  unpack  the  Broadly  Anscombean  View  in  terms  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis,  we  arrive  at  
the  claim  that  desiring  to  bring  about  P  is  an  instance  of  believing  that  it  is  good  to  bring  about  
P.    Now,  according  to  the  weak  version  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis,  only  some  desires  to  bring  
about  P  are  instances  of  believing  that  it  is  good  to  bring  about  P.    However,  on  those  occasions  
in  which  the  desire  to  bring  about  P  is  not  an  instance  of  believing  that  it  is  good  to  bring  about  
P,  the  desire  in  question  does  not  have  the  good  as  its  object.    Therefore,  the  central  claim  of  the  
Broadly  Anscombean  View  does  not  apply  to  such  desires.    Hence,  insofar  as  we  are  interested  
in  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis  as  a  means  of  unpacking  the  Broadly  Anscombean  View,  we  are  
only   concerned   with   those   cases   in   which   a   desire   may   be   said   to   be   a   type   of   belief.    
                                                
46 Collins [1988] impugns the Desire-as-Belief Thesis on the grounds that it is incompatible with non-quantitative 
decision theory, and David Lewis [1988] argues that the desire-as-belief thesis is incompatible with formal theories 
of Bayesian decision and belief revision. For replies to the objections of Collins and Lewis, along with a defence of 




Consequently,   the   distinction   between   the   weak   and   strong   versions   of   the   Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  
Thesis  is  superfluous  in  the  context  of  the  present  discussion.47        
   In  his  paper,  “Defending  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief”,  Huw  Price  highlights  two  motivations  for  the  
desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑belief   thesis;   a   rejection   of   the   Humean   theory   of   desire   and   a   defence   of   Anti-­‐‑
Emotivism  in  moral  discourse.    He  writes:  
  
In modern terminology the Humean view is thus that action is a joint product of an agent's 
beliefs and desires; and that these are distinct kinds of mental states, desires being 
distinguished from beliefs in virtue of their motivational role. . . . In recent years, however, 
several philosophers have questioned the Humean orthodoxy.  They suggest that certain 
beliefs might be intrinsically motivational—in effect, in other words, that some or all 
desires might themselves be beliefs. . . . An attractive feature of the suggestion that (some) 
desires might be beliefs has been its evident potential to undermine emotivist accounts of 
moral discourse (and so to enable ethical statements to be brought within the scope of a 
truth-conditional general semantics).48   
  
According   to   Price,   the   Humean   view   amounts   to   the   thesis   that   desires   are   intrinsically  
motivational   while   beliefs   are   not.      Moreover,   Price   construes   emotivist   accounts   of   moral  
discourse  as  entailing  the  denial  of  the  claim  that  ethical  statements  display  a  truth-­‐‑conditional  
semantics.    I  will  refer  to  the  rejection  of  the  Humean  view  as  Anti-­‐‑Humeanism,  and  the  rejection  
of  emotivist  accounts  as  Anti-­‐‑Emotivism.      
   Although,   in   the   passage   just   cited,   Price   associates   the   Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief   Thesis   with  
Anti-­‐‑Humeanism  and  Anti-­‐‑Emotivism,  it  is  worth  emphasising  that  the  denial  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑
Belief  Thesis  is  consistent  with  both.    It  is  common  ground  between  the  Humean  and  the  Anti-­‐‑
                                                
47 Cf. Lewis [1988: 325]. 
 




Humean  that  desires  are  intrinsically  motivating.49    However,  the  Humean  denies,  and  the  Anti-­‐‑
Humean  affirms,   that   some  beliefs   are   also   intrinsically  motivating.  But  one  may   consistently  
subscribe  to  the  claim  that  some  beliefs  are  intrinsically  motivating  and  yet  deny  that  desires  are  
beliefs.     For  example,  suppose  one  held  that  being  intrinsically  motivational  is  a  necessary  but  
insufficient  condition  for  an  attitude  to  be  a  desire.50    Then  one  may  also  consistently  hold  that  
desires  are  distinct  attitudes  from  beliefs  (thereby  denying  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis)  and  that  
some  beliefs  are   intrinsically  motivational   (thereby  affirming  Anti-­‐‑Humeanism).     Moreover,   if  
we  identify  the  content  of  moral  discourse  with  the  content  of  an  intrinsically  motivating  belief  
(rather  than  with  the  content  of  a  desire),   then  we  may  consistently  hold  that  moral  discourse  
displays  a  truth-­‐‑conditional  semantics  and  that  the  content  of  desire  does  not.    (One  only  needs  
to  add   the   further  assumption   that   the   content  of   an   intrinsically  motivating  belief  displays  a  
truth-­‐‑conditional  semantics.)     Hence,   if  we  reject  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis,   it  does  not  follow  
from  this  rejection  that  either  Anti-­‐‑Humeanism  or  Anti-­‐‑Emotivism  is  false.  
   The   preceding   observations   draw   attention   to   an   important   feature   of   Price'ʹs   account.    
Price   associates   the   claim   that   “certain   beliefs   might   be   intrinsically   motivational”   with   the  
claim  that  “some  or  all  desires  might  themselves  be  beliefs”,  either  equating  the  two  claims  or  
taking  the  second  to  be  entailed  by  the  first.    However,  the  equivalence  or  entailment  only  holds  
if  we  assume  that  being  motivational   is  a  sufficient  condition  for  an  attitude  to  be  a  desire.   In  
brief,  Price  assumes  that  only  desires  are  intrinsically  motivational.    However,  it  seems  like  both  
                                                
49 Strictly speaking, it would be more accurate to say that some desires are motivating, since there may be some 
desires, such as the desire that it rain tomorrow, that are not intrinsically motivating. However, since we are only 
concerned with the desire to bring about P, we will not be concerned with such desires. 
 
50 Recall, the present usage of the word “desire” is meant to exclude “helpless desires”, understood as desires that 




the   Humean   and   the   Anti-­‐‑Humean   alike   are   well   within   their   rights   in   rejecting   this  
assumption.   For   example,   both   the   Humean   and   the   Anti-­‐‑Humean   may   hold   that   certain  
emotions,   like   love  and  hatred,  are   intrinsically  motivational.     However,   it   is  not   immediately  
clear,  nor   is   it  a   fundamental  assumption  of  either  Humeanism  or  Anti-­‐‑Humeanism,  that   love  
and  hate  are  desires.    I  do  not  wish  to  either  endorse  or  impugn  the  claims  that  some  emotions  
are   intrinsically   motivational,   or   that   emotions   are   not   desires.      I   merely   wish   to   stress   that  
neither   claim   is   inconsistent  with  either  Humeanism  or  Anti-­‐‑Humeanism.51     The  end   result   is  
that  both  the  Humean  and  Anti-­‐‑Humean  may  reject  the  claim  that  only  desires  are  intrinsically  
motivating.    If  this  suggestion  is  right,  then  it  is  best  to  see  Humeanism  as  being  committed,  not  
to  the  thesis  that  desires  are  the  only  attitudes  that  are  intrinsically  motivational,  but  rather  to  
the   claim   that   beliefs   are  not   among   those   attitudes   that   are.      The  Anti-­‐‑Humean,   by   contrast,  
wants   to   insist   that   at   least   some   beliefs   (perhaps,   beliefs   about   the   good   or   about  what   one  
should  do)  are  included  among  the  set  of  attitudes  that  are  intrinsically  motivational.    But  once  
it  is  acknowledge  that  the  set  of  intrinsically  motivational  attitudes  is  not  limited  to  desires,  then  
(as   far  as  Anti-­‐‑Humeanism   is  concerned)   there   is  no  need   to   insist   that  desires  are  beliefs.      In  
light  of  the  preceding  considerations,  it  should  not  be  assumed  that  the  rejection  of  the  Desire-­‐‑
as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis  is  necessarily  motivated  by  Humeanism  or  that  the  acceptance  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑
Belief  Thesis  is  necessarily  motivated  by  Anti-­‐‑Humeanism.52      
  
                                                
51 Hume himself typically speaks about the “passions”, a label that includes, but is by no means limited to, desires.  
See A. J. Kenny [1963], esp. chapters 4 and 5. 
 
52 Price is not alone in associating the Desire-as-Belief Thesis with Humeanism.  David Lewis [1988, 1996] does so 




3.4.  The  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Thesis  
Another  common  strategy  for  unpacking  the  Broadly  Anscombean  View  is  by  appealing  to  the  
thesis  that  desires  are  a  type  of  perception.     According  to  this  view,  which  we  may  refer  to  as  
the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Thesis,   to  desire   to  bring  about  P   is   to  perceive   that   it   is  good   to  bring  
about  P.     One  putative  advantage  of   the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Thesis  over   the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  
Thesis  is  that  it  is  able  to  preserve  the  intuition  that  one  may  have  desires  that  one  knows  to  be  
inconsistent   without   being   guilty   of   irrationality.      This   is   because,   unlike   beliefs,   one   may  
knowingly  have  inconsistent  perceptual  appearances  without  being  liable  to  rational  criticism.    
For   example,   an   agent  may  visually   perceive   that   a   partially   submerged   stick,  X,   is   bent   and  
tactilely  perceive  that  X  is  straight  (where  the  agent  in  question  recognises  that  these  represent  
inconsistent  perceptions)  without  being  liable  to  rational  criticism.  We  may  explain  this  fact  by  
registering  that  perceiving  that  P  does  not  entail  that  one  is  rationally  committed  to  the  truth  of  
P.53  Hence,   if   desires   are   a   type   of   perception,   then   it   does   not   follow   from   the   fact   that   one  
desires  to  bring  about  P  that  one  is  rationally  committed  to  the  goodness  of  bringing  about  P.  
The  above  point  should  not  be  taken  to  suggest  that  the  advocate  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  
Thesis  is  left  without  any  resources  for  explaining  why  having  conflicting  desires  does  not  make  
one  guilty  of   irrationality.     For  example,  the  defender  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis  may  claim  
that  a  desire  is  an  instance  of  believing  that  it  is  good  to  bring  about  P  from  a  certain  perspective  
or  relative  to  a  certain  set  of  considerations.    Since,  one  may  consistently  believe  that  it  is  good  
to  bring  about  P  relative  a  perspective  or  set  of  considerations,  A,  and  believe  that  it  is  not  good  
to  bring  about  P  relative  to  another  perspective  or  set  of  considerations,  B,  the  defender  of  the  
                                                




Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief   Thesis   may   claim   that   conflicting   desires   are   not   actually   inconsistent   (in   a  
rationally   significant   sense)   since   they   are   always   relative   to   a   certain   perspective   or   set   of  
considerations.    This  argument  may  be  used  to  explain  why  having  conflicting  desires  does  not  
make   one   liable   to   rational   criticism.      However,   this   line   of   reply   saves   one   intuition   (the  
intuition   that   one   may   have   conflicting   desires   without   being   guilty   of   irrationality)   by  
sacrificing  another  (the  intuition  that  one  may  have  genuinely  inconsistent  desires).    The  Desire-­‐‑
as-­‐‑Perception   Thesis,   by   contrast,   is   able   to   preserve   both   intuitions.      Which   of   the   two  
explanations   one   finds  most   satisfying  will   partly   depend   on  whether   or   not   one   thinks   the  
intuition  that  there  may  be  genuinely  inconsistent  desires  is  worth  preserving.  
   We   may   include,   under   the   umbrella   of   the   Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception   Thesis,   the   account  
defended  by  Sergio  Tenenbaum,  who  argues   that  desires  are  appearances  of   the  good   from  a  
certain   perspective.54      However,   it   is   important   to   register   that   the   claim   that   desires   are  
appearances  (or  perceptions)  of  the  good  from  a  certain  perspective  differs  from  the  claim  that  
desiring   to   bring   about   P   entails   the   belief   that   it   is   good   to   bring   about   P   from   a   certain  
perspective,  since  the  latter  is  a  claim  about  the  content  of  the  desire,  while  the  former  is  a  claim  
about   the   mode   of   presentation   that   a   desire   embodies.      For   example,   if   we   say   that   my  
perception  that  a  partially  submerged  stick  is  bent  represents  a  certain  perspective,  we  are  not  
saying   that   the   content   of   my   visual   experience   is   that   ‘the   stick   is   bent   from   a   visual  
                                                
54 Strictly speaking, Tenenbaum's [1999] claim that desires are appearances of the good does not entail that desires 
are a type of perception.  For example, Tenenbaum often draws an analogy between desires and non-perceptual 
appearances, such as when an invalid inference appears valid because the agent is in the grip of a fallacious thought 
process.  For example, it may non-perceptually appear that the next coin-flip will land head-side-up to an agent who 
is in the grip of the gambler’s fallacy and who has witnessed the coin land tail-side-up ten times in a row.  It would 
therefore be more accurate to say that Tenenbaum is committed to a Desire-as-Appearance Thesis than a Desire-as-





perspective’.    The  relevant  content  is  simply  that  ‘the  stick  is  bent’.    And  if  the  agent  felt  that  the  
stick  was  straight  with  her  hands,  then  the  content  of  her  tactile  experience  would  be  that  ‘the  
stick  is  straight’,  not  that  ‘the  stick  is  straight  from  a  tactile  perspective’.    In  other  words,  it  is  not  
part  of   the   content  of   the  perceptual   appearance   that  what   is  perceived   is   true   from  a   certain  
perspective.      Rather,   the   thing   to   say   is   that   the   perceptual   appearance   itself   instantiates   a  
particular  perspective.      
   The   end   result   is   that  when   the   advocate   of   the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception   Thesis   says   that  
desires  are  perspectival,  she  is  saying  something,  not  about  the  content  of  the  desire,  but  about  
the  mode  under  which   that   content   is   entertained.      She   is,   in   effect,   registering   that   there   are  
alternative   perceptual  modes  under  which   that   very   same   content  may   be   entertained.      Each  
perceptual   mode   is   on   par   with   the   other   in   the   sense   that   none   of   them   involve   rational  
commitments.    By  contrast,  when  the  advocate  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis  says  that  a  desire  is  
perspectival,  she  is  saying  something  about  the  content  of  the  desire.    Moreover,  the  advocate  of  
the   Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief   Thesis   remains   committed   to   the   claim   that   desires   involve   rational  
commitments.      Hence,   the   crucial   difference   between   the   Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief   and   Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑
Perception   Theses   is   that   the   former   (but   not   the   latter)   entails   that   desires   involve   rational  
commitments.    
     
3.5.    The  Anscombe  Interpretation  
How  are  we  to  make  sense  of  the  claim  that  a  desire  is  a  type  of  belief  or  perception  in  light  of  
the   direction   of   fit   analysis?      I   believe   that,   properly   understood,   the   direction   of   fit   analysis  




inspection,  the  two  most  widely  discussed  interpretations  of  the  direction  of  fit  metaphor—the  
interpretations  due  to  Elizabeth  Anscombe  and  Michael  Smith—turn  out  to  be  consistent  with  
either   the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  or  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Thesis.   I   take   this   to  be   symptomatic  of   the  
fact   that   neither   interpretation   succeeds   in   getting   to   the   heart   of   the   matter   as   far   as   the  
direction  of  fit  analysis  is  concerned.    
As  we  noted  in  chapter  2,  section  2.2,  the  most  common  way  of  unpacking  the  direction-­‐‑
of-­‐‑fit   metaphor—what   I   refer   to   as   the   Anscombe   interpretation—is   in   terms   of   whether   the  
attitude   or   the  world   is   deemed   to   be   at   fault   or   subject   to   revision  when   there   is   a   lack   of  
correspondence  between  the  two.     On  this  view,  what  it  means  for  a  belief  to  have  a  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑
world  fit  is  that  the  belief  is  deemed  to  be  at  fault  (and  therefore  subject  to  revision)  when  there  
is  a  mismatch  between  the  world  and  what  is  believed.        By  contrast,  what  it  means  for  a  desire  
to  have  a  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind  fit   is  that  the  world  is  deemed  to  be  at  fault  (and  therefore  subject  to  
revision)  when  there  is  a  mismatch  between  what  is  desired  and  the  world.     
   Contra  initial  appearances,  the  Anscombe  interpretation  of  the  direction  of  fit  metaphor  
is  perfectly  consistent  with  both  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  and  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Theses.  There  can  
be   little  doubt   that   the  Anscombe   interpretation  entails   that   the  desire   to  bring  about  P   is  not  
identical  to  the  belief  that  P  (or  the  belief  that  one  has,  is,  or  will  bring  about  P).    For  example,  if  
I  believe  that  I  am  having  wine  with  dinner  when  I  am  in  fact  not  having  wine  with  dinner,  then  
(according   to   the  Anscombe   interpretation)  my  belief   is  at   fault;   it   is  my  belief   that   should  be  
changed  to  suit  the  world,  rather  than  the  other  way  around.    By  contrast,  if  I  desire  that  I  have  
wine   with   dinner   when   I   am   in   fact   not   having   wine   with   dinner,   then   (according   to   the  




changed  to  suit  my  desire,  rather  than  the  other  way  around.    The  end  result  is  that  my  desire  to  
have  wine  with  dinner   cannot  be   identical  with  my  belief   that   I   am  having  wine  with  dinner  
since  the  two  states  have  different  success  and  revision  conditions.      
   However,  what   remains  unestablished   is   that   the  Anscombe   interpretation  entails   that  
the   desire   to   bring   about   P   is   not   an   instance   of   believing   that   it   is   good   to   bring   about   P.    
Moreover,  upon  closer   inspection,   this   turns  out   to  be  the  salient  question  when  assessing  the  
consistency   of   the  Anscombe   interpretation   and   the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief   and  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  
Theses.    The  first  step  to  seeing  that  this  is  so  is  to  register  that  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis  does  
not  entail  that  the  desire  to  bring  about  P   is  an  instance  of  believing  that  P  (or  believing  that  I  
have  brought  about  P,  am  bringing  about  P,  or  will  bring  about  P).    For  example,  according  to  
the  advocate  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis,  my  desire  to  have  a  glass  of  wine  with  dinner  is  not  
an  instance  of  believing  that  I  am  having  (or  will  have)  a  glass  of  wine  with  dinner.    Rather,  it  is  
an   instance   of   believing   that   my   having   a   glass   of   wine   with   dinner   is   good.      The   salient  
question,   then,   is   not   whether   my   desire   to   have   wine   with   dinner   is   at   fault   or   subject   to  
revision  when  I  do  not  have  wine  with  dinner.  It  is  whether  my  desire  to  have  wine  with  dinner  
is  at  fault  or  subject  to  revision  when  my  having  a  glass  of  wine  with  dinner  is  not  good.    Since  
the  advocate  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis  is  committed  to  saying  that  the  desire  to  have  wine  
with   dinner   is   an   instance   of   believing   that   having   wine   with   dinner   is   good,   she   is   also  
committed   to  saying   that   the  desire   to  have  wine  with  dinner   is  at   fault  or  subject   to  revision  
when   it   is   not   good   to   have  wine  with   dinner.      But   this   is   certainly   not   a  mark   against   the  
Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis.     On   the   contrary,   this   is   just   the   sort   of   result  we  would   expect   if   the  




mean   to   say   that   a   desire   is   somehow  defective,   gets   things  wrong,   or   is   subject   to   revision,  
when  the  desired  outcome  is  not  good.    What  we  do  not  want  to  say  is  that  the  world  is  at  fault  
or  subject  to  revision  when  an  agent  desires  something  that  is  not  good.  The  end  result  is  that,  
insofar   as   we   are   committed   to   the   claim   that   desire   aims   at   the   good,   the   Anscombe  
interpretation  forces  us  to  also  hold  that  the  desire  to  bring  about  P  has  the  same  direction  of  fit  
as   the   belief   that   it   is   good   to   bring   about  P.      Consequently,   the  Anscombe   interpretation   is  
consistent  with   the   claim   that   the  desire   to  bring  about  P   is   an   instance  of  believing   that   it   is  
good  to  bring  about  P.    The  same  line  of  argument,  mutatis  mutandis,  may  be  used  to  argue  that  
the  Anscombe  interpretation  is  consistent  with  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Thesis.  
The   Anscombe   interpretation   lacks   the   resources   to   establish   that   the   desire   to   bring  
about  P  is  not  an  instance  of  believing  or  perceiving  that  it  is  good  to  bring  about  P  because  of  
its   exclusive   focus   on  when   a   belief   or   desire   is   deemed   to   be   at   fault   or   subject   to   revision.    
Insofar  as  the  GG  theorist  is  committed  to  the  claim  that  the  good  is  the  object  of  desire,  she  is  
committed  to  saying  that  a  desire   is   faulty  or  subject   to  revision  when  the  desired  outcome  is  
not  good.    However,  this  makes  the  conditions  under  which  the  desire  to  bring  about  P  is  faulty  
or  subject  to  revision  the  same  as  the  conditions  under  which  the  belief  that  it  is  good  to  bring  
about  P  is  faulty  or  subject  to  revision.    Since  differences  in  when  a  pair  of  attitudes  are  faulty  or  
subject  to  revision  are  the  only  tools  available  to  the  Anscombean  interpretation  for  saying  that  
they  have  different  directions  of  fit,  it  follows  that  any  two  attitudes  with  the  same  correctness  






3.6.    The  Smith  Interpretation     
An   alternative   interpretation   of   the   direction   of   fit   metaphor   is   that   of   Michael   Smith,   who  
suggests  that  we  unpack  the  metaphor  in  terms  of  a  dispositional  account  of  desire  and  belief:  
 
[A] dispositional conception of desires enables us to cash the metaphor characterising 
beliefs and desires in terms of their direction of fit . . . . [T]he difference between beliefs 
and desires in terms of direction of fit comes down to a difference between the 
counterfactual dependence of a belief and a desire that P, on a perception that not P: 
roughly, a belief that P is a state that tends to go out of existence in the presence of a 
perception that not P, whereas a desire that P is a state that tends to endure, disposing the 
subject in the state to bring it about that P.  Thus, we may say, attributions of beliefs and 
desires require that different kinds of counterfactuals are true of the subject to whom they 
are attributed.  We may say that this is what a difference in their direction of fit is.55 
 
Smith  points  out  that,  given  the  above  characterisation,  it  is  impossible  for  the  same  attitude  to  
have  both  directions  of  fit.     After  all,   this  would  require  that  the  attitude  in  question  have  the  
tendency   to  both  go  out  of  existence   in  presence  of  a  perception   that  not  P  and  endure   in   the  
presence   of   a   perception   that   not  P.56   Consequently,   Smith   concludes   that   desires   and   beliefs  
must  be  distinct  attitudes.    Let  us  refer  to  Smith'ʹs  unpacking  of  direction  of  fit  metaphor  as  the  
Smith  interpretation.  
   Unlike   the   Anscombe   interpretation,   the   Smith   interpretation   clearly   entails   that   the  
Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  Thesis  is  false.  However,  it  is  less  clear  that  it  entails  the  falsity  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑
Perception   Thesis.   Recall,   according   to   the   Smith   interpretation,   desires   and   beliefs   have  
different   directions   of   fit   since   the   latter   tends   to   go   out   of   existence   in   the   presence   of   a  
perception   that   ¬P,  while   the   former   tends   to   persist   in   the   presence   of   a   perception   that   ¬P.    
                                                
55 Smith [1987: 54]. 
 




However,   on   this   score,   a   perceptual   appearance   seems   to   be  more   like   a   desire   than   like   a  
belief.      Consider   once   again   the   case   in  which   I   visually   perceive   that   a   partially   submerged  
stick   is   bent   and   tactilely   perceive   that   it   is   straight.      Since  my   visual   experience   of   the   stick  
being  bent  tends  to  persist  in  the  presence  of  my  tactile  perception  of  it  being  straight,  it  seems  
to   follow   from   Smith’s   analysis   that   my   visual   experience   has   the   same   direction   of   fit   as   a  
desire  rather  than  a  belief.  Since  the  Smith  interpretation  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  claim  
that  desires  and  perceptual  appearances  have  the  same  direction  of  fit,  it  gives  us  no  reason  to  
doubt  that  desires  are  types  of  perceptions.    
The  preceding  observations  suggest  not  only  that  the  Smith  interpretation  is  consistent  
with  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Thesis,  but  also  that  it  is  of  questionable  plausibility.  In  order  to  
constitute  a   satisfactory   interpretation  of   the  direction  of   fit  metaphor,   a  given  proposal  must  
not  only  preserve  the  intuition  that  desires  and  beliefs  have  different  directions  of  fit,  but  also  
the   intuition   that   believing,   imagining   and   pretending   all   share   the   same   direction   of   fit.    
However,  by  Smith’s  lights,  imagining  and  pretending  turn  out  to  have  a  different  direction  of  
fit  to  believing,  owing  to  the  fact  that  imagining  that  P  and  pretending  that  P  tends  to  persist  in  
the  presence  of  the  perception  that  ¬P  while  believing  that  P  tends  to  go  out  of  existence  in  the  
presence   of   the   perception   that   ¬P.   The   end   result   is   that   the   Smith   interpretation   cannot   be  
generalised  in  order  to  provide  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  notion  of  direction  of  fit.      
Additionally,   it   is  not  clear  that  Smith  is  even  able  to  offer  us  a  satisfactory  analysis  of  
the   difference   between   belief   and   desire.      The   Smith   interpretation   takes   it   to   be   a   brute  
psychological  fact  about  us  that  our  desires  tend  to  endure  in  the  presence  of  a  perception  that  




However,  it  is  entirely  conceivable  that  there  may  be  exceptions  to  the  above  rule.    For  example,  
there  may  be  a  putative  belief   that  does  not   tend   to  go  out  of  existence   in   the  presence  of   the  
perception   that   ¬P,   simply   because   it   is   dogmatically   held.      (Consider,   for   example,   the  
dogmatic  beliefs  of  a  religious  fanatic.)  Moreover,  we  may  wish  to  regard  such  a  putative  belief  
as   a   genuine   belief,   despite   its   dogmatic   nature.      However,   Smith'ʹs   interpretation   of   the  
direction  of   fit  metaphor   forces  us   to   regard   such  a  putative  belief   as  a  desire.     Thus,  Smith'ʹs  
framework   seems   to   define   out   of   existence   what   many   would   regard   as   a   real   possibility;  
namely,   a   belief   that   is   so   dogmatically   held   that   it   is   immune   to   contravening   perceptual  
evidence.     Moreover,   if  we  were   to   encounter   a   religious   fanatic  who  held   such   a   “dogmatic  
belief”,  we  would  be   left  without  grounds   for   criticising   such  an   individual   since   (by  Smith'ʹs  
lights)  their  dogmatic  “belief”  would  not  constitute  a  belief  at  all,  but  a  desire.    Thus,  the  Smith  
interpretation   offers   the   rather   surprising   prescription   for   arriving   at   epistemically   faultless  
beliefs;  one  merely  has  to  hold  such  beliefs  in  such  a  dogmatic  fashion  that  they  become  de  facto  
desires.  These  are  all  rather  unattractive  consequences  of  the  Smith  interpretation,  ones  that  cast  
doubt  on  its  adequacy  as  an  interpretation  of  the  direction  of  fit  metaphor.    
       
3.7.    Diagnosing  the  Direction  of  Fit  Analysis  
The   take  away  from  sections  3.4  and  3.5   is   that   the   two  most   influential   interpretations  of   the  
direction  of  fit  metaphor  are  consistent  with  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  or  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Thesis.    
However,  the  defender  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  or  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Thesis  should  not  see  this  
as   cause   for   celebration   since   I   have   also   argued   that   both   the   Anscombe   and   Smith  




distinction   between   saying   that   an   attitude   has   a   certain   direction   of   fit   and   saying   that   an  
attitude  has  certain  correctness  conditions.57     The  second   is   inadequate  because   it   is  unable   to  
preserve  the  intuition  that  beliefs  share  the  same  direction  of  fit  as  imaginings  and  pretendings,  
and   accommodate   the   possibility   of   dogmatic   beliefs.      Below,   I   present   the   two-­‐‑content  
interpretation  as  an  alternative   to   the  Anscombe  and  Smith   interpretations,  one   that  does  not  
suffer   from   the   aforementioned   shortcomings.      Moreover,   I   show   that   the   two-­‐‑content  
interpretation  entails  the  falsity  of  both  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  and  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Theses.    If  
my   claim   that   the   two-­‐‑content   interpretation   is   superior   to   the   Anscombe   and   Smith  
interpretation  is  sound,  then  the  defender  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  or  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Thesis  
can  take  little  comfort  in  the  fact  that  these  interpretations  are  consistent  with  their  account.    
In  the  remainder  of  this  chapter,  I  will  attempt  to  do  three  things.    First,  identify  what  I  
take   to  be   the  key   intuition   that   the  notion  of  direction  of   fit   is  meant   to  capture;  namely,   the  
intuition   that   there   is   a   difference   in   the   logical   structure   of   belief-­‐‑like   attitudes,   on   the   one  
hand,  and  desire-­‐‑like  attitudes,  on  the  other.    Second,  present  the  two-­‐‑content  interpretation  as  
a   plausible   way   of   making   sense   of   this   intuition.      Third,   show   that   the   two-­‐‑content  
interpretation  entails  the  falsity  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  and  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Theses.  
   The   intuition   that   there   is  a  difference   in   the   logical   structure  of  belief-­‐‑like  and  desire-­‐‑
like   attitudes   is   inchoately   registered  by   the  observation   that   the   former,   but  not   the   latter,   is  
truth-­‐‑assessable.    This  comports  with  our  quotidian  conception  of  the  relevant  attitudes—to  wit,  
we  do  not  ordinarily  conceive  of  attitudes  like  desiring,  wishing,  hoping  and  intending  as  truth-­‐‑
assessable.      There   are   at   least   two   things   we   could   mean   when   we   say   that   desires   are   not  
                                                




ordinarily  seen  as  truth-­‐‑assessable.     We  could  mean  that  we  ordinarily  believe  that  desires  are  
not   truth-­‐‑assessable.      Call   this   the   strong   reading.      On   the   strong   reading,   our   quotidian  
conception  actually  takes  a  stand  on  whether  or  not  a  desire  is  truth-­‐‑assessable;  to  wit,  it  denies  
that  it  is.     On  the  other  hand,  we  could  mean  that  we  do  not  ordinarily  believe  that  a  desire  is  
truth-­‐‑assessable,   but   neither   do   we   believe   that   it   is   not   truth-­‐‑assessable.      Call   this   the  weak  
reading.   According   to   the   weak   reading,   our   quotidian   conception   does   not   take   a   stand   on  
whether  or  not  a  desire  is  truth-­‐‑assessable;  it  is  agnostic  on  the  issue.58  
   Whether  the  strong  or  weak  reading  accurately  mirrors  our  ordinary  linguistic  practice  
is   a   sociological   question,   one   that   can   hardly   be   answered   from   the   philosopher’s   armchair.    
However,  as  I  understand  it,  the  direction  of  fit  analysis  is  not  meant  to  serve  as  a  description  of  
our  quotidian  conception  of  beliefs,  desires,  etc.    Rather,  it  is  part  of  a  robust  theoretical  account  
of   the   relevant   attitudes.      Consequently,   there   is   no   need   for   us   to   answer   the   sociological  
question  of  whether  the  weak  or  strong  reading  is  right.    What  interests  us  is  the  corresponding  
theoretical  question:  should  we  conceive  of  intentions  and  desires  as  truth-­‐‑assessable  in  the  very  
same  sense  that  beliefs  and  perceptions  are?    The  direction  of  fit  analysis  is  first  and  foremost  a  
negative  answer  to  this  question.      
Consider  Anscombe’s  shopping  list  example.  One  of  its  central  points  is  that,  unlike  the  
detective’s  record,  the  shopping  list  is  not  deemed  false  because  it  fails  to  match  the  items  in  the  
shopping  cart.    This  is  because  the  shopping  list  does  not  represent  the  shopping  cart  as  having  
certain   items.   By   contrast,   the   detective’s   record   does   represent   the   shopping   cart   as   having  
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certain  items.  As  such,  the  detective’s  record  may  be  described  as  representing  matters  falsely  if  
it   fails   to  match   the   items   in   the  shopping  cart.     Moreover,  Anscombe’s  point  may  be  applied  
not  only   to   shopping   lists   and  detective’s   records,   but   also   to   attitudes.   If  we  assume   that   an  
attitude   is   true   just   in   case  matters  are  as   the  attitude   represents   them   to  be,   and   false   just   in  
case  matters  are  not  as  the  attitude  represents  them  to  be,  then  we  may  conclude  that  an  attitude  
is   truth-­‐‑assessable   just   in   case   it   represents   matters   as   being   a   certain   way.      On   this   much,  
Anscombe  and   I   agree.  However,  where   I   believe  Anscombe  goes  wrong   is   that   she   assumes  
that  the  fact  that  an  attitude  represents  matters  as  being  a  certain  way  entails  that  it  is  incorrect  
or  subject  to  revision  if  matters  are  not  that  way.    What  the  existence  of  attitudes  like  imagining  
and   pretending   illustrates   is   that   is   it   possible   to   represent   matters   as   being   a   certain   way  
without  purporting  to  represent  matters  truly.    For  example,  if  I  were  to  pretend  that  there  were  
magic  beans  in  my  shopping  cart,  my  pretence  does  represent  matters  as  being  a  certain  way—
to  wit,  it  represents  matters  as  though  there  were  magic  beans  in  my  shopping  cart.    However,  
my  pretence  is  not  incorrect  or  subject  to  revision  if  there  are  no  magic  beans  in  my  shopping  
cart  because   it  does  not  purport   to   represent  matters   truly.  What  Anscombe  overlooks   is   that  
there   is   a   gap  between  merely   representing  matters   as   being   a   certain  way,   and   representing  
matters  as  being  a  certain  way  while  purporting  to  represent  matters  truly.      
  Once  we  recognise  this  gap,  it  becomes  clear  that  we  can  only  preserve  the  intuition  that  
supposing,  imagining,  and  pretending  have  the  same  direction  of  fit  as  belief  if  we  assume  that  
the   direction   of   fit   metaphor   tracks   the   contrast   between   attitudes   that   represent   matters   as  
being  a   certain  way  and  attitudes   that  do  not,   rather   than   the   contrast  between  attitudes   that  




do  not.    This  is  because  only  the  former  dichotomy  keeps  all  four  attitudes  on  the  same  side  of  
the  direction  of   fit  divide.        Moreover,  all   that   follows   from  saying   that  an  attitude  represents  
matters   a   certain  way   is   that   the   attitude   is   false   if   things   are   not   that  way.     What   does   not  
follow   is   that   the   attitude   is   incorrect   or   subject   to   revision   if  matters   are   not   as   the   attitude  
represents   them   to   be.      Of   course,   there   is   a   natural   tendency   to   think   that   saying   that   an  
attitude   is   false   is   equivalent   to   saying   that   it   is   incorrect  or   subject   to   revision.     However,   as  
natural  as  it  may  be,  this  tendency  should  be  resisted.    Saying  that  an  attitude  is  false  is  to  make  
a   formal   claim   about   its   logical   structure.      Saying   that   an   attitude   is   incorrect   or   subject   to  
revision  is  to  make  an  evaluative  claim  about  an  attitude’s  normative  import.    In  short,  these  are  
very  two  different  sorts  of  claims.  
My   contention,   then,   is   that   the   direction   of   fit   analysis   is   a   claim   about   an   attitude’s  
logical  structure,  rather  than  a  claim  about  its  normative  import.    The  first  half  of  the  preceding  
claim  appears  to  be  common  ground  between  Anscombe  and  I  since  she  would  no  doubt  agree  
that   beliefs   are   truth   assessable   and   that  desires   are  not.     Where  we   seem   to  disagree   is  with  
respect  the  second  half  of  the  preceding  claim—to  wit,  my  insistence  that  the  notion  of  direction  
of   fit   lacks  a  certain  normative   import.  The  normative   import   in  question   is   that  having  to  do  
with  the  correctness  or  revision  conditions  of  an  attitude.  This  is  the  lesson  to  be  learned  from  
the  existence  of  attitudes   like   imagining  and  pretending.  Saying   that  an  attitude  has  a   certain  
direction  of  fit   is  not  yet  to  say  what   its  correctness  or  revision  conditions  are.      It   is  not  yet  to  
specify  what   I  have  been  calling  an  attitude’s  normative   import.     Consequently,   if  we  wish  to  




to  the  logical  properties  of  an  attitude.  Specifically,  we  must  restrict  ourselves  to  the  question  of  
whether  or  not  the  attitude  is  truth-­‐‑assessable.    
Anscombe  violates  this  restriction  when  she  assumes  that  the  direction  of  fit  analysis  is  
meant   to  capture  an  attitude’s  normative   import,  and   this  violation  explains  why  her  account  
conflates  an  attitude’s  correctness  conditions  with  its  direction  of  fit.59     Smith  also  violates  this  
restriction  when  he  assumes   that   the  direction  of   fit  analysis   is  meant   to  capture  an  attitude’s  
dispositional  properties,  and  this  violation  explains  why  he  is  unable  to  preserve  the  intuition  
that   imagining   and   pretending   have   the   same   direction   of   fit   as   believing.      Since   two   truth-­‐‑
assessable  attitudes  may   involve  very  different  dispositions   (e.g.,  believing   that  P   tends   to  go  
out  of  existence  in  the  presence  of  a  perception  that  ¬P  while  pretending  that  P  tends  to  persist  
in   the   presence   of   a   perception   that   ¬P,   despite   the   fact   that   both   are   truth-­‐‑assessable),   the  
attempt   to   make   sense   of   direction   of   fit   via   a   dispositional   analysis   is   ill   conceived,   if   not  
moribund.    Hence,  when  viewed  from  a  sufficient  level  of  abstraction,  the  Anscombe  and  Smith  
interpretations   may   be   seen   as   suffering   from   the   same   flaw.      Both   take   the   direction   of   fit  
analysis   to   involve   more   than   a   claim   about   the   logical   structure   of   two   broad   classes   of  
attitudes—namely,   those   that   are   truth-­‐‑assessable   and   those   that   are   not.   If   my   proposed  
restriction  is  right,  and  the  claim  that  believing  and  pretending  share  the  same  direction  of  fit  is  
merely  meant  to  capture  the  idea  that  they  both  have  truth-­‐‑assessable  content,  while  the  claim  
that  believing  and  desiring  have  different  directions  of   fit   is  merely  meant   to  capture  the   idea  
that,  unlike  the  former,  the  latter  does  not  have  truth-­‐‑assessable  content,  then  an  interpretation  
of  the  direction  of  fit  metaphor  which  focuses  on  the  correctness  conditions,  revision  conditions  
                                                




or   dispositions   implicated   by   an   attitude   runs   the   risk   of   being   little  more   than   a   distraction  
from  the  central  issue.    
  
3.8.    The  Two  Content  Interpretation  
The  two-­‐‑content  interpretation  represents  an  attempt  to  take  seriously  the  idea  that  the  notion  
of  direction  of  fit  is  meant  to  capture  a  logical  property  of  an  attitude.    As  such,  it  unpacks  the  
claim   that   beliefs   and  desires   have  different   directions   of   fit   by   saying   that   the   two   attitudes  
belong  to  different  Boolean  domains.    This  proposal  combines  the  negative  claim  that  a  desire  is  
not  truth  assessable  in  the  way  that  a  belief  is,  and  the  positive  claim  that  a  desire  has  its  own  
two-­‐‑valued  logical  structure,  one  that  implicates  doability  conditions.     In  the  present  section,  I  
will  briefly  examine  both  claims,  beginning  with  the  negative  claim.  
According  to  the  negative  claim,  attitudes  with  a  desire-­‐‑like  direction  of  fit  (e.g.,  desires,  
wishes,  intentions)  are  not  truth-­‐‑assessable.    It  is  important  to  note  that  saying  that  desires  are  
not   truth-­‐‑assessable   does   not   entail   that   they   have   no   truth-­‐‑assessable   features   or   parts.      To  
assume  that  it  does  would  be  to  commit  a  fallacy  of  composition.    Hence,  the  claim  that  a  desire  
is   not   truth   assessable   is   consistent  with   the   claim   that   the   propositional   object   of   a   desire   is  
truth-­‐‑assessable.    The  direction  of  fit  analysis  is  therefore  consistent  with  the  claim  that  desires  
are   propositional   attitudes,   where   a   proposition   is   conceived   of   as   a   truth-­‐‑assessable   entity.    
What   the   direction   of   fit   analysis   does   entail   is   that   a   desire   does   not   display   the   same   two  
values  displayed  by  its  propositional  content.    Another  way  this  point  may  be  put  is  to  say  that  
the  attitudes  of  desire  is  not  a  member  of  the  same  Boolean  domain  as  its  propositional  content,  




The   possibility   that   an   attitude   may   fail   to   display   the   same   logical   structure   as   its  
propositional  content  introduces  a  need  to  talk  about  an  attitude  in  a  way  that  is  independent  of  
its  propositional  content.    This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  the  notion  of  illocutionary  content  was  
introduced.  Appealing  to  this  notion  allows  us  to  buy  into  something  like  the  following  picture.    
We  may  say  that  both  believing  that  P  and  desiring  that  P  have  the  same  propositional  content.    
Moreover,   like  all  propositions,  P   is   truth-­‐‑assessable.     However,   there   is   a  difference  between  
saying   that   the   propositional   content   of   an   attitude   is   truth-­‐‑assessable   and   saying   that   the  
attitude  itself  is  truth-­‐‑assessable.    The  latter  is  a  claim  about  an  attitude’s  illocutionary  content.    
Thus,  in  the  case  of  belief,  both  the  attitude’s  illocutionary  content  and  propositional  content  are  
truth   assessable.      As   such,   the   illocutionary   content   and   propositional   content   of   a   belief   are  
members   of   the   same   Boolean   domain.      However,   in   the   case   of   a   desire,   the   illocutionary  
content   is   not   a   member   of   the   same   Boolean   domain   as   its   propositional   content   since   the  
illocutionary  content  of  a  desire  is  not  truth-­‐‑assessable.    This  means  that  if  desires  have  a  two-­‐‑
valued  logical  structure  at  all,  then  the  values  are  not  truth  and  falsity.    
There  is  still  disagreement  among  those  who  buy  into  the  direction  of  fit  analysis  with  
regards  to  the  question  of  whether  desires  have  a  two-­‐‑valued  logical  structure,  and  (if  so)  what  
are   the   two   relevant   values.      These   are   the   issues   taken   up   by   the   positive   claim.      The   two-­‐‑
content  interpretation  goes  beyond  the  negative  claim  by  not  only  positing  that  desires  have  a  
two-­‐‑valued  structure  (analogous  to  but  different  from  truth-­‐‑values),  but  also  by  identifying  the  
values   in   question   with   the   “doable”   and   “undoable”.      It   is   at   this   stage   that   the   notion   of  
imperative  content  takes  on  particular  significance.    Simply  put,  a  desire  is  not  truth  assessable  




allows  us  to  determine  that  attitudes  with  imperative  content  have  doability  conditions.    Thus,  
we  can  characterise  the  difference  between  indicative  content  and  imperative  content   in  terms  
of   a   difference   in   Boolean   domains,  with   indicative   content   referring   to   illocutionary   content  
belonging   to   the   domain   of   truth-­‐‑assessable   items   and   imperative   content   referring   to  
illocutionary  content  belonging  to  the  domain  of  doability-­‐‑assessable  items.    
Significantly,  once  we  have  taken  on  board  the  idea  that  what  it  means  for  an  attitude  to  
have  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world   fit   is   for   it   to   have   truth-­‐‑assessable   illocutionary   content   (i.e.,   indicative  
content),  and  what  it  means  for  an  attitude  to  have  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind  fit  is  for  it  to  have  doability-­‐‑
assessable  illocutionary  content  (i.e.,  imperative  content),  there  can  be  no  question  of  whether  a  
desire   is   a   type   of   belief   or   perceptual   appearance.      Since   a   desire   has   a   different   kind   of  
illocutionary  content  to  a  belief  or  perceptual  appearance,   the  former  cannot  be  an  instance  of  
the   latter.     Hence,   the   two-­‐‑content   interpretation  entails   the  falsity  of  both  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  
and  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception   Theses.     Moreover,   the   two-­‐‑content   interpretation   provides   us  with  
the   resources   to   say   that   two   attitudes   have   different   directions   of   fit   (in   virtue   of   having  
different   kinds   of   illocutionary   content)   even   if   they   have   the   same   correctness   or   revision  
conditions   (as   is  alleged   in   the  case  of  desire   to  bring  about  P  and  the  belief   that   it   is  good  to  
bring  about  P)  and  even  if  they  involve  the  same  dispositions  (as  in  the  case  of  a  desire  and    a  
dogmatic   belief).     Hence,   the   two-­‐‑content   interpretation   is   immune   to   the  problems  plaguing  







3.9.    Conclusion  
In   this   chapter,   I   have   attempted   to   further   situate   the   account   of   desire   on   offer   in   this  
dissertation  in  the  context  of  ongoing  attempts  to  make  sense  of  the  claim  that  desires  aim  at  the  
good.    Specifically,  I  have  argued  that  the  two-­‐‑content  interpretation  better  captures  the  central  
intuition   underlying   the   direction   of   fit   analysis   than   the   accounts   of   Anscombe   and   Smith.    
Moreover,  I  have  argued  that,  in  contradistinction  to  the  Anscombe  and  Smith  interpretations,  
the  two-­‐‑content  interpretation  entails  the  falsity  of  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  and  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  
Theses.  This  does  not  only  underscore  the  distinctiveness  of  the  two-­‐‑content  interpretation  (as  
compared  to  the  Anscombe  and  Smith  interpretations),  but  is  also  symptomatic  of  the  fact  that  
the  Anscombe  and  Smith  interpretations  fail  to  get  to  the  heart  of  the  matter,  as  far  as  direction  
of   fit   analysis   is   concerned.      I   submit   that   an  account  of  direction  of   fit,   if   it   is   adequate,  will  
preclude  the  possibility  of  an  attitude  with  mind-­‐‑to-­‐‑world  fit  being  identical  to  or  an  instance  of  
an  attitude  with  world-­‐‑to-­‐‑mind  fit.    Of  course,  the  immediately  preceding  claim  does  not  entail  
that  either  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  or  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Perception  Thesis  is  false.     What  it  entails   is  that  if  
the  direction  of  fit  analysis  (properly  understood)  is  true,  then  the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  and  Desire-­‐‑
as-­‐‑Perception  Theses   are  both   false.   In   short,   I   am   (in   this   chapter)  making   a   claim  about   the  
incompatibility  of  two  sets  of  claims,  rather  than  a  claim  about  one  set  of  claims  being  true  and  
another  set  of  claims  being  false.  Nonetheless,  those  who  accept  the  direction  of  fit  analysis,  and  
who   also   buy   into   the   two-­‐‑content   interpretation   defended   in   this   dissertation,  may   take   the  
arguments  advanced   in   this  chapter  as  a  basis   for   rejecting   the  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief  and  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑
Perception  Theses.  











4.1.    Introduction  
In  this  chapter,  I  argue  that  there  are  two  distinct  kinds  of  rational  significance  that  an  attitude  
may  display.    This  will  turn  out  to  have  important  implications  for  the  question  of  whether  or  
not  a  desire  is  rationally  significant,  since  (if  the  arguments  presented  below  are  correct)  it  will  
mean   that   there   are   two   things   the   cognitivist   may   mean   when   she   says   that   desires   are  
rationally  significant.     Ultimately,   I  will  argue  that  we  should  be  sceptical  about  desires  being  
rationally  significant  in  either  of  the  two  senses  I  describe  in  this  chapter.  But  we  will  get  to  that  
in  due  course.    At  present,  I  simply  wish  to  get  clear  on  the  two  kinds  of  rational  significance  I  
have  in  mind,  what  they  amount  to,  and  why  we  should  be  interested  in  them.  
In  section  4.2,  I  define  and  motivate  the  notion  of  rational  significance  with  which  I  am  
interested.  Then,  in  section  4.3,  I  describe  the  two  kinds  of  rational  significance  that  an  attitude  
may  display  under  the  heading  of  what  I  refer  to  as  the  Dual-­‐‑Significance  Thesis.    In  section  4.4,  I  




be   said   to   be   rationally   significant.      I   devote   the   rest   of   the   chapter   (sections   4.5—4.6)   to  
responding   to   the  objection   limned   in   section  4.4,   and   (in   the  process  of   so  doing)   attempt   to  
further   clarify   and  motivate   the  Dual-­‐‑Significance   Thesis.   If   successful,   the   arguments   in   this  
chapter  will   (1)  establish  that   there  are   two  kinds  of  rational  significance  that  an  attitude  may  
display,   (2)   go   some   distance   towards   clarifying   the   rational   significance   of   belief,   and   (3)  
provide   a   framework   (to   be   used   in   later   chapters)   for   assessing   the   claim   that   desires   are  
rationally  significant.    
  
4.2.  Rational  Significance    
Let  us  say  that  an  attitude  is  rationally  significant  just  in  case  it  plays  a  role  (qua  psychological  
state)   in  generating  a   rational  obligation.      In   this  dissertation,   I  will  be  primarily   interested   in  
rational  obligations  that  are  related  to  the  adoption  of  a  belief  or  intention.    Specifically,  I  will  be  
concerned  with   rational   obligations   to   adopt   a   belief   or   intention,   and   rational   obligations   to  
refrain  from  adopting  a  belief  or  intention.  Hence,  I  define  rational  significance  as  follows:  
  
Definition  4.1  (Rational  Significance):  
X  is  rationally  significant  with  respect  to  a  belief  or  intention,  Y,  IFF  X  plays  a  role  (qua  
psychological   state)   in   generating   a   rational   obligation   to   adopt   Y   or   refrain   from  
adopting  Y.  
  
Two  points  of  clarification  are  worth  making  with  respect  to  the  preceding  definition.    First,  the  




introduction   of   this   dissertation.   An   attitude   does   not   count   as   rationally   significant,   in   the  
sense  I  presently  have  in  mind,  when  it  constitutes  a  reason  qua  fact.  This  is  not  to  deny  that  an  
attitude  may  play  a  role  in  generating  a  rational  obligation  by  constituting  a  reason,  in  the  sense  
in  which  the  fact  that  I  am  having  a  perceptual  appearance  of  an  elephant  in  the  corner  of  the  
room  constitutes  a  reason  for  me  to  check  myself   into  a  hospital.      I  affirm  that,   like  any  other  
fact,   the   fact   that   I   have   an   attitude  may,   under   the   right   circumstances,   constitute   a   reason.  
However,  the  notion  of  rational  significance  I  currently  have  in  mind  is  one  that  only  applies  to  
an  attitude  when  it  generates  a  rational  obligation  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  it  is  a  psychological  
state—i.e.,  a  state  with  the  property  of  aboutness.      
   Second,  I  will  be  presupposing  the  following  definition  of  a  rational  obligation:    
  
Definition  4.2  (Rational  Obligation):  
S  is  rationally  obligated  to  X  IFF  S  would  be  liable  to  rational  criticism  if  S  failed  to  X.      
  
For   example,   S   is   rationally  obligated   to  believe  P   if   and  only   if   S  would  be   liable   to   rational  
criticism   for   failing   to  believe  P.      Similarly,  an  agent,  S,   is   rationally  obligated   to   refrain   from  
intending  to  bring  about  P  if  and  only  if  S  would  be  liable  to  rational  criticism  if  S  intended  to  
bring  about  P.     Furthermore,  I  will  say  that  X  is  rationally  permissible  if  and  only  if  one  is  not  
rationally  obligated  to  refrain  from  X.    Thus  understood,  the  notion  of  rational  permissibility  is  
parasitic  on  the  notion  of  a  rational  obligation.  
The   present   conception   of   rational   significance   yields   something   like   the   following  




mentally-­‐‑grasped   justification   for   believing  P,   and   that   (2)   perceiving  P   provides   one  with   a  
mentally-­‐‑grasped  justification  for  believing  P.    Given  (1)  and  (2),  it  would  follow,  on  the  present  
picture,  that  perceiving  P  is  rationally  significant  relative  to  the  belief  that  P.  Two  further  points  
of  clarification  are  worth  noting.    First,  saying  that  an  attitude  is  rationally  significant  does  not  
entail   that   it   is   sufficient   to   generate   a   rational   obligation.      The   connection   between   rational  
significance  and  a  rational  obligation  is  contributory  rather  than  decisive.60    Second,  saying  that  
an  attitude,  X,  plays  a   role   in  generating  a   rational  obligation  does  not   entail   that   some  other  
attitude,   Y,   could   not   also   play   this   role.   For   example,   the   present   account   allows   that   both  
perceiving  P   and  remembering  P  may  be   rationally  significant  because   they  provide  an  agent  
with  a  mentally-­‐‑grasped  justification  for  believing  P.    
   Definitions  4.1  and  4.2  are  meant  to  be  stipulative.    As  such,  they  are  not  meant  to  settle  
any   pre-­‐‑existing   philosophical   debates.      That   would   constitute   a   misuse   of   a   stipulation.    
Stipulations,  properly  understood  and  employed,  are  meant  to  circumscribe  a  particular  area  of  
concern.      The   present   stipulation   is   motivated   by   a   concern   with   minimising   the   rational  
criticism  for  which  one  is  liable.    Motivations  for  having  this  concern  range  from  the  social  (e.g.,  
we  may  wish   to   gain   the   approval   or   avoid   censure   of   other  members   of   the   community   of  
reasoners   to  which  we  belong)   to   the   epistemic   (e.g.,  we   believe   that  minimising   the   rational  
criticism  to  which  we  are  liable  happens  to  be  the  most  effective  way  of  arriving  at  knowledge  
or   maximising   true   beliefs)   and   the   practical   (e.g.,   we   believe   that   minimising   the   rational  
criticism  to  which  we  are  liable  happens  to  be  the  most  effective  way  of  arriving  at  appropriate  
or  effective  intentions).    Whatever  our  motivation,  we  often  find  ourselves  concerned  with  what  
                                                




we   are   rationally   obligated   to   believe,   intend,   etc.      It   is   this   sort   of   concern   that   the   present  
stipulation   is  meant   to   circumscribe.      However,   I   am   no  more   committed   to   saying   that   the  
present  conception  of  rational  significance  is  the  only  legitimate  one  than  I  am  to  saying  that  my  
particular  concerns  are  the  only  ones  worth  having.    Nevertheless,  in  order  to  further  motivate  
my  operationalization  of  the  terms,  it  may  be  worthwhile  to  briefly  sketch  what  I  believe  to  be  
at  stake  with  regards  to  the  present  conception  of  rational  significance.  
I  begin  with  a  few  clarificatory  remarks  about  what  I  mean  by  the  expression  “liability  to  
rational   criticism”.   Being   free   from   liability   to   rational   criticism  does   not   amount   to   freedom  
from   error,   tout   court.      For   example,   consider   an   agent,   Tanya,   who   has   her   brain   removed  
while  asleep  and  placed   into  a  vat  of   the  kind  epistemologists  dread.     Let  us  assume   that   the  
envatment   process   is   carried   out   seamlessly,   so   that   Tanya   fails   to   realise   that   the  world   she  
now  perceives  is  not  the  actual  world,  but  rather  a  virtual  reality  made  to  look  and  feel  like  the  
actual   world.      Furthermore,   suppose   that   Tanya   goes   about   forming   her   beliefs   in   the   most  
responsible  manner   possible.      She   is   careful   not   adopt   any   inconsistent   beliefs,   observes   the  
appropriate  standards  of  evidence,  etc.  Nonetheless,  insofar  as  Tanya  believes  that  the  ‘tree’  she  
now  sees  outside  her  window   is   the  same  sort  of   thing  as   the  actual   trees   she   frequently  saw  
prior  to  her  envatment,  she  has  a  false  belief.    A  fortiori,  Tanya  does  not  know  that  there  is  a  tree  
outside  her  window.  As  such,  she  may  be  described  as  falling  short  of  certain  epistemic  ideals.    
However,   Tanya   is   not   liable   to   rational   criticism,   at   least   not   of   the   kind   with   which   I   am  
presently   concerned.      Insofar   as   Tanya   went   about   forming   her   belief   responsibly   (e.g.,   by  
avoiding   inconsistent   beliefs,   observing   the   appropriate   standards   of   evidence,   etc.)   she   still  




It  bears  repeating  that  the  preceding  analysis  of  rational  obligations  is  not  offered  as  an  
argument   to   the   effect   that   we   should   conceive   of   rational   obligations   along   the   lines   just  
described.      Rather,   it   is   merely   an   attempt   to   get   clear   on   what   I   mean—and   the   sorts   of  
considerations  I  will  be  concerned  with—when  I  talk  about  rational  obligations.  The  reason  I  am  
interested   in   this   conception   of   a   rational   obligation   is   because   I   am   concerned   with   the  
questions  “What  shall   I  believe?”  and  “What  shall   I  do?”  when  posed  from  the  perspective  of  
the  deliberating  agent.     This   is  a  perspective   that  we  have  all  occupied.  For  example,  suppose  
that  I  am  trying  to  decide  whether  I  should  take  the  local  train,  which  is  now  pulling  into  the  
station,   but   which   will   make   multiple   stops   before   getting   to   my   destination,   or   whether   I  
should  wait  for  an  express  train,  which  would  get  me  to  my  destination  without  extra  stops,  but  
is  currently  running   late.     There   is,  of  course,  an  objective   fact  of   the  matter  as   to  which   train  
will  get  me  to  my  destination  first,  and  if  this  is  my  sole  concern,  then  this  fact  will  determine  
which  train  I  should  take.    However,  when  I  am  engaged  in  deliberation,  I  am  not  privy  to  this  
fact.     What  I  am  privy  to  is  my  past  experience,  my  knowledge  of  past  local  and  express  train  
frequency,   etc.     Within   this   context,  making   a   decision   that   is   not   liable   to   rational   criticism  
means  weighing  the  reasons  that  are  within  my  ken.    It  does  not  involve  making  a  decision  that  
simply   gets   things   right,   in   a   sense   that   ignores   the   epistemic   limitations   with   which   actual  
reasoners  are  typically  saddled.    It  is  in  this  sense  that  we  are  often  in  a  situation  analogous  to  
that   of   Tanya.     Not   that  we   are   typically  mistaken   in   the  manner  Tanya   is   (or   at   least   so  we  
hope).    But  in  the  sense  that,  when  we  find  ourselves  in  the  situation  of  deliberating  about  what  
to  believe  or   intend,  we  can  only  be  expected   to  consider  and  be  held  responsible   for  what   is  




matter.    Moreover,  even  when  we  are  saddled  with  the  aforementioned  limitations,  we  still  find  
ourselves  confronted  with  the  questions  “What  shall  I  believe?”  and  “What  shall  I  do?”  This  is  




4.3.  The  Dual-­‐‑Significance  Thesis  
It   is   typically   assumed   that   beliefs   are   rationally   significant   because   they   provide   us   with  
reasons   to   adopt   other   beliefs.     However,   John  Broome   calls   attention   to   a   potential   problem  
with  this  assumption.    According  to  Broome,  believing  P  does  not  provide  one  with  a  reason  to  
believe   the   logical   consequences   of   P.61   His   argument   begins   with   the   observation   that   P  
logically   entails  P.      If  we   assume   that   believing  P   provides   one  with   a   reason   to   believe   the  
logical   consequences   of  P,   then   it   follows   that   the  belief   that  P   is   a   reason   to   believe  P.      This  
generates   the   rather   unattractive   conclusion   that   every   belief   is   a   reason   for   itself.62      If   we  
assume  that  one  is  rationally  obligated  to  believe  P  only  if  one  has  a  reason  to  believe  P,  then  it  
                                                
61 Broome [2000]. 
 
62 Broome [2000: 85; 2002: 92-95]. For discussion, see: Brunero [2007: 426-427].  While I share Broome’s general 
misgivings about the claim that all beliefs are self-justifying, it should be noted that versions of this position have 
been embraced by a number of prominent philosophers, including Quine [1951], Sklar [1975], Chisholm [1980], and 
Harman [1986].  Some versions of epistemic conservatism, as this family of views is typically called, are more 
defensible than others, and a detailed examination of its many permutations will not be possible here.  (For a helpful 
discussion of the various kinds of epistemic conservativism, see: Christensen [1994] and Vahid [2004].  See also: 
Fumerton [2007].) However, I believe this omission is tolerable since my main contention in this chapter—namely, 
that there are two kinds of rational significance that an attitude may display—is perfectly consistent with most 
versions of epistemic conservatism.  While I am committed to saying that a belief displays a different kind of 
rational significance to perception, this does not prevent me from saying that a belief also displays the same kind of 
rational significance as perception.  After all, it is possible that belief may display two different kinds of rational 
significance, only one of which it shares with perception. Hence, while I will be following Broome’s lead by 
assuming that belief’s cannot be self-justifying (and, therefore, cannot be said to provide reasons), this assumption 





seems   to   follow   that   believing   P   cannot   generate   a   rational   obligation   to   believe   the   logical  
consequences  of  P.     The  point  of   the  preceding  appropriation  of  Broome’s  argument   is  not   to  
deny   that   an   agent   who   believes   P   is   typically   rationally   obligated   to   believe   the   logical  
consequences   of   P.      It   is   to   cast   doubt   on   the   assumption   that   believing   P   plays   a   role   in  
generating  said  obligation.      
Even  if  one  finds  the  preceding  argument  persuasive  with  respect  to  the  conclusion  that  
beliefs  fail  to  provide  reasons  for  other  beliefs,  one  need  not  conclude  that  belief  plays  no  role  
whatsoever   in  generating  a   rational  obligation.     This   is  because   there  are  at   least   two  distinct  
kinds  of  rational  significance  that  an  attitude  may  display:  one  having  to  do  with  the  incursion  
of   rational   commitments   and   another   having   to   do   with   providing   rational   support.      Belief  
displays  the  first  kind  of  rational  significance.    When  I  adopt  the  belief  that  P,  I  incur  a  rational  
commitment  to  the  logical  consequences  of  P.    Incurring  such  a  commitment  means  that,  so  long  
as  I  continue  to  believe  P,  I  am  rationally  committed  to  everything  that  logically  follows  from  P.    
This,  of  course,  includes  being  rationally  committed  to  P  itself.    However,  saying  that  believing  
P  entails  being  rationally  committed  to  P  is  different  from  saying  that  the  belief  that  P  gives  one  
a  reason  to  believe  P.    While  the  latter  amounts  to  the  doctrine  that  all  beliefs  are  self-­‐‑justifying  
(i.e.,   believing  P   gives   one   a   reason   to   believe  P),   the   former   is   a   truism   about   the   beliefs   of  
rational  agents  (i.e.,  believing  P  entails  that  one  is  rationally  committed  to  P).63    
                                                
63 Another difference between saying that believing P gives one a reason to believe the logical consequences of P 
and saying that believing P rationally commits one to the logical consequences of P is that the latter, but not the 
former, entails that one is liable to rational criticism if one adopts the belief that ¬P. I am here, of course, assuming 
that the reason in question is pro tanto rather than decisive. One may have a pro tanto reason for believing P and yet 
rationally believe that ¬P if the weight of one’s reasons favour believing ¬P.  However, if one believes that P, and is 





Perceptual   appearances   display   the   second   kind   of   rational   significance.   Perceiving  P  
does  not  rationally  commit  me  to  P.    For  example,  suppose  that  I  perceive  P  but  fail  to  adopt  the  
belief  that  P  because  I  deem  my  perceptual  appearance  unreliable.    In  such  a  case,  it  would  be  
rationally   permissible   to   adopt   the   belief   that   ¬P.      Hence,   perceiving   P   does   not   rationally  
commit  one  to  P.     Nevertheless,  perceiving  P  favours  the  adoption  of  the  belief  that  P.     It  does  
this  by  putting  one  in  touch  with  the  fact  that  P,  the  very  fact  that  makes  one’s  belief  that  P  true,  
or  by  providing  one  with  evidence  for  P.  Thus,  while  perceiving  P  does  not  rationally  commit  
one  to  P,  it  provides  one  with  rational  support  for  an  attitude  that  rationally  commits  one  to  P.  
Incurring  rational  commitments  and  providing  rational  support  are  species  of  the  same  
genus,  the  genus  of  rational  significance.    Both  kinds  of  rational  significance  are  pro  tanto  in  the  
sense  that  they  are  either  contributory  or  defeasible.    To  say  that  a  type  of  rational  significance  is  
contributory   means   that   it   is   insufficient   for   generating   a   rational   obligation   on   its   own.      A  
conjunction   of   contributory   factors  may   be   sufficient   to   generate   a   rational   obligation.     What  
makes   each   individual   factor   qualify   as   contributory   is   that   it   could   not   generate   a   rational  
obligation   in   isolation   from   other   factors.64      To   say   that   a   type   of   rational   significance   is  
defeasible   means   that   it   may   be   defeated,   undermined   or   overturned.      For   example,   the  
perceptual  appearance  of  it  raining  may,  in  the  absence  of  defeaters,  be  sufficient  to  generate  a  
rational  obligation  to  believe  that  it  is  raining.    However,  insofar  as  my  perceptual  appearance  
may  be  defeated   (for   example,   if   I  were   to   learn   that   I   imbibed   a  powerful   hallucinogen   that  
typically  made  it  look  like  it  was  raining),  it  still  counts  as  pro  tanto  because  of  its  defeasibility.    
                                                




If   the   rational   significance  of   an  attitude   (or   set   of   attitudes)   is   sufficient   to  generate   a  
rational  obligation,   I  will  say  that   it   is  decisive.     However,  we  may  distinguish  between  saying  
that  the  rational  significance  displayed  by  an  attitude  is  always  sufficient  to  generate  a  rational  
obligation,   and   saying   that,   on   a   particular   occasion,   it   is   sufficient   to   generate   a   rational  
obligation.    The  former  is  a  claim  about  a  certain  type  of  rational  significance,  and  the  latter  is  a  
claim  about   a   certain   token  of   rational   significance.      I  will   refer   to   an  attitude   that  displays   a  
kind  of   rational   significance   that   is   always   sufficient   to  generate   a   rational   obligation   as   type-­‐‑
decisive.    Saying  that  an  attitude  is  type-­‐‑decisive  entails  that  the  rational  significance  it  displays  
is   not   pro   tanto.      By   contrast,   I   will   refer   to   an   attitude   that   displays   a   kind   of   rational  
significance  that  is,  on  a  particular  occasion,  sufficient  to  generate  a  rational  obligation  as  token-­‐‑
decisive.65         Saying   that   an  attitude   is   token-­‐‑decisive   is   consistent  with   saying   that   the   rational  
significance  it  displays  is  pro  tanto.    Hence,  when  I  say  that  commitment  incursion  and  rational  
support  are  pro  tanto,  I  am  only  denying  that  they  are  type-­‐‑decisive.     I  have  not  ruled  out  the  
possibility  that  they  are  token-­‐‑decisive.    
While   there   are   basic   cases   in   which   a   single   attitude,   with   a   single   kind   of   rational  
significance,  is  sufficient  to  generate  a  rational  obligation  (i.e.,  be  token-­‐‑decisive),  there  are  also  
more   complex   cases   in   which   several   different   attitudes   (displaying   both   kinds   of   rational  
significance)   are   required   to   generate   a   rational   obligation.      For   example,   we   need   several  
different  attitudes,  and  both  kinds  of  rational  significance,  in  order  to  explain  how  believing  the  
                                                
65   I   am  sceptical  about   the  existence  of   type-­‐‑decisive  attitudes.      I  only  use   the  notion  of  a   type-­‐‑decisive  





premises  of  a  modus  ponens  inference  with  empirical  content  makes  one  rationally  obligated  to  
believe  the  conclusion.    For  example,  consider  the  following  inference:  
  
(A1):    The  streets  are  wet.  
(A2):      If  the  streets  are  wet,  then  it  rained  last  night.  
(A3):      It  rained  last  night.    
  
Believing  (A1)  and  (A2)  incurs  a  commitment  to  (A3).    This  means  that  so  long  as  one  believes  
(A1)   and   (A2),   one   is   only   rationally   permitted   to   adopt   an   attitude   of   belief   towards   (A3),  
insofar  as  one  adopts  any  attitude  towards  (A3)  at  all.  There  are  three  possible  doxastic  attitudes  
one  may   adopt   towards   (A3).      One  may   believe   (A3),   one  may   disbelieve   (A3),   or   one  may  
withhold  belief  and  disbelief  with  respect  to  (A3).66    Saying  that  believing  (A1)  and  (A2)  incurs  a  
rational  commitment  to  (A3)  means  that  of  these  three  options,  belief  is  the  only  attitude  one  is  
rationally  permitted  to  adopt  towards  (A3),  so  long  as  one  remains  committed  to  (A1)  and  (A2).      
Another  way  this  point  may  be  put  is  to  say  that  one  would  be  liable  to  rational  criticism  if  one  
were  to  either  disbelieve  (A3)  or  withhold  (A3),  so  long  as  one  believes  (A1)  and  (A2).    
However,   saying   that   believing   P   incurs   a   rational   commitment   to   the   logical  
consequences   of   P   does   not   explain   how   believing   (A1)   and   (A2)   may   make   one   rationally  
obligated   to   believe   (A3).      This   is   because   there   are   always   two   ways   to   discharge   the  
                                                
66  Significantly,  I  take  withholding  belief  and  disbelief  towards  P  to  be  its  own  distinct  attitude  towards  P.    
As  such,  it  should  not  be  confused  with  cases  in  which  I  fail  to  take  any  attitude  towards  P  because  I  am  
still   contemplating  whether  P   or   ¬P   or   because  P   simply  has  not   occurred   to  me.   For   simplicity,   I  will  





commitment   incurred  by  a  belief.     One  may  discharge   the  commitment   incurred  by  believing  
(A1)  and  (A2)  by  either  adopting  the  belief  that  (A3)  or  by  giving  up  one’s  commitment  to  (A1)  
or  (A2).    Moreover,  the  rational  significance  displayed  by  believing  (A1)  and  (A2)  is  indifferent  
to   these   two   ways   of   discharging   one’s   rational   commitment.   As   such,   the   kind   of   rational  
significance   displayed   by   belief—i.e.,   rational   commitment-­‐‑incursion—leaves   one’s   rational  
obligations  underspecified.      
It  is  at  this  point  that  the  kind  of  rational  significance  displayed  by  perception  becomes  
salient.      Suppose   that   one’s   basis   for   believing   (A1)   is   one’s   currently  perceiving   the   street   is  
wet.    (Let  us  also  assume,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  the  conditional  depicted  in  (A2)  is  true  
and   that   one’s   belief   in   (A2)   is   well   founded.)      One   way   to   make   sense   of   the   claim   that  
perceiving  the  street  is  wet  provides  rational  support  for  the  belief  that  the  street  is  wet  is  to  say  
that  one’s  perceptual  appearance  privileges  one  way  of  discharging  one’s  rational  commitment  
over  another.    To  wit,  visually  perceiving  the  street  is  wet  favours  remaining  committed  to  (A1),  
and   adopting   the   belief   that   (A3)   over   giving   up   one’s   commitment   to   (A1)   and   thereby  
foregoing  the  need  to  believe  (A3).    Or,  to  put  the  same  point  more  simply,  perceiving  P  favours  
believing  P  over  disbelieving  P  and  withholding  P.      
The   end   result   of   the   preceding   analysis   is   that   both   kinds   of   rational   significance  
collaborate  to  explain  how  believing  the  premises  of  a  modus  ponens  inference  with  empirical  
content  generates  a  rational  obligation  to  believe  the  conclusion.    If  the  premises  of  an  argument  
imply  the  conclusion,  then  belief  in  the  premises  incurs  a  commitment  to  the  conclusion.    This  
means   that   one   is   rationally   obligated   to   refrain   from   both   believing   the   premises   of   the  




discharging  this  commitment:  to  either  believe  the  conclusion  or  give  up  belief  in  one  or  more  of  
the   premises.      If   one   has   equal   amounts   of   rational   support   for   and   against   the   truth   of   the  
premises   (a   possibility   that   includes   cases   in   which   one   has   no   reasons   for   and   no   reasons  
against  the  truth  of  one’s  premises),  then  one  is  rationally  obligated  to  withhold  the  premise(s).  
In   such   cases,   believing   the   premise(s)   fails   to   generate   a   rational   obligation   to   believe   the  
conclusion.  If  one  has  (net)  reasons  in  favour  of  the  falsity  of  one  or  more  of  the  premises,  then  
one’s  (net)  reasons  favour  giving  up  the  relevant  premise(s)  over  believing  the  conclusion  of  the  
inference.      In  such  cases,  believing  the  premises  again  fails  to  generate  a  rational  obligation  to  
believe   the   conclusion.      However,   if   one’s   (net)   reasons   speak   in   favour   of   the   truth   of   the  
premise(s),  then  one’s  (net)  reasons  favour  believing  the  conclusion  of  the  inference  over  giving  
up  the  premise(s).      In  such  cases,  and  only   in  such  cases,  believing   the  premise(s)  generates  a  
rational   obligation   to   believe   the   conclusion.   Hence,   on   the   present   picture,   both   kinds   of  
rational   significance—i.e.,   commitment-­‐‑incursion   and   rational   support—are   necessary   for  
explaining  how  believing   (A1)  and   (A2)  generates  a   rational  obligation   to  believe   (A3).      I  will  
refer  to  the  account  just  limned—one  that  posits  two  distinct  kinds  of  rational  significance  that  
an  attitude  may  display—as  the  Dual-­‐‑Significance  Thesis.  
  
4.4.    The  Dispensability  Objection  
It  is  my  contention  that  there  are  two  distinct  kinds  of  rational  significance  that  an  attitude  may  
display.     However,   it  may   be   argued   that,   given   how   I   have   set   things   up,   it   is   unclear   that  




consequences  of  P   since,   in  principle,   all   the  normative  work  may  be  done  by  perceiving  P.67    
After  all,  by  my  own  admission,  perceiving  P  may,  in  the  absence  of  defeaters,  be  sufficient  to  
generate  a  rational  obligation  to  believe  P.     Given  that   this   is  so,   it   is  unclear  that   there   is  any  
need   to   invoke   the   commitment-­‐‑incurring   power   of   belief.   For   example,   suppose   that   I   have  
token-­‐‑decisive  rational  support  for  believing  the  following  propositions:    
  
(A1):   The  streets  are  wet.    
(A2):   If  the  streets  are  wet,  then  it  rained  last  night.      
  
Saying  that  the  rational  support  is  token-­‐‑decisive  means  that  (on  the  occasion  in  question)  it  is  
sufficient  to  generate  a  rational  obligation  to  believe  (A1)  and  (A2).    For  example,  it  means  that  
(on   the   occasion   in   question)   there   are   no   defeaters   in   the   vicinity   that   could   potentially  
undermine  my   perceptual   evidence.   But   suppose   that   I   have   not   adopted   the   corresponding  
beliefs.      In   short,   I   have   failed   to   fulfil  my   rational   obligation.     Nevertheless,   it   still   seems   as  
though   I   am   rationally   obligated   to   adopt   an   attitude   of   belief   towards   the   following  
proposition:    
  
(A3):   It  rained  last  night.      
  
                                                
67 I am here restricting myself to cases of belief based on a perceptual appearance.  This is solely for the sake of 
simplicity. I do not believe that perceptual appearance is the only attitude that provides rational support.  For 
example, memory does as well.  Moreover, the same argument may be reformulated, mutatis mutandis, in terms of 




In  other  words,  given  that  I  have  token-­‐‑decisive  rational  support  for  (A1)  and  (A2),  it  seems  as  
though  I  would  be   liable  to  rational  criticism  for  either  disbelieving  (A3)  or  withholding  (A3).    
This   seems   to   be   true   even   in   cases   in  which   I   have   failed   to   fulfil  my   rational   obligation   to  
believe   (A1)   and   (A2).     And   therein   lays   the  potential  problem   for  my  view.      For   it   seems  as  
though   I   have   incurred   a   commitment   to   believe   the   logical   consequences   of   (A1)   and   (A2)  
simply  in  virtue  of  having  token-­‐‑decisive  rational  support  for  (A1)  and  (A2).    There  is  therefore  
no   work   left   for   belief   to   do.      When   it   comes   to   generating   rational   obligations,   belief   is  
dispensable.      I   will   refer   to   the   present   objection   to   the   Dual-­‐‑Significance   Thesis   as   the  
Dispensability  Objection.      
The   remainder   of   this   chapter   will   be   devoted   to   responding   to   the   Dispensability  
Objection.    This  will  not  only  constitute  a  defence  of  the  Dual-­‐‑Significance  Thesis,  but  will  also  
highlight   a   number   of   important   normative   features   of   belief.     A   preliminary   (but   ultimately  
unsuccessful)   response   to   the   Dispensability   Objection   is   to   point   out   that   a   perceptual  
appearance  can  only  provide  rational  support  in  the  absence  of  defeaters.      It  may  therefore  be  
argued   that   a   perceptual   appearance   does   not   incur   a   rational   commitment   on   its   own.    
However,   this  argument   seems   to  offer   little   comfort   since   the  very  same  point  may  be  made  
with   respect   to   belief.   For   example,   believing   (A1)   and   (A2)   can   only   generate   a   rational  
obligation   to   believe   (A3)   if   there   are   no   defeaters   in   the   vicinity.      Consequently,   there   is   no  
salient  difference  between  perception  and  belief  in  this  regard.      
I  wish  to  pursue  a  different  line  of  argument.    To  this  end,  I  will  argue  that  it  is  a  mistake  
to  assume  that  one  must  have  a  belief  in  order  for  the  kind  of  rational  significance  displayed  by  




Broome),  I  hold  that  the  kind  of  rational  significance  displayed  by  belief  is  wide  in  scope  in  the  
sense   that  an  agent  need  not  have  a  belief   in  order   for   the   rational  norms  governing  belief   to  
have   application   to   the   agent.68         Consider,   for   example,   the   norm   that   says   that   an   agent   is  
irrational  if  she  believes  P  and  also  disbelieves  or  withholds  P.  A  narrow  scope  formulation  of  
this  norm  may  be  expressed  as  follows:      
  
Example  4.1  (Narrow  Scope  Norm):  
If  one  believes  that  P,  then  one  is  rationally  obligated  to  refrain  from  disbelieving  P  and  
withholding  P.    
  
By  contrast,  a  wide  scope  formulation  of  the  aforementioned  norm  is  as  follows:    
  
Example  4.2  (Wide  Scope  Norm):  
One  is  rationally  obligated  to  refrain  from  simultaneously  believing  P  and  disbelieving  P  
or  withholding  P.    
  
                                                
68 The question of whether or not rational norms (or what Broome calls “rational requirements”) are narrow or wide 
in scope remains a hotly contested issue.  Broome typically frames the debate in terms of whether or not we have 
reasons to satisfy the requirements of rationality.  However, at present, I am not interested in answering this 
question.  I appeal to the narrow/wide scope distinction only to get a better handle on the difference between the 
kinds of rational significance displayed by belief and perception.  Significantly, while I affirm that there are wide 
scope rational norms, I do not deny that there are also narrow scope rational norms.  On the contrary, my own 
suspicion is that the norms governing perception (and other attitudes that provide rational support) are narrow in 
scope.  Thus, I remain open to the possibility that while some rational requirements are wide in scope, others are 
narrow in scope. This puts me at odds with Broome, who not only affirms the existence of wide scope rational 
requirements, but also denies the existence of narrow scope rational requirements. I will not attempt to engage in a 
detailed examination of how my proposal fits into the narrow/wide scope debate here, since doing so will take us too 
far afield from the primary concern of this dissertation. For arguments to the effect that the requirements of 
rationality are narrow in scope, see Schroeder [2004, 2009] Kolodny [2005]. For contemporary defenses of the claim 
that the requirements of rationality are wide in scope, see Broome [1999, 2007], Dancy [2000], Wallace [2001], 




One  difference  between  the  narrow  and  wide  scope  formulations  of  the  preceding  norm  is  that  
the   former   is   inconsistent  with   the   observation   that  we   are   sometimes   rationally   obligated   to  
give  up  a  belief  we  already  have  and  adopt  an  attitude  of  disbelief  or  withholding  in  its  stead.    
For  example,  if  I  believe  P,  and  then  encounter  token-­‐‑decisive  rational  support  for  disbelieving  
P,  I  am  rationally  obligated  to  give  up  my  belief  in  P  and  adopt  an  attitude  of  disbelief  towards  
P.    However,  according  to  the  narrow  scope  norm,  if  I  believe  that  P,  I  am  rationally  obligated  to  
refrain  from  disbelieving  and  withholding  P.    This  rules  out  the  possibility  of  revising  the  belief  
I  already  have,  and  adopting  an  attitude  of  disbelief  or  withholding  towards  P  in  its  stead.    As  
such,  I  take  the  narrow  scope  norm  to  be  implausible.  By  contrast,  the  wide  scope  formulation  is  
perfectly  consistent  with  the  observation  that  we  are  sometimes  rationally  obligated  to  revise  a  
belief   we   already   have   in   favour   of   disbelief   or   withholding.      The   only   rational   obligation  
specified   by   the   wide   scope   formulation   is   that   I   ensure   that   I   do   not   both   believe   P   and  
disbelieve  or  withhold  P.    Fulfilling  this  norm  allows  that  I  may  either  abandon  my  belief  that  P  
or  continue  to  believe  that  P  and  refrain  from  disbelieving  and  withholding  P.      
Another  difference  between   the  narrow  and  wide  scope  norms   is   that   the   former  only  
applies   to   an   agent   who   has   a   belief   (and   who   has   therefore   fulfilled   the   antecedent   of   the  
conditional),  while  the  latter  applies  to  an  agent  irrespective  of  whether  or  not  she  has  a  belief.    
Hence,   if  we   assume   that   the   relevant   norms   governing   belief   are   narrow   in   scope,   an   agent  
would   have   to   actually   have   a   belief   in   order   for   the   belief   to   play   a   role   in   generating   the  
agent’s  rational  obligations.    However,  if  we  assume  that  the  relevant  norms  are  wide  in  scope,  
then  they  may  generate  a  rational  obligation  even  if  the  agent  in  question  does  not  have  a  belief.    




that   the  agent   in  question  does  not  have  a  belief  entails   that  no  normative  properties  of  belief  
play  a  role  in  generating  her  rational  obligation.  Contra  this  assumption,  I  maintain  that  it  is  the  
fact   that   the   norms   governing   belief   are   wide   in   scope   that   explains   why   the   normative  
properties  of  belief  can  play  a  role  in  generating  a  rational  obligation  for  an  agent  who  does  not  
have  a  belief.    
However,   if   the   rational  norms  governing  belief   are  wide   in   scope   (in   the   sense   that   I  
have   suggested),   this   seems   to   introduce   a   puzzle.   If   a   certain   norm   applies   to   an   agent  
irrespective  of  whether  or  not  they  have  a  belief,  then  why  should  we  conceive  of  that  norm  as  a  
reflection   of   the   rational   significance   of   belief?      The   short   answer   to   this   question   is   that   the  
relevant   norm   applies   to   belief   and   fails   to   apply   to   other   attitudes   that   share   the   same  
propositional   content   as   belief.      The   slightly   longer   answer   to   this   question   may   be   put   as  
follows.    Consider  the  norm  that  says  that  one  is  rationally  obligated  to  refrain  from  believing  P  
and  also  disbelieving  or  withholding  P.    (In  the  next  section,  I  will  offer  an  explanation  of  why  
this  norm  applies  to  belief.)    It  is  important  to  register  that  a  comparable  norm  fails  to  apply  to  
perceiving  P.      It   is   false   that  one   is   rationally  obligated   to   refrain   from  perceiving  P   and  also  
disbelieving   and   withholding   P.   Since   perceiving   P   and   believing   P   both   share   the   same  
propositional  content,  it  means  that  the  aforementioned  norm  does  not  simply  track  the  logical  
relations  in  which  one  proposition  stands  to  another.      If   it  did,  then  it  would  apply  equally  to  
every  attitude  that  shared  the  same  propositional  content.     This  means  that   the  norm  must  be  
conceived  of  as  applying  to  the  attitude  itself,  rather  than  to  its  propositional  content.    It  is  this  
idea   that   I  aim  to  capture  when   I   say   that   the   relevant  norm  reflects  a   rational   significance  of  




4.5.    Belief  as  a  Reason-­‐‑Receiving  Attitude  
In   this   section,   I  will   attempt   to   fill   in   some   of   the   details   omitted   in  my   initial   reply   to   the  
Dispensability  Objection.    My  aim  is  to  show  that  the  kind  of  rational  significance  displayed  by  
belief  does  something  that  the  rational  significance  displayed  by  perception  cannot  do.    Hence,  
contra  the  Dispensability  Objection,  there  is  still  normative  work  left  for  belief  to  do.  
I   begin  with   the   observation   that   a   belief   is   the   sort   of   attitude   that   one  may   have   a  
justification   for   having,   while   a   perceptual   appearance   is   not.      There   is   a   clear   and   intuitive  
sense   in   which   it   is   appropriate   to   talk   about   an   agent’s   justification   for   believing   P   and   in  
which  it  would  be  inappropriate  to  talk  about  her  justification  for  perceiving  P.    Suppose  I  were  
to  ask  why  you  believe   it   is   raining  outside.      If  you  responded  by  saying  that  you  saw  that   it  
was   raining   outside,   it   would   be   inappropriate   for   me   to   then   ask   for   your   justification   for  
seeing   that   it   is   raining  outside.69     Perceptual  appearances  are   simply  not   the  sort  of  attitudes  
one   may   have   a   justification   for   having.      In   short,   beliefs   are   reason-­‐‑receiving   attitudes   while  
perceptual  appearances  are  not.      I  will   refer   to   the  present  disanalogy  between  a  belief   and  a  
perceptual  appearance  as  the  justification  disanalogy.  
The  thesis   that  beliefs  are  reason-­‐‑receiving  attitudes  has   important   implications  for   the  
normative  nature  of  belief.    Let  us  say  that  an  agent  has  sufficient  justification  for  taking  P  to  be  
true  just  in  case  the  total  evidence  an  agent  has  available  makes  P  more  probable  than  ¬P.    I  take  
the   present   notion   of   sufficient   justification   to   be   a   minimalist   requirement   on   well-­‐‑formed  
belief.    Presumably,  we  will  eventually  wish  to  invoke  a  higher  standard  for  epistemically  well-­‐‑
                                                
69 On this score, it is important to distinguish between asking for someone’s justification for thinking that their 
perceptual appearance is reliable, and their justification for having a certain perceptual appearance.  While the 




formed  belief.     However,   the  minimalist   requirement  will  do   for  our  present  purposes  since   I  
am   only   concerned   with   articulating   a   necessary   condition   for   reasonable   belief.   Given   that  
believing  P  entails  taking  P  to  be  true,  I  hold  that  one  is  only  rationally  permitted  to  believe  P  if  
one  has  sufficient  justification  for  taking  P  to  be  true.    Saying  that  one  is  rationally  permitted  to  
believe   that  P   only   if   one  has   sufficient   justification   for   taking  P   to  be   true  means   that   one   is  
liable   to   rational   criticism   if  one   lacks   sufficient   justification   for   taking  P   to  be   true.  Thus,  we  
arrive   at   the   first   implication   of   the   claim   that   beliefs   are   reason-­‐‑receiving   for   the   normative  
nature  of  belief:  
  
(B1):   The  fact  that  a  belief  is  a  reason-­‐‑receiving  attitude  is  sufficient  to  explain  why  believing  
P  makes  one  liable  to  rational  criticism  if  one  lacks  sufficient  justification  for  taking  P  to  
be  true.  
  
The  fact  that  a  belief  is  a  reason-­‐‑receiving  attitude  also  explains  why  having  inconsistent  beliefs  
makes  one  liable  to  rational  criticism.  If  believing  P  makes  one  liable  to  rational  criticism  if  one  
lacks  sufficient  justification  for  taking  P  to  be  true,  then  believing  ¬P  makes  one  liable  to  rational  
criticism  if  one  lacks  sufficient   justification  for  taking  P  to  be  false.  Thus,  believing  both  P  and  
¬P   makes   one   liable   to   rational   criticism   if   one   does   not   simultaneously   have   sufficient  
justification  for  taking  P  to  be  true  and  false.  However,  it  is  not  possible  to  simultaneously  have  
sufficient   justification   for   taking   P   to   be   true   and   false.   Given   the   minimalist   conception   of  
sufficient   justification   currently   at   play,   having   sufficient   justification   for   taking  P   to   be   true  




The  end  result  is  that  if  one  believes  both  P  and  ¬P,  one  must  be  liable  to  some  kind  of  rational  
criticism  (whether  for  believing  P  without  sufficient  justification,  believing  ¬P  without  sufficient  
justification,  or  both).    Thus,  we  arrive  at  my  second  hypothesis  about  the  fact  that  a  belief  is  a  
reason-­‐‑receiving  attitude:  
  
(B2):   The  fact  that  a  belief  is  a  reason-­‐‑receiving  attitude  is  sufficient  to  explain  why  believing  
both  P  and    ¬P  makes  one  liable  to  rational  criticism.  
  
   The   above   point   may   be   expanded   to   include   not   only   inconsistent   beliefs,   but   also  
inconsistent  doxastic  attitudes  in  general.  On  the  present  analysis,  believing  P  and  disbelieving  
P  makes  one  liable  to  rational  criticism  because  believing  P  makes  one  liable  to  rational  criticism  
if   one   lacks   sufficient   justification   for   taking   P   to   be   true   while   disbelieving   P   (which   is  
equivalent   to   believing   ¬P)   makes   one   liable   to   rational   criticism   if   one   lacks   sufficient  
justification   for   taking  P   to   be   false.   This  means   that   there   is   no  way   to   simultaneously   have  
sufficient  justification  for  both.    It  therefore  follows  that  one  must  be  liable  to  rational  criticism.  
A   similar   argument   may   be   put   forward   to   show   that   simultaneously   believing   P   and  
withholding  P  makes   one   liable   to   rational   criticism.      This   is   because   believing  P  makes   one  
liable   to   rational   criticism   if   one   lacks   sufficient   justification   for   taking   P   to   be   true,   while  
withholding  P  makes  one  liable  to  rational  criticism  if  one  has  sufficient  justification  for  taking  P  
to  be  either  true  or  false.    Since  withholding  P  amounts  to  an  acknowledgement  that  one  lacks  
sufficient  justification  for  taking  P  to  be  true,  and  since  believing  P  makes  one  liable  to  rational  




rational  criticism  for  both  believing  P  and  withholding  P.    This  brings  us  to  my  third  hypothesis  
about  the  fact  that  a  belief  is  a  reason-­‐‑receiving  attitude:  
  
(B3):   The   fact   that   a   belief   is   a   reason-­‐‑receiving   attitude   is   sufficient   to   explain   why  
simultaneously   believing   P   and   disbelieving   P   or   simultaneously   believing   P   and  
withholding  P  makes  one  liable  to  rational  criticism.      
  
It   is  worth  noting   that   (B3)   corresponds  with   the  wide   scope  norm  described   in  Example  4.2.    
We  can  now  see  that  this  norm  is  tied  to  the  fact  that  a  belief  is  a  reason-­‐‑receiving  attitude.  
Next,  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  logical  consequences  of  a  belief.    If  believing  P  makes  
one  liable  to  rational  criticism  if  one  lacks  sufficient  justification  for  taking  P  to  be  true,  and  P  is  
true   only   if   Q   is   true,   then   believing   P   makes   one   liable   to   rational   criticism   if   one   lacks  
sufficient   justification   for   taking  Q   to   be   true.      This   explains   why   one   is   liable   to   rational  
criticism  if  one  either  disbelieves  or  withholds  the  logical  consequences  of  one’s  belief.     Given  
that   believing   P   makes   one   liable   to   rational   criticism   if   one   lacks   sufficient   justification   for  
taking  Q  to  be  true  (where  Q  must  be  true  in  order  for  P  to  be  true),  it  follows  that  one  would  be  
liable  to  rational  criticism  if  one  were  either  to  disbelieve  or  withhold  Q  (which  we  have  already  
established  by  our  argument  for   (B3)).  Thus,  we  arrive  at  my  fourth  hypothesis  about   the  fact  





(B4):   The   fact   that   a   belief   is   a   reason-­‐‑receiving   attitude   is   sufficient   to   explain  why   one   is  
liable   to   rational   criticism   for   disbelieving   or  withholding   the   logical   consequences   of  
one’s  belief.      
  
I   believe   that   (B1)-­‐‑(B4)   displays   four   important   respects   in   which   believing   P   differs   from  
perceiving  P.    Two  points  are  worth  noting  on  this  score.    First,  (B1)-­‐‑(B4)  suggests  that  the  fact  
that  a  belief  is  a  reason-­‐‑receiving  attitude  explains  a  number  of  important  normative  features  of  
belief.    Specifically,  the  fact  that  a  belief  is  a  reason-­‐‑receiving  attitude  explains  why  one  is  liable  
to   rational   criticism   for   having   inconsistent   beliefs,   inconsistent   doxastic   attitudes,   and   for  
disbelieving  or  withholding  the  logical  consequences  of  one’s  beliefs.    Since  a  belief  is  a  reason-­‐‑
receiving   attitude   independently   of   whether   or   not   it   is   justified,   and   (by   extension)  
independently   of   whether   or   not   there   is   a   defeater   present,   it   follows   from   (B1)-­‐‑(B4)   that   a  
belief  displays   these  normative   features  whether   or  not   they   are   justified   and  whether   or  not  
there   is   a   defeater   present.      Second,   since   perceiving   P   is   not   a   reason-­‐‑receiving   attitude,   it  
follows   that  we   cannot   substitute   perception   for   belief   in   (B1)-­‐‑(B4).      This  means   that   even   if  
perception  displayed   the  various  normative  properties   that   constitute   the  explananda  of   (B1)-­‐‑
(B4),  the  explanans  would  be  different.      
Of   course,   it   does   not   follow   from   the   fact   that   perceiving  P   is   not   a   reason-­‐‑receiving  
attitude   that   perceiving   P   does   not   display   the   same   normative   properties   that   believing   P  
displays  in  virtue  of  being  a  reason-­‐‑receiving  attitude.    After  all,  perceiving  P  may  display  these  




However,   I   believe   that   there   are   independent   grounds   for   thinking   that   it   does   not.      Let   us  
consider  each  of  the  aforementioned  normative  properties  in  turn:      
First,  it  is  simply  not  plausible  that  perceiving  P  makes  one  liable  to  rational  criticism  if  
one   lacks   sufficient   justification   for   taking  P   to   be   true.     After   all,   that  would   entail   that   one  
would   be   liable   to   rational   criticism   whenever   there   was   a   defeater   for   one’s   perceptual  
evidence.     Granted,  one  would  be   liable   to   rational   criticism   if   one  adopted  a  belief  based  on  
defeated   perceptual   evidence.      But   one   is   not   liable   to   rational   criticism   for   simply   having  
defeated  perceptual  evidence.      
Second,  one  is  not  liable  to  rational  criticism  for  having  a  perceptual  appearance  that  is  
inconsistent  with  what   one   believes.      For   example,   if   the   two   lines   of   a  Müller-­‐‑Lyer   illusion  
perceptually   appeared   to   be   different   in   length   even   though   (having  measured   them  with   a  
ruler)  one  believed  them  to  be  equal  in  length,  one  would  not  be  liable  to  rational  criticism  for  
having  a  perceptual  appearance  that  was  inconsistent  with  what  one  believed.    A  similar  line  of  
argument   may   be   given   to   show   that   one   is   not   liable   to   rational   criticism   for   having   a  
perceptual  appearance  that  is  inconsistent  with  what  one  disbelieves  or  withholds.      
Third,   one   is  not   liable   to   rational   criticism   for  disbelieving  or  withholding   the   logical  
consequences   of   one’s   perceptual   appearance.   For   example,   suppose   that   line  A   perceptually  
appears  to  be  longer  than  line  B.    Suppose  further  that  I  know  that  line  C  is  equal  in  length  to  
line   B.      It   would   logically   follow   from   the   truth   of  my   perceptual   appearance   that   line   A   is  
longer  than  line  C.    However,  if  I  know  that  lines  A  and  B  are  part  of  a  Müller-­‐‑Lyer  illusion,  I  
may  disbelieve   that   line  A   is   longer   than   line  C.     Moreover,   I  would  not   be   liable   to   rational  




my  perceiving  that  line  A  is  longer  than  line  B.    In  light  of  the  preceding  considerations,  we  may  
not  only  conclude  that  perceiving  P  is  not  a  reason-­‐‑receiving  attitude,  but  also  that  perceiving  P  
lacks   the   normative   properties   that   believing   P   has   in   virtue   of   being   a   reason-­‐‑receiving  
attitude.      
  
4.6.    Implications  of  the  Dual-­‐‑Significance  Thesis  
Three  implications  of  the  analysis  of  belief  and  desire  offered  in  the  previous  section  are  worth  
noting.    The  first  is  that  a  belief  may  be  said  to  incur  a  rational  commitment  irrespective  of  the  
presence   or   absence   of   a   defeater.      This   seems   to   give   rise   to   the   following   question:   If   the  
presence  of  a  defeater  is  sufficient  to  prevent  believing  P  from  generating  a  rational  obligation  
to   believe   the   logical   consequences   of   P,   then   does   it   not   follow   that   it   is   also   sufficient   to  
prevent   believing  P   from   incurring   a   rational   commitment   to   the   logical   consequences   of  P?    
The  answer  is  no.    This  is  because  incurring  a  rational  commitment  to  the  logical  consequences  
of  P   does   not   entail   that   one   is   rationally   obligated   to   believe   the   logical   consequences   of  P.    
Recall,  saying  that  believing  P   incurs  a  rational  commitment  to  Q  entails  that  one  is  rationally  
obligated  to  refrain  from  simultaneously  believing  P  and  disbelieving  or  withholding  Q.    This  is  
consistent  with  being  rationally  obligated  to  give  up  one’s  belief  in  both  P  and  Q.    Hence,  saying  
that   an   agent   has   incurred   a   rational   commitment   to   the   logical   consequences   of  P   does   not  
entail  that  she  is  rationally  obligated  to  believe  the  logical  consequences  of  P.  
    A  second  noteworthy  implication  of  the  analysis  of  belief  and  perception  offered  in  the  




single  inference.    Consider,  for  example,  the  modus  ponens  inference  introduced  in  section  4.3  
(reproduced  below):  
  
(A1):    The  streets  are  wet.  
(A2):      If  the  streets  are  wet,  then  it  rained  last  night.  
(A3):      It  rained  last  night.    
  
According  to  the  view  currently  on  offer,  an  agent,  Aasif,  would  be   liable   to  rational  criticism  
for  believing  (A1)  and  (A2),  and  disbelieving  (A3),  even  if  his  belief  in  (A1)  were  unjustified.    In  
such  a  case,  Aasif  would  be  guilty  of  two  separate  instances  of  irrationality:  the  irrationality  of  
believing   something   he   had   insufficient   justification   for   believing,   and   the   irrationality   of  
having   inconsistent   doxastic   attitudes.      The   same   point   holds,   mutatis   mutandis,   if   Aasif  
believes  (A1)  and  (A2),  based  on  insufficient  evidence,  and  withholds  (A3).      
The   preceding   argument   highlights   an   important   difference   between   saying   that  
believing  P   incurs   a   rational   commitment   to   the   logical   consequences   of  P   irrespective   of   the  
presence  or  absence  of  a  defeater   (i.e.,   the  view  I  accept),  and  saying  that  believing  P   incurs  a  
rational  commitment  to  the  logical  consequences  of  P  only  if  there  are  no  defeaters  present  (i.e.,  
the   view   I   reject).      According   to   the   view   I   reject,   Aasif   is   guilty   of   a   single   instance   of  
irrationality   if   he   believes   (A1)   and   (A2),   and   disbelieves   or   withholds   (A3).      The   fact   that  
Aasif’s   belief   in   (A1)   is   unjustified  means   that   he   is   rationally   permitted   to   adopt   a   doxastic  
attitude   that   is   inconsistent   with   believing   (A3),   such   as   disbelieving   or   withholding   (A3).    




logical   consequences   of   his   unjustified   beliefs.      The   only   irrationality  Aasif   is   guilty   of   is   the  
irrationality  of  having  a  belief  based  on  insufficient  (i.e.,  defeated)  perceptual  evidence.      
However,   according   to   the   view   I   accept,   Aasif   is   guilty   of   two   separate   instances   of  
irrationality.      This   feature   of   the   view   I   accept  may   generate   the   following  worry:   if  Aasif   is  
guilty  of  two  instances  of  irrationality,  then  why  think  that  he  has  a  rational  obligation  to  give  
up  his  belief  in  (A1)  rather  than  adopt  an  attitude  of  belief  towards  (A3)?    After  all,  aren’t  both  
rational   obligations  on  a  par?     Again,   the   answer   is  no.      If  Aasif   is   guilty  of   two   instances  of  
irrationality,   then  he  is  rationally  obligated  to  extricate  himself   from  both.     However,   the  only  
way  to  do  this  would  be  to  give  up  his  belief  in  (A1).    If  Aasif  were  to  simply  adopt  an  attitude  
of   belief   towards   (A3),   he  would   still   be   left  with   the   irrationality   of   believing   (A1)   based  on  
insufficient  evidence.    However,  if  Aasif  were  to  give  up  his  belief  in  (A1),  then  he  would  both  
forego  the  need  to  believe  (A3),  and  he  would  no  longer  be  liable  to  rational  criticism  for  having  
a  belief  based  on  insufficient  evidence.  This  means  that  the  only  way  for  Aasif  to  avoid  rational  
criticism  altogether  would  be  to  give  up  his  belief  in  (A1).  Hence,  the  account  presently  on  offer  
is  able  to  preserve  the  intuition  that  Aasif  is  rationally  obligated  to  give  up  his  belief  that  (A1)  
rather  than  adopt  the  belief  that  (A3).                  
This   brings   us   to   a   third   important   implication   of   the   analysis   of   belief   offered   in   the  
previous   section:   The   fact   that   believing   P   incurs   a   rational   commitment   to   the   logical  
consequences   of   P   is   a   necessary   but   insufficient   condition   for   believing   P   to   give   rise   to   a  
rational  obligation  to  believe  the  logical  consequences  of  P.    There  is  therefore  a  sense  in  which  
the   commitment   incurred  by  believing  P   is  pro   tanto  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis   an  agent’s   rational  obligations.    




commitment  to  the  logical  consequences  of  P.    Rather,  it  is  pro  tanto  in  the  sense  that  incurring  a  
commitment  to  the  logical  consequences  of  P  does  not  always  generate  a  rational  obligation  to  
believe  the  logical  consequences  of  P.    This  comports  with  my  insistence  (in  section  4.3)  that  the  
kind  of  rational  significance  displayed  by  belief  is  not  type-­‐‑decisive.  
Finally,   it   may   be   argued   that   I   have   still   failed   to   address   one   of   the   key   intuitions  
motivating   the  Dispensibility  Objection:  namely,   the   intuition   that  we   can  determine  what  an  
agent’s  rational  obligations  are  by  simply  looking  at  their  (perceptual)  evidence.    For  example,  
consider  the  case  of  an  agent  who  perceives  that  it  is  raining  outside.    Suppose  further  that  the  
rational  support  provided  by   the  agent’s  perceptual  appearance  of   it   raining  outside   is   token-­‐‑
decisive.      Given   this   assumption,   we   do   not   need   to   inquire   into   whether   or   not   the   agent  
believes  that  it  is  raining  outside  in  order  to  know  what  her  rational  obligations  are.    Insofar  as  
she  has  token-­‐‑decisive  rational  support  of  the  proposition  ‘it  is  raining  outside’,  we  are  already  
in   a   position   to   say   that   she   has   a   rational   obligation   to   refrain   from   disbelieving   and  
withholding   the   proposition   ‘it   is   raining   outside’   along   with   any   proposition   that   logically  
follows   from   the   proposition   ‘it   is   raining   outside’.      It   may   therefore   be   argued   that   talk   of  
“rational   commitment   incursion”   is   unnecessary   when   it   comes   to   determining   our   rational  
obligations.70  
Where   I  believe   the  above  argument  goes  wrong   is   that   it  conflates  an  epistemic  claim  
with  an  explanatory  one.    The  Dual-­‐‑Significance  Thesis  does  not  claim  that,  in  cases  in  which  a  
belief  is  rationally  significant,  the  belief  plays  a  role  in  our  knowing  what  our  rational  obligations  
are.    Rather,  it  claims  that  the  belief  plays  a  role  in  our  having  a  rational  obligation.  The  present  
                                                




distinction  may  be   illustrated  by   the   following  example.     Suppose   that   I  am  able   to   tell   that  a  
certain  physical  reaction  has  taken  place  by  observing  tracks  in  a  bubble  chamber.    It  would  be  
absurd  to  conclude  from  the  fact  that  I  did  not  have  to  observe  the  atomic  particles  causing  the  
tracks   in  order   to  know  that   the  physical   reaction   took  place   that   the  atomic  particles  did  not  
play  a   role   in  generating   the  physical   reaction.      In   short,   there   is   a  difference  between   saying  
that  an  atomic  particle  is  necessary  for  a  certain  physical  reaction  to  take  place,  and  saying  that  
observing  the  atomic  particle  is  necessary  for  knowing  that  a  certain  physical  reaction  has  taken  
place.        Analogously,  I  may  grant  that  observing  the  rational  support  an  agent  has  available  is  
enough   for   us   to   know  what   her   rational   obligations   are.      However,   this   does   not   settle   the  
question  of  whether  or  not  belief  plays  a  role  in  an  agent  having  the  rational  obligations  that  she  
has.     Moreover,   it   is  this  question  that  the  arguments  presented  in  this  chapter  have  sought  to  
address  by   casting  belief   as   an   attitude  governed  by  wide   scope  norms.     What   the  preceding  
objection   overlooks,   and  what   the   last   two   sections   attempt   to   show,   is   that   the   only   reason  
someone’s   rational   support   may   play   the   epistemic   role   of   revealing   an   agent’s   rational  
obligations  is  because  there  is  a  need  for  rational  support,  and  the  only  reason  there  is  a  need  
for   rational   support   (as   a   type   of   rational   significance)   is   because   of   the   existence   of   reason-­‐‑
receiving   attitudes,   like   belief.   If   there   were   no   reason-­‐‑receiving   attitudes   like   belief,   there  
would  be  nothing   for  which   to  have   reasons,  no  work   for  perceptual   appearances   to  do,   and  









4.7.  Conclusion    
If   the  arguments  presented   in   this  chapter  are  right,  we  are   left  with   the   following  picture:   In  
order   for   S’s   belief   that  P   to   generate   a   rational   obligation   to   believe  Q   (where  Q   is   a   logical  
consequence   of  P),   the   following   two   conditions  must   be   satisfied:   (1)   S’s   belief   that  P   must  
incur  a   rational   commitment   to  Q,   and   (2)  S  must  have  sufficient   justification   for  believing  P.    
Condition   (1)   is   satisfied   by   the   belief   itself,   owing   to   the   fact   that   it   is   a   reason-­‐‑receiving  
attitude.  Borrowing   the  notion  of  a  wide  scope   requirement   from  Broome,   I  have  argued   that  
the  rational  commitment  incurred  by  a  belief  is  best  conceived  of  in  terms  of  the  following  wide  
scope   norm:      one   is   rationally   obligated   to   refrain   from   simultaneously   believing   P   and  
disbelieving  or  withholding  the  logical  consequences  of  P.  Saying  that  it  is  the  belief  that  incurs  
the  rational  commitment  is  a  way  to  register  that  we  are  making  a  claim  about  a  certain  attitude,  
and   not   merely   a   claim   about   the   logical   relations   that   obtain   between   certain   propositions.  
Unlike   condition   (1),   I   hold   that   condition   (2)   cannot   be   satisfied  by   the  belief   itself.     On   this  
point   Broome   and   I   also   agree.      I   believe   that   this   is   why   the   type   of   rational   significance  
displayed  by  perception  is  necessary.    However,  even  if  one  holds  that  beliefs  are  self-­‐‑justifying  
(a  la  epistemic  conservatism),  one  may  consistently  hold  that  a  perceptual  appearance  may  also  
fulfil  condition  (2).  Hence,  we  may  conclude  that  the  kind  of  rational  significance  displayed  by  
perceptual  appearances  satisfies  condition  (2).    The  end  result  is  that  there  are  two  distinct  kinds  
of  rational  significance  that  conspire  to  explain  how  believing  P  generates  a  rational  obligation  
to  believe  the  logical  consequences  of  P.    











5.1.    Introduction  
According  to  the  cognitivist,  the  desire  to  bring  about  P  provides  rational  support  for  bringing  
about  P  because  the  desire  to  bring  about  P  represents  bringing  about  P  as  good.    The  standard  
strategy  for  resisting  the  claim  that  desires  provide  rational  support  is  to  argue  that  the  desire  to  
bring  about  P  does  not  represent  bringing  about  P  as  good.  In  this  chapter,  I  present  Velleman’s  
objections  to  cognitivism  as  an  example  of   the  standard  strategy  for  arguing  against   the  claim  
that  desires  provide  rational  support.    I  argue  that  Velleman’s  objections  ultimately  fail.    I  then  
attempt  to  fill  in  the  lacuna  left  by  the  failure  of  Velleman’s  objections  by  raising  a  worry  of  my  
own.     However,  unlike  Velleman,  who  attempts   to  meet   the   cognitivist  head  on,   I   attempt   to  
show   that   the   cognitivist   claims   remain   unmotivated   by   offering   an   alternative   picture   of  
practical  rationality.     The  present  chapter  concludes  (in  section  6)  by  sketching  this  alternative  




final  chapter,   I  attempt  to  fill  out  the  picture  further,  using  a  number  of  putative  objections  to  
my  proposal  as  a  foil  for  highlighting  the  more  distinctive  features  of  my  view.    
  
5.2.    The  Objection  to  Simple  Cognitivism  
Velleman   discusses   two   types   of   cognitivism:   simple   and   sophisticated.   According   to   simple  
cognitivism,   desires   provide   rational   support   because   the   object   of   a   desire   is   an   evaluative  
proposition.    Velleman  attributes  this  approach  to  Donald  Davidson.71  On  this  view,  the  object  
of,  for  example,  the  desire  to  have  a  glass  of  water  is  an  evaluative  proposition,  such  as  ‘having  
a  glass  of  water  is  good’.    Insofar  as  an  evaluation  of  having  a  glass  of  water  as  good  speaks  in  
favour  of  having  a  glass  of  water,  simple  cognitivism  entails   that   the  desire   to  have  a  glass  of  
water  provides  one  with  a  reason  to  have  a  glass  of  water.    
Velleman   rejects   simple   cognitivism   because   it  makes   the   possession   of   an   evaluative  
concept  a  necessary  condition   for  having  a  desire,  and   therefore  precludes   the  possibility   that  
infants   and   animals—who   lack   the   relevant   evaluative   concepts—have   desires.      He   puts   the  
point  as  follows:  
  
If the cognitivist seriously means to characterize desire as an attitude toward an 
evaluative proposition, then he implies that the capacity to desire requires the possession 
of evaluative concepts. Yet a young child can want things long before it has acquired the 
concept of their being worth wanting or desirable.72 
  
                                                
71  See: Davidson [1978: 86]. 
 




Insofar  as  the  simple  cognitivist  is  interested  in  offering  a  general  theory  of  desire,  Velleman’s  
objection   seems   apt.      However,   it   is   not   clear   that   simple   cognitivism   is   most   charitably  
conceived  of  in  this  way.    Recall,  simple  cognitivism  aims  to  explain  how  desires  may  provide  
rational   support.      As   such,   the   simple   cognitivist   need   not   see   herself   as   offering   a   general  
theory   of   desire.      Instead,   she   may   see   herself   as   offering   a   theory   of   a   subset   of   desires—
namely,  those  that  provide  rational  support.    Thus,  the  simple  cognitivist  may  consistently  hold  
that  the  desires  of  infants  and  animals  fail  to  provide  them  with  rational  support  because  they  
lack  the  relevant  evaluative  concept  and  also  insist  that  the  desires  of  an  agent  equipped  with  
the  relevant  concepts  may  provide  her  with  rational  support.     In  fact,  since  there  is  agreement  
on  both  sides  of  the  cognitivism  debate  that  infants  and  animals  are  not  the  kinds  of  agents  of  
whom   talk   of   rational   support   is   appropriate,   this   is   precisely   the   sort   of   result   one   would  
expect.  
   Velleman   anticipates   something   along   the   lines   of   the   preceding   response   to   his  
objection:  
  
Of course, the young child may not be susceptible to rational guidance, either, but this 
point hardly counts in Davidson’s favour. When Davidson characterises belief-desire 
motivation as equivalent to rational guidance, he leaves no room for agents who are 
moved by desires without being guided by reasons. The fact that children, who pursue 
desired ends, can nevertheless be too young for rational guidance is therefore a point 
against Davidson, on a par with my point that they can be too young for the concept of 
the desirable.73 
  
                                                




The  above  passage  suggests  that  Velleman  takes  Davidson  to  be  committed  to  the  claim  that  all  
desires  constitute  value  judgements.74    As  such,  the  observation  that  we  do  not  ordinarily  expect  
infants   to   possess   mentally-­‐‑grasped   justification   is   as   much   an   objection   to   Davidson   as  
Velleman’s  original  criticism.75    I  will  not  attempt  to  settle  the  exegetical  question  of  whether  or  
not  Velleman  has  accurately  characterised  Davidson’s  view  here.    Rather,  I  am  interested  in  the  
more   philosophically   substantive   question   of   whether   or   not   the   simple   cognitivist   must   be  
saddled  with  such  a  view.    I  believe  that  the  answer  is  no.    To  see  why  this  is  so,  the  following  
analogy  from  belief  may  be  helpful.    There  are  things  we  take  to  be  true  of  the  beliefs  of  rational  
agents  that  we  do  not  take  to  be  true  of  the  beliefs  of  animal  and  infants.    For  example,  the  fact  
that   a   rational   agent   believes   P   entails   that   she   is   rationally   committed   to   the   logical  
consequences   of   P.      As   we   noted   in   chapter   4,   this   means   that   a   rational   agent   is   liable   to  
rational   criticism   if   she   believes  P   and  Q,   and   also   believes   that  P   entails   ¬Q.     However,   the  
same  cannot  be   said  of  non-­‐‑rational  agents   since  part  of  what  we  mean  when  we  say   that  an  
agent   is   non-­‐‑rational   is   that   the   agent   is   not   subject   to   rational   appraisal.   As   such,   if   a   non-­‐‑
rational   agent   believes   P,   it   does   not   follow   that   she   is   rationally   committed   to   the   logical  
consequences  of  P.    Consequently,  there  is  something  we  take  to  be  true  of  the  beliefs  of  rational  
agents  that  we  do  not  take  to  be  true  of  the  beliefs  of  non-­‐‑rational  agents.  
   The  preceding  disparity  between  the  beliefs  of  rational  and  non-­‐‑rational  agents  stands  in  
need   of   explanation.      One   explanation   of   this   disparity   is   that   there   is   a   difference   in   kind  
between  the  beliefs  of  rational  agents  and  the  beliefs  of  non-­‐‑rational  agents.    On  this  view,  our  
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ordinary  concept  of  a  belief  picks  out  two  different  metaphysical  kinds—the  beliefs  of  rational  
agents   and   the   beliefs   of   non-­‐‑rational   agents—which   are   to   be   distinguished   based   on   their  
different   properties—e.g.,   the   fact   that   the   former   generates   rational   commitments   while   the  
latter  does  not.    Admittedly,  there  are  theorists—most  notably,  Davidson—who  insist  that  only  
the   beliefs   of   rational   agents   are   deserving   of   the   title.      Such   theorists   seem   happy   to   take   a  
revisionist  approach  to  our  ordinary  concept  of  a  belief  by  substituting  a  much  more  narrowly  
circumscribed   theoretical   concept   in   its   stead.      However,   once   one   grants   that   there   is   a  
difference   in  kind  between   the  beliefs  of   rational   agents  and   those  of  non-­‐‑rational   agents,   the  
question   of   whether   or   not   the   latter   still   deserves   the   label   “belief”   turns   out   to   be   largely  
terminological.    It  basically  amounts  to  the  question  of  whether  or  not  we  are  willing  to  have  the  
term   belief   applied   to   two   different   metaphysical   kinds   (thereby   ensuring   that   the   technical  
usage  of  the  word  “belief”  is  consistent  with  the  quotidian  usage)  or  only  one  (thereby  ensuring  
a  technical  usage  that  is  more  restrictive  than  the  quotidian).      
   I   do  not  wish   to   either   endorse   or   impugn   the   claim   that   there   is   a  difference   in  kind  
between  the  beliefs  of  rational  agents  and  the  beliefs  of  non-­‐‑rational  agents,  here.    There  may  be  
other  possible  explanations  of  why  there  are  things  we  take  to  be  true  of  the  beliefs  of  rational  
agents  that  we  do  not  take  to  be  true  of  the  beliefs  of  non-­‐‑rational  agents,  explanations  that  do  
not  require  that  we  say  that  the  ordinary  concept  of  belief  picks  out  two  distinct  metaphysical  
kinds.     For  our  present  purposes,   it   is  sufficient   to  note   that   the  explanation  which  posits   two  
distinct  metaphysical   kinds   is   included   in   the   logical   space   of   possibilities,   is   one   that  many  
theorists  have  taken  seriously  as  a  candidate  explanation,  and  is  one  that  remains  a  live  option  




the   simple   cognitivist   vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis   desire.      To   this   end,   the   simple   cognitivist  may   hold   that   our  
ordinary   concept   of   a   desire   picks   out   two   distinct  metaphysical   kinds:   the   desires   of   agents  
equipped  with  some  set  of  salient  evaluative  concepts  and  the  desires  of  agents   that   lack  said  
evaluative   concepts.      Moreover,   the   simple   cognitivist   may   see   herself   as   only   offering   an  
account  of  the  former.    On  this  view,  it  is  no  criticism  of  simple  cognitivism  to  show  that  it  fails  
to  apply  to  the  desires  of  agents  that  lack  the  relevant  evaluative  concepts  since  the  theory  was  
never  intended  to  provide  an  account  of  the  desires  of  such  agents.  
   At  first  pass,  the  above  argumentative  strategy  may  seem  ad  hoc.    However,  depending  
on   how   we   fill   in   the   details   of   the   view,   the   simple   cognitivist   may   turn   out   to   have   a  
principled  reason  for  the  preceding  restriction.    For  example,  suppose  that  the  simple  cognitivist  
was  committed  to  the  view  that  only  agents  equipped  with  the  relevant  evaluative  concepts  are  
liable  to  rational  criticism  for  their  actions  and  intentions.    Suppose  further  that  only  agents  that  
are   liable   to   rational  criticism  for   their   intentions  or  actions  are  correctly  regarded  as   rational,  
while  agents  that  are  not  liable  to  rational  criticism  for  their  intentions  or  actions  (e.g.,  animals  
and  infants)  are  non-­‐‑rational.    Assuming  that  the  simple  cognitivist  had  reasons  for  holding  the  
preceding  views—both  of  which  strike  me  as  plausible—she  seems   to  have  a  principled  basis  
for  distinguishing  between  the  desires  of  rational  agents  and  the  desires  of  non-­‐‑rational  agents.    
Moreover,   since  simple  cognitivism   is  being  appealed   to   in  order   to  explain  how  desires  may  




agents,   then   the  desires  of   rational   agents   are   the  only  desires   that   are   relevant   to   the   simple  
cognitivist’s  aims.76    
Since  I  do  not  hold  that  desires  provide  rational  support,  it  goes  without  saying  that  I  do  
not   find  the  preceding  considerations  to  speak  decisively   in   favour  of   the   idea  that  desires  do  
provide   rational   support.     However,  what   I   take   the  preceding  considerations   to   show   is   that  
Velleman  has  not  established  that  simple  cognitivism  is  mistaken  or  moribund.    There  are  still  a  
number   of   philosophical/rhetorical   moves   open   to   the   simple   cognitivist   that   Velleman   has  
failed   to   forestall.      As   such,   there   is   still  work   for  Velleman   to   do   if   his   objections   to   simple  
cognitivism  are  to  succeed.        
  
5.3.    The  Objection  to  Sophisticated  Cognitivism  
Having   impugned   simple   cognitivism   (at   least   to   his   own   satisfaction),   Velleman   turns   his  
attention   to   sophisticated   cognitivism.      The   sophisticated   cognitivist   holds   that   a   desire  
provides  rational  support,  not  because  its  object  is  an  evaluative  proposition,  but  because  of  its  
direction  of  fit.    Dennis  Stampe  espouses  a  version  of  sophisticated  cognitivism  when  he  writes:    
  
While the belief and the desire that P have the same propositional content and represent 
the same state of affairs, there is a difference in the way it is represented in the two states 
                                                
76 The suggestion that the desires of an agent equipped with the relevant concepts may play a justificatory role that 
the desires of an infant cannot is not as strange or novel as it may initially seem.  It is widely held that the perceptual 
appearances of an agent equipped with the appropriate concepts may provide her with justification that could not be 
had by someone who lacked the concepts in question. For example, an agent who is equipped with the appropriate 
concepts may come to justifiably believe that there is a fire truck nearby after hearing a blaring siren even though an 
infant or animal (that lacked the appropriate concepts) could not come to have the same justified belief under similar 
circumstances.  If there were a theory of perception that aimed to explain how the perceptual appearances of an 
agent equipped with the appropriate concepts could provide her with justification for adopting certain beliefs, it 
would be no objection to such an account to argue that it failed to apply to agents who lacked the ability to conceive 




of mind.  In belief it is represented as obtaining, whereas in desire, it is represented as a 
state of affairs the obtaining of which would be good.77 
  
By  Stampe’s  lights,  the  desire  to  have  a  glass  of  water  has  the  same  propositional  object  as  the  
belief  that  one  will  have  a  glass  of  water.    Hence,  the  object  of  the  desire  to  have  a  glass  of  water  
is  not  an  evaluative  proposition,  such  as   ‘having  a  glass  of  water   is  good’.  What  distinguishes  
the  desire   to  have  a  glass  of  water   from  the  belief   that   I  will  have  a  glass  of  water   is  how  the  
relevant  proposition  is  represented  by  each  attitude,  with  the  latter  representing  the  proposition  
‘I  am  having  a  glass  of  water’  as  true,  and  the  former  representing  the  proposition  ‘I  am  having  
a  glass  of  water’  as   to  be  made  true.     The  present  characterisation  of   the  difference  between  a  
desire  and  a  belief  is  typically  summarised  by  saying  that  the  attitudes  have  different  directions  
of   fit.     More   generally,   the   belief   that  P   represents  P   as   true,   and   the   desire   to   bring   about  P  
represents   P   as   to   be   made   true.      Assuming   that   the   fact   that   P   is   to   be   made   true   is   a  
consideration  that  speaks  in  favour  of  making  P  true,  then  sophisticated  cognitivism  entails  that  
desires  may  put  us  in  touch  with  a  reason  and  that  desires  therefore  provide  rational  support.  
Since,  according  to  sophisticated  cognitivism,  a  desire  aims  at  the  good  in  virtue  of  its  direction  
of  fit,  rather  than  in  virtue  of  its  propositional  content,  it  does  not  require  that  the  desiring  agent  
possess   a   particular   evaluative   concept.     Hence,   it   sidesteps   the   standard   objection   to   simple  
cognitivism.      Insofar  as  all  desires  share   the  same  direction  of   fit,   the  sophisticated  cognitivist  
offers  a  univocal  account  of  the  desires  of  rational  and  non-­‐‑rational  agents.    Velleman  takes  this  
to  be  an  attractive   feature  of   sophisticated  cognitivism,  one   that  makes   it  more  plausible   than  
simple  cognitivism.    
                                                




   However,   Velleman   maintains   that   while   more   plausible   than   simple   cognitivism,  
sophisticated  cognitivism  has  problems  of  its  own.    If  the  sophisticated  cognitivist  means  to  say  
that   the   good   is   the   constitutive   aim   of   desire,   then   she  must   be   committed   to   saying   that   a  
desire  aims  at  depicting  the  way  the  agent  wants  the  world  to  be  with  the  aim  of  getting  it  right  
that  things  should  be  that  way.    Velleman  sums  up  this  idea  by  saying  that  a  desire  must  track  
the  facienda.    Only  then  is  the  sophisticated  cognitivist  entitled  to  say  that  the  good  determines  a  
desire’s  correctness.    However,  Velleman  insists  that  desire  does  not  track  the  facienda.    At  least  
two  separate  lines  of  argument  in  support  of  this  conclusion  may  be  extracted  from  Velleman’s  
discussion.      
  
5.3.1    The  Constitutive  Aim  Argument  
The   first   line  of  argument   takes   issue  with   the  sophisticated  cognitivist’s  attempt   to  ground  a  
desire’s   capacity   to  provide   rational   support   in   its  direction  of   fit.      Specifically,   it   attempts   to  
establish  that  the  direction  of  fit  of  an  attitude  is  poorly  suited  for  the  purpose  of  determining  
its   constitutive   aim   by   depicting   the   latter   as   too   fine-­‐‑grained   a   concept   for   the   former   to  
capture.      The   label   “constitutive   aim”   is   typically   applied   to   a   feature   of   an   attitude   that  
distinguishes   it   from  all  other  attitudes   (including   those  with   the  same  direction  of   fit).78     The  
following  analogy  is  illustrative:    to  say  that  having  mammary  glands  is  constitutive  of  being  a  
mammal  is  to  say  that  having  mammary  glands  is  both  necessary  and  sufficient  for  a  species  to  
be  a  mammal.    Having  mammary  glands  distinguishes  mammals  from  all  other  animal  species.    
                                                
78 While I am reluctant to attribute this view to Velleman himself, audience members at graduate philosophy 
conferences at Princeton University and the University of Waterloo, where earlier versions of this chapter were 
presented, have either found this view attractive or see Velleman as committed to such a view.  Either way, I take 




Being  warm-­‐‑blooded,   by   contrast,   is   not   constitutive   of   being   a  mammal   since   other   animals  
(such  as  birds)  are  also  warm-­‐‑blooded.    Analogously,  to  say  that  truth  is  the  constitutive  aim  of  
belief  is  to  say  that  having  the  truth-­‐‑aim  is  both  necessary  and  sufficient  for  an  attitude  to  be  a  
belief.      According   to   this   view,   aiming   at   truth   distinguishes   belief   from   all   other   attitudes,  
including  those  that  share  its  direction  of  fit,  such  as  imagining  and  fantasising.      
Given  the  preceding  conception  of  a  constitutive  aim,   it  quickly  becomes  clear   that   the  
good  is  not  the  constitutive  aim  of  desire.    Let  us  assume,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  a  desire  
aims   at   the   good   in   virtue   of   its   direction   of   fit.      This   is   certainly   not   unique   to   desire.    
Ostensibly,  a  wish  or  hope  seems  to  aim  at  the  good  no  less  than  a  desire  does.    For  example,  if  I  
wish  to  bring  about  P  or  hope  to  bring  about  P,  it  seems  as  though  my  wish  or  hope  would  be  
deemed  incorrect  or  defective  (if  it  were  not  good  to  bring  about  P)  to  the  very  same  extent  as  
my   desire   to   bring   about  P.      There   is   no   salient   difference   among   the   three   attitudes   in   this  
regard.     Thus,   if   one  were   to  hold   that   a  desire   aims   at   the  good  because   a  desire   is  deemed  
incorrect  or  defective  if  the  desired  outcome  is  not  good,  then  one  should  be  equally  committed  
to   saying   that  wishes   and   hopes   aim   at   the   good.   But   this   suggests   that,   in   reference   to   our  
earlier   analogy,   the   goodness   aim   is   more   like   being   warm-­‐‑blooded   than   like   possessing  
mammary  glands;   it   is   something   a  desire   shares  with  other   attitudes,   rather   than   something  
that  distinguishes  a  desire  from  other  attitudes.    As  such,  the  good  could  not  be  the  constitutive  







5.3.2  The  Perverse  Desire  Argument  
The  second  line  of  argument  attempts  to  exploit   the  concept  of  a  perverse  desire  to  show  that  
desires   do   not   track   the   facienda.   Velleman   defines   a   perverse   desire   as   a   desire   for   some  
outcome  under  the  very  description  in  which  one  recognises  that  outcome  to  be  bad,  pointless,  
or  unworthy  of   being  desired.     Velleman  does  not   elaborate   on  what   it  means   to   say   that   an  
agent  desires  an  outcome  under  the  very  description  in  which  she  recognises  it  to  be  bad,  but  he  
seems   to  be  borrowing   the   idea   from  Anscombe,  who  notes   that   the  same  act  or  set  of  bodily  
movements  may  be  conceived  of  under  different  descriptions.    For  example,  consider  the  case  of  
an  agent,  Smith,  who  is  being  paid  $50  to  pump  water  to  a  village  using  a  hand  crank.    Suppose  
Smith  comes  to  learn  that  there  is  poison  in  the  water,  and  that  the  act  of  pumping  water  would  
result  in  the  poisoning  the  village.    There  are  two  different  descriptions  under  which  Smith  may  
conceive  of  the  act  of  pumping  water.  
  
   (A):   Pumping  water  in  order  to  make  $50  dollars.  
   (B):   Pumping  water  in  order  to  poison  the  village.  
  
Moreover,   it   is   possible   that   Smith  may   regard   the   act   of   pumping  water   as   good  under   one  
description,  (A),  and  as  bad  under  the  other,  (B).    Moreover,  it  is  possible  that  Smith  may  desire  
to  pump  water  under  description  (A),  but  fail  to  desire  to  pump  water  under  description  (B)—
e.g.,  if  Smith  wanted  to  make  $50  dollars  but  did  not  want  to  poison  the  village.    However,  such  
a  case  would  fail  to  constitute  a  perverse  desire  in  Velleman’s  sense.    Insofar  as  Smith  believes  




if   he  desires   to  pump  water  under  description   (A).     However,  we   can   imagine   an   alternative  
case,  one  in  which  Smith  despises  the  villagers  and  therefore  desires  to  poison  them,  despite  the  
fact  that  he  believes  it  would  not  be  good  to  do  so.    In  this  alternative  scenario,  Smith  desires  to  
pump   water   under   description   (B),   the   very   description   under   which   he   believes   pumping  
water  to  be  bad.    It  is  in  this  second  scenario  that  Smith  may  be  said  to  have  a  perverse  desire,  in  
Velleman’s  sense  of  the  term.  
According  to  Velleman,  if  a  desire  were  really  analogous  to  a  belief  about  what  is  good  
or   worth   desiring   then   it   should   be   just   as   incoherent   to   desire   an   outcome   under   the   very  
description  in  which  one  recognises  it  to  be  bad  or  unworthy  of  being  desired  as  it  would  be  to  
believe  that  a  proposition  were  true  under  the  very  description  in  which  one  recognises  it  to  be  
false.    Velleman  insists  that  the  incoherence  of  believing  something  under  the  very  description  
in  which  one  recognises  it  to  be  false  is  illustrated  by  the  impossibility  of  believing  the  following  
proposition:    
  
(C):   I  am  five  inches  taller  than  I  am.    
  
One  could  not  believe  (C)  because  doing  so  would  require   that  one  take  something  to  be  true  
under  the  very  description  in  which  one  recognises  it  to  be  false.    
By   contrast,   the   coherence   of   desiring   something   under   the   very   description   in  which  
one   recognises   it   to   be   bad   or   unworthy   of   being   desired   is   illustrated   by   the   example   of  





The assumption that desire aims at the good forces the cognitivist to misdescribe 
examples of perverse desire.  Consider, for a particularly vivid example, the figure of 
Satan in Paradise Lost, who responds to his defeat with the cry “Evil be thou my Good.”  
Satan is here resolving to desire and pursue evil, and hence—as he himself puts it—to 
regard evil as good.  But he cannot reasonably be interpreted as adopting new estimates 
of what is valuable—that is, as resolving to cease judging evil to be evil and to start 
judging it to be good.  If Satan ever loses sight of the evil in what he now desires, if he 
ever comes to think of what he desires as really good, he will no longer be at all satanic; 
he’ll be just another well-intentioned fool.  The ruler of Hell doesn’t desire what he 
wrongly thinks is worthy of approval; he desires what he rightly thinks isn’t.79 
 
Velleman   interprets   Satan’s   cry   “Evil   be   thou   my   Good”   to   be   an   expression   of   a   desire   to  
pursue  evil  under  the  very  description  in  which  it  is  recognised  as  such.    If  the  cognitivist  were  
correct   to  conceive  of  desire  as  aiming  at   the  good  in   the  same  sense   that  belief  aims  at   truth,  
then  Satan’s  declaration  would  be  analogous  to  believing  something  under  the  very  description  
in  which  it  is  recognised  to  be  false.    Since  this  is  impossible  in  the  case  of  the  belief,  the  fact  that  
it   is   possible   in   the   case   of   desire   indicates   that   desire   does   not   aim   at   the   good   in   the   same  
sense  that  belief  aims  at  the  truth.    That  is  to  say,  desire  does  not  depict  the  way  the  agent  wants  
the  world  to  be  with  the  aim  of  getting  it  right  that  the  world  should  be  that  way;  desires  do  not  
track  the  facienda.  
 
5.4.    Reply  to  the  Constitutive  Aim  Argument  
The   constitutive   aim   argument   ultimately   fails   as   an   objection   to   cognitivism   because   the  
cognitivist  need  not  be  committed  to  the  claim  that  the  good  is  the  constitutive  aim  of  desire.  To  
this   end,  we  may  distinguish  between   two  notions  of   the  aim  of   a  psychological   attitude:   the  
constitutive  aim  and  the  normative  aim.  Recall,  according  to  Velleman,  the  constitutive  aim  of  an  
attitude  does  not  only  specify  the  correctness-­‐‑conditions  of  that  attitude,  but  also  distinguishes  
                                                




that  attitude   from  all  other  attitudes.     On   this   conception,   to   say   that  desire  aims  at   the  good  
entails  both  that  (1)  the  desire  to  bring  about  P  is  correct  just  in  case  it  is  good  to  bring  about  P,  
and   (2)  only   the  desire   to  bring  about  P   is   correct   just   in   case   it   is  good   to  bring  about  P.  By  
contrast,   the   notion   of   a   normative   aim   simply   specifies   the   correctness-­‐‑conditions   of   an  
attitude.  It  does  not  tell  us  what  distinguishes  a  given  attitude  from  all  other  attitudes.    To  say  
that  the  good  is  the  normative  aim  of  desire  entails  that  the  desire  to  bring  about  P  is  correct  just  
in   case   it   is   good   to   bring   about  P.     However,   it   does  not   entail   that   only   the  desire   to   bring  
about  P  is  correct  just  in  case  it  is  good  to  bring  about  P.    Hence,  the  concept  of  a  normative  aim  
is  weaker  than  that  of  a  constitutive  aim.     While   two  or  more  attitudes  cannot  share  the  same  
constitutive  aim,  they  can  share  the  same  normative  aim.      
   According   to   the  constitutive  aim  argument,   the  desire   to  bring  about  P   cannot  aim  at  
the  good  because  there  are  other  attitudes,  such  as  wishing  to  bring  about  P  and  hoping  to  bring  
about  P,   that   are   correct   just   in   case   it   is  good   to  bring  about  P.     This   argument   relies  on   the  
implicit   assumption   that   the   cognitivist   is   committed   to   the   claim   that   the   good   is   the  
constitutive   aim   of   desire.   However,   pace   Velleman,   I   will   argue   that   (i)   when   almost   all  
cognitivists  say  that  desire  aims  at  the  good,  they  are  most  plausibly  understood  as  having  the  
weaker   notion   of   a   normative   aim   in   mind,   (ii)   the   weaker   notion   of   a   normative   aim   is  
sufficient  to  play  the  theoretical  role  that  the  cognitivist  needs,  and  (iii)   there  are   independent  
reasons  to  prefer  the  notion  of  a  normative  aim  to  Velleman’s  conception  of  a  constitutive  aim.    
Consequently,  Velleman’s  assumption  that  the  cognitivist  is  committed  to  saying  that  the  good  




   In   support   of   (i),   it   is   sufficient   to   note   that   almost   all   cognitivists   hold   that   not   only  
desires,   but   also   intentions,   aim   at   the   good.      By   the   lights   of   almost   all   cognitivists,   the  
intention  to  bring  about  P   is  correct  just  in  case  it  is  good  to  bring  about  P.     It  follows  that,  by  
the   lights  of  almost  all   cognitivists,   the  desire   to  bring  about  P   is  not   the  only  attitude   that   is  
correct  when  it  is  good  to  bring  about  P.    This  suggests  that  when  almost  all  cognitivists  say  that  
desire  aims  at   the  good,   they  have   the  notion  of  a  normative  aim,   rather   than   the  notion  of  a  
constitutive  aim,  in  mind.    
   In  support  of  (ii),  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that  none  of  the  claims  that  Velleman  attributes  
to   the  cognitivist   requires   that  she  be  committed   to   the  claim  that   the  good   is   the  constitutive  
aim   of   desire.     We  may,   following   Velleman,   grant   that   a   desire   can   provide   an   agent   with  
rational  support  only  if  it  tracks  the  facienda.  But  saying  that  desires  track  the  facienda  does  not  
require   that  we  say  that  desires  are   the  only  attitudes  that   track  the   facienda;   it  does  not  entail  
that  the  desire  to  bring  about  P  is  the  only  attitude  that  is  correct  just  in  case  it  is  good  to  bring  
about  P.    It  only  requires  that  the  desire  to  bring  about  P  be  a  member  of  the  set  of  attitudes  that  
are  correct  just  in  case  it  is  good  to  bring  about  P.  Hence,  the  cognitivist  need  not  be  committed  
to  the  claim  that  a  desire  is  the  only  attitude  that  is  correct  just  in  case  its  object  is  good.  If  this  is  
right,   then   the   cognitivist   need   not   be   saddled  with   the   position   Velleman   attributes   to   her:  
namely,  the  claim  that  the  good  is  the  constitutive  aim  of  desire.    
   Some  may  object  to  my  suggestion  that  the  notion  of  a  normative  aim  is  sufficient  to  do  
all  the  work  that  the  cognitivist  needs  on  the  grounds  that  the  notion  of  a  normative  aim  is  an  
insufficient  basis  for  individuating  attitudes.    I  believe  this  charge  gets  things  half  right.    Given  




notion  of  a  normative  aim  cannot  serve  as  a  basis  for  individuating  attitudes.    That  much  seems  
right.      But   why   should   we   expect   the   aim   of   an   attitude   to   play   such   a   role?      Firstly,   the  
cognitivist   never   claimed   that   her   account   of   the   aim   of   desire   should   be   used   as   a   basis   for  
individuating  attitudes.  Secondly,  there  are  other  features  of  a  desire,  apart  from  its  correctness  
conditions,  that  may  potentially  serve  as  an  adequate  basis  for  individuating  a  desire  from  other  
attitudes.80    In  fact,  Velleman  provides  us  with  what  he  takes  to  be  a  perfectly  adequate  basis  for  
individuating   between  desires   and  other   attitudes,   one   that   is   completely   independent   of   the  
fact   that   it   is   correct   just   in   case   the  desired   outcome   is   good.     According   to  Velleman,  what  
distinguishes  desire   from  all   other   conative   attitudes   is   that   it   is   directed   at   a  possible   future  
outcome.    Borrowing  this  idea  from  Velleman,  the  cognitivist  may  say  that  what  distinguishes  a  
desire  from  other  conative  attitudes  is  not  its  normative  aim—i.e.,  the  fact  that  it  is  correct  just  
in  case   the  desired  state  of  affairs   is   true—but   the   fact   that   it   is  always  directed  at   something  
believed  to  be  a  possible  future  outcome.    Given  that,  by  Velleman'ʹs  own  lights,  there  are  other  
features  of  desire  that  can  be  used  to  individuate  it  from  other  attitudes,  the  cognitivist  need  not  
be  committed  to  individuating  attitudes  based  on  their  correctness-­‐‑conditions.  
   In   support   of   (iii),   it   is   worth   noting   that   the   notion   of   a   normative   aim   is,   from   a  
taxonomic  point  of  view,  more  useful  than  the  notion  of  a  constitutive  aim.  This  is  because  the  
                                                
80 I suspect that the assumption that attitudes should be individuated in terms of their correctness-conditions may 
seem tempting because, as philosophers, we are used to talking about propositions and it is common to individuate 
propositions in terms of their correctness-conditions.  This may prime us to see correctness-conditions as an 
attractive basis for individuating various items.   However, this temptation overlooks the many important differences 
between a proposition and an attitude.  In contradistinction to propositions, attitudes display many non-normative 
features.  After all, attitudes are also the subject matter of a number of different empirical sciences, whose interest in 
them is often far removed from their normative underpinnings. This should already hint to us that there is no need to 
make some normative feature of an attitude—namely, its correctness-conditions—the single basis upon which that 
attitude is to be distinguished from all others.  In brief, there are several non-normative features of attitudes that are 
well positioned to serve as a basis for individuating one attitude from another.  In this respect, attitudes differ from 




notion   of   a   constitutive   aim   (which   features   in   the   constitutive   aim   argument)   conflates   two  
very  different  properties  of  an  attitude:  that  which  determines  the  correctness  conditions  of  an  
attitude   and   that   which   distinguishes   a   particular   attitude   from   all   other   attitudes.      Recall,  
according  to  the  constitutive  aim  argument,  truth  is  the  aim  of  belief  because  (a)  believing  P  is  
correct  just  in  case  P  is  true,  and  (b)  believing  P  is  the  only  attitude  towards  P  that  is  correct  just  
in  case  P  is  true.    However,  there  are  many  theorists  (who  would  describe  themselves  as  being  
committed  to  the  claim  that  belief  aims  at  the  truth)  who  are  committed  to  saying  that  not  only  
believing  P,  but  also  perceiving  P  and  remembering  P  are  correct   just   in  case  P   is   true.      If  we  
buy   into   Velleman’s   notion   of   a   constitutive   aim,   we   would   be   forced   to   classify   all   such  
theorists   (despite   their   claims   to   the   contrary)  among   the   ranks  of   those  who  deny   that  belief  
aims  at  the  truth.      
This  is  a  very  unattractive  consequence  of  the  notion  of  a  constitutive  aim  that  features  
in   the   constitutive   aim   argument.      It   equates   a   certain   positive   claim   about   memory   or  
perception—namely,   the   claim   that   remembering  P   or  perceiving  P   is   correct   just   in   case  P   is  
true—with  a  certain  negative  claim  about  belief—namely,   the  claim   that  beliefs  do  not  aim  at  
truth.    Whether  or  not  one  buys  into  the  claim  that  remembering  P  or  perceiving  P  is  correct  just  
in  case  P  is  true,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  there  is  something  awkward  about  saying  that  all  
those  who  do  are  ipso  facto  denying  that  belief  aims  at  the  truth.  This  is  not  a  problem  for  the  
notion  of  a  normative  aim,  which  allows  us   to  consistently  affirm  that  belief  aims  at   the   truth  
and  that  believing  P,  remembering  P  and  perceiving  P  are  all  correct  just  in  case  it  is  true  that  P.    
The  end   result  of   (i)-­‐‑(iii)   is   that   the  assumption   that   the   cognitivist  must  be   committed   to   the  




5.5.    The  Inconsistency  Test  
The  remainder  of   this  chapter  will  be  devoted   to  showing   that   the  Perverse  Desire  Argument  
fails  as  an  objection  to  cognitivism.    I  believe  that  the  problem  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  argument  
assumes  that  the  sophisticated  cognitivist  is  committed  to  an  analogy  between  desire  and  belief.    
This,  I  will  argue,  is  a  mistake.  To  recap,  Velleman  depicts  the  sophisticated  cognitivist  as  being  
committed  to  the  claim  that  desires  aim  at  the  good  in  the  same  sense  that  a  belief  aims  at  the  
truth.    He  then  proceeds  to  point  out  that  the  sense  in  which  a  belief  aims  at  the  truth  precludes  
the  possibility  of  perverse  belief.     Desires,  by  contrast,  do  not  aim  at   the  good   in  a   sense   that  
precludes  the  possibility  of  perverse  desires.     Consequently,  desires  do  not  aim  at  the  good  in  
the  same  sense  that  belief  aims  at  truth.  
Contra   Velleman,   I   claim   that   the   sophisticated   cognitivist   is   most   charitably   seen   as  
being   committed   to   an   analogy   not   between   desire   and   belief,   but   between   desire   and  
perception.   It   is   at   this  point   that   the   theoretical   framework   introduced   in   chapter   4   becomes  
salient.      Recall,   according   to   the   Dual-­‐‑Significance   Thesis,   there   are   two   kinds   of   rational  
significance  that  an  attitude  may  display:  commitment  incursion  and  rational  support.    The  first  is  
the  kind  displayed  by  belief,  and  the  second  is  the  kind  displayed  by  perception.  The  question  
that  now  confronts  us   is   this:  which  of   the   two  kinds  of  rational  significance   is   the  cognitivist  
most  plausibly  seen  as  attributing  to  desire?    The  first  step  to  answering  this  question  is  to  note  
that  it  is  not  plausible  that  a  desire  is  a  commitment-­‐‑incurring  attitude.    
One  test  for  determining  if  an  attitude  is  commitment-­‐‑incurring  exploits  the  observation  
that  an  agent  with  inconsistent  rational  commitments  is  liable  to  rational  criticism.    Call  this  the  




inquiring   about  with   an   attitudinal   contrapositive   of   the   same   type,   and   then   ask   if   an   agent  
with  both  attitudes  would  be  liable  to  rational  criticism.    I  define  an  attitudinal  contrapositive  as  
follows:  
  
Definition  5.1  (Attitudinal  Contrapositive):  
An  attitude,  X,  is  the  attitudinal  contrapositive  of  some  attitude,  Y,  IFF  the  illocutionary  
content  of  X  is  equivalent  to  the  negation  of  the  illocutionary  content  of  Y.  
  
In  the  case  of  belief,  the  notion  of  an  attitudinal  contrapositive  is  relatively  straightforward  since  
the  illocutionary  content  of  a  belief  is  the  same  as  its  propositional  content.    Thus,  the  attitudinal  
contrapositives   of   believing   P   include   believing   ¬P   and   disbelieving   P   (the   latter   being  
equivalent  to  believing  ¬P).    Other  attitudinal  contrapositives  of  believing  P  include  imagining  
¬P   and  pretending   that   ¬P.     However,   the   attitudes   of   imagining   and  pretending   are   not   the  
same   attitude   type   as   believing.      Thus,   they  do  not   fulfil   the   requirement   that   the   attitudinal  
contrapositive   be   of   the   same   type   as   the   attitude   to   which   the   inconsistency   test   is   being  
applied.    Only  believing  ¬P  fulfils  this  requirement.    Hence,  in  order  to  apply  the  inconsistency  
test   to   belief,   we   juxtapose   the   belief   that   P   with   the   belief   that   ¬P   (i.e.,   an   attitudinal  
contrapositive  of  the  same  type),  and  then  ask  if  a  person  with  both  attitudes  would  be  liable  to  
rational   criticism.      Since   the   answer   is   yes,   we   may   conclude   that   belief   is   a   commitment-­‐‑
incurring  attitude.  
In  order   to  apply   the   inconsistency   test   to  an  attitude  with   imperative  content  we  will  




desire   to   bring   about   P   (which   has   the   imperative   content:   ‘bring   about   P!’),   the   attitudinal  
contrapositive  is  the  desire  to  not  bring  about  P  (which  has  the  imperative  content:  ‘do  not  bring  
about  P!’).      Having   determined   the   identity   of   the   attitudinal   contrapositive   of   the   desire   to  
bring   about  P,  we   are   now   in   a   position   to   apply   the   inconsistency   test.     We  merely   have   to  
juxtapose   the  desire   to  bring   about  P   and   the  desire  not   to  bring   about  P,   and   then   ask   if   an  
agent   with   both   attitudes   is   ipso   facto   liable   to   rational   criticism.      I   believe   that   the   most  
plausible   answer   to   this   question   is   no.   For   example,   consider   an   agent   who   wants   to   quit  
smoking,  but  who  continues  to  have  the  craving  for  cigarettes.    A  situation  may  arise  in  which  
such  an  agent  may  be  described  as  both  desiring  to  bring  it  about  that  she  has  a  cigarette,  and  
desiring  to  bring  it  about  that  she  does  not  have  a  cigarette.  It  seems  wrong  to  say  that  the  agent  
is  liable  to  rational  criticism  for  simply  having  the  inconsistent  desires.    
If  the  above  application  of  the  inconsistency  test  seems  inconclusive  (and  some  readers  
may   find   themselves   with   less   than   clear   intuitions   about   what   we   should   say   about   the  
preceding  case),  we  may  also  apply  a  modified  version  of  the  inconsistent  test  by  juxtaposing  a  
desire   with   an   attitude   of   another   type.      However,   in   order   for   the   modified   version   of   the  
inconsistency   test   to   be   effective,   the   second   attitude   must   display   the   following   two  
characteristics.    Firstly,  it  must  be  the  attitudinal  contrapositive  of  the  attitude  we  are  inquiring  
about.      Since   desires   have   imperative   content,   this   means   that   (given   the   definition   of   an  
attitudinal  contrapositive)  the  second  attitude  must  also  have  imperative  content.     Secondly,  it  
must   be   pre-­‐‑determined   that   the   second   attitude   is   commitment-­‐‑incurring.      The   rationale   for  
this   second   requirement   stems   from   the   fact   that   an   agent   who   has   a   pair   of   inconsistent  




means   that   if   the   second   attitude   is   not   already   known   to   be   commitment-­‐‑incurring,   and  we  
find  that  an  agent  with  both  attitudes  is  not  liable  to  rational  criticism,  we  will  have  no  way  of  
knowing  which  of  the  two  attitudes  is  not  commitment-­‐‑incurring.    At  most,  we  will  know  that  
at  least  one  of  the  two  attitudes  is  not  commitment-­‐‑incurring,  without  being  sure  which  one  it  
is,  or  if  both  are.  
For   our   second   attempt   to   apply   the   inconsistency   test   to   desire,   I   propose   to   use   an  
intention  as  the  attitudinal  contrapositive.    We  begin  by  establishing  that  the  intention  is  indeed  
a  commitment-­‐‑incurring  attitude.    To  do  this,  we  merely  juxtapose  the  intention  to  bring  about  
P  and  the  intention  not  to  bring  about  P,  and  then  ask  if  an  agent  with  both  attitudes  would  be  
liable  to  rational  criticism.    The  answer  is  yes.    For  example,  an  agent  who  both  intended  to  have  
a  cigarette  and  intended  not  to  have  a  cigarette  would  be  liable  to  rational  criticism.    It  follows  
that  an  intention  is  a  commitment-­‐‑incurring  attitude.    We  may  now  apply  the  inconsistency  test  
to   desire   by   juxtaposing   the   desire   to   bring   about  P  with   the   intention   not   to   bring   about  P.    
(Notice  that  since  both  the  desire  and  intention  have  imperative  content,  and  the  illocutionary  
content  of  the  intention  is  equivalent  to  the  negation  of  the  illocutionary  content  of  the  desire,  
the  intention  is  the  attitudinal  contrapositive  of  the  desire.)     For  example,  we  may  consider  an  
agent  who   desires   to   have   a   cigarette   but  who   intends   not   to   do   so.      This   is   a   situation   that  
almost  anyone  who  decides  to  quit  smoking  will  find  themselves  in  since  their  desire  to  have  a  
cigarette  is  likely  to  persist  even  after  they  have  adopted  the  intention  not  do  so.    It  is  clear  that  
we  would  not  want  to  say  that  such  an  agent  is  liable  to  rational  criticism.    This  would  have  the  
rather  unpalatable  consequence  that  anyone  who  continues  to  desire  something  after  adopting  




liable  to  rational  criticism  because  she  continues  to  have  a  desire  after  adopting  a  contrapositive  
intention  is  right,  then  it  follows  that  a  desire  is  not  a  commitment-­‐‑incurring  attitude.  
  
5.6.    Reply  to  the  Perverse  Desire  Argument  
Given   that   a   desire   is   not   a   commitment-­‐‑incurring   attitude,   it   follows   that   a   desire   does   not  
display   the   kind   of   rational   significance   displayed   by   a   belief.      If   this   is   right,   then   the  most  
plausible   remaining   strategy   for   establishing   that  desires   are   rationally   significant   is   to   argue  
that   desires   display   the   kind   of   rational   significance   displayed   by   perception—namely,   by  
providing   rational   support   for   commitment-­‐‑incurring   attitudes.      To   this   end,   the   cognitivist  
may  hold  that  desiring  to  bring  about  P  favours  intending  to  bring  about  P  over  not  intending  
to  bring  about  P.     In  this  respect,  the  desire  to  bring  it  about  that  P   is  once  again  analogous  to  
perceiving   that  P,   since  perceiving   that  P   provides   rational   support   by   favouring   believing  P  
over   not   believing  P.     Hence,   the   cognitivist  may   claim   that   desires   provide   rational   support  
with  respect  to  intentions  in  a  sense  analogous  to  how  perceptual  appearances  provide  rational  
support  with  respect  to  beliefs.    
Hence,   the  following  account  of  what   it  means  for  a  desire   to  provide  rational  support  
seems   available   to   the   cognitivist.   Consider   the   following   practical   analogue   to   a   deductive  
inference:    
  
   (E):  I  intend  to  make  an  omelette.  
   (F):    If  I  intend  to  make  an  omelette,  then  it  is  necessary  that  I  intend  to  break  eggs.  





Let  us  assume  that  (E)  and  (G)  are  reports  of  an  intention,  and  that  one  is  committed  to  (E)  or  
(G)   just   in   case  one  possesses   the   corresponding   intentions:  namely,   the   intention   to  make  an  
omelette  and  the   intention  to  break  eggs.  And  let  us  assume  that   (F)   is  something  I   justifiably  
believe  to  be  true.    Being  committed  to  (E)  and  (F)  incurs  a  commitment  to  adopt  the  intention  
reported  in  (G).    However,  one  may  discharge  this  commitment  by  either  adopting  the  intention  
reported  in  (G)  or  by  giving  up  one’s  commitment  to  (E)  or  (F).  We  therefore  need  some  rational  
basis  for  determining  which  way  we  should  discharge  this  commitment.      
The  sophisticated  cognitivist  may   insist   that   it   is  at   this   stage   that   the   rational   support  
provided   by   a   desire   becomes   salient.      Suppose   that   my   reason   for   intending   to   make   an  
omelette   is  my  desire   to  make  an  omelette.     We  may  make   sense  of   the   claim   that  my  desire  
speaks   in   favour   of   my   intention   to   make   an   omelette   by   observing   that   the   desire   is   not  
indifferent   with   respect   to   two   competing   ways   of   discharging   my   commitment.   To   wit,   it  
favours  remaining  committed  to  (E),  and  adopting  the  intention  reported  in  (G),  over  giving  up  
my  commitment   to   (E).  Hence,   the   cognitivist  may  argue   that   the  desire   to  make  an  omelette  
speaks   in   favour   of   intending   to  make   an   omelette   in   the   very   sense   that   perceiving   that   the  
street  is  wet  speaks  in  favour  of  believing  that  the  street  is  wet.  Moreover,  the  cognitivist  may  
argue  that  we  can  only  make  sense  of  how  being  committed  to  (E)  and  (F)  may  justify  adopting  
the  intention  reported  in  (G)  if  we  assume  that  desires  provide  the  type  of  rational  support  that  
is   the   practical   analogue   to   the   type   of   rational   support   provided   by   perceptual   appearance.  
Consequently,   insofar   as   we   are   committed   to   saying   that   perceptual   appearances   provide  




also   be   committed   to   saying   that   desires   provide   rational   support   in   the   context   of   practical  
inferences.  
If  we  take  the  cognitivist  to  be  committed  to  the  thesis  that  the  rational  support  a  desire  
provides  is  the  practical  analogue  to  that  provided  by  a  perceptual  appearance  rather  than  that  
provided  by  a  belief,81  then  the  perverse  desire  objection  loses  its  force.  Consider  an  agent  who  
visually   perceives   the   two   lines   of   the   Müller-­‐‑Lyer   illusion   as   being   different   lengths   even  
though  she  believes  them  to  be  equal  in  length.    The  sense  in  which  perceiving  that  P  represents  
P   as   being   true   is   a   sense   that   allows   an   agent   to   perceive   that   P   even   though   she   fully  
recognises  that  P  is  false.    Consequently,  if  the  sophisticated  cognitivist  holds  that  the  desire  to  
bring  about  P  represents  P  as  an  outcome  it  would  be  good  to  bring  about,  in  a  sense  analogous  
to  how  perceiving  that  P  represents  P  as  being  true,  then  the  sophisticated  cognitivist  may  allow  
for   the  possibility  of  perverse  desires—i.e.,  desiring  something  one   fully  recognises   to  be  bad.    
Along  these  lines,  the  sophisticated  cognitivist  may  hold  that  for  Satan  to  desire  evil  is  for  evil  
to  appear  good  to  Satan.    However,  this  no  more  entails  that  Satan  believes  or  judges  that  evil  is  
good  than  experiencing  what  one  knows  to  be  a  perceptual  illusion  entails  believing  or  judging  
that  it  is  veridical.  Since,  according  to  the  present  view,  Satan  is  neither  benighted  nor  confused  
about  what  is  actually  good,  the  sophisticated  cognitivist  is  able  to  preserve  the  satanic  quality  
of  Milton’s  Satan;  to  wit,  she  is  able  to  preserve  the  intuition  that  Satan  desires  evil  even  though  
he  does  not  mistakenly  believe  that  it  is  good.82    
                                                
81 Sergio Tenenbaum [2007] advocates something very close to this view. See and Cf. Scanlon [1998: 38]. 
 
82 The present reply to the perverse desire objection is consistent with Michael Stocker’s [1979] denial of the claim 





The  preceding  cognitivist   account  allows   for  a  much  more   flat-­‐‑footed   interpretation  of  
Satan’s   declaration,   “Evil   be   thou  my  Good”,   than  Velleman’s   analysis.  Velleman   claims   that  
“Satan  is  here  resolving  to  desire…evil.”83    However,  if  (as  Velleman  insists)  desire  does  not  aim  
at  the  good,  then  it  becomes  mysterious  why  resolving  to  desire  evil  amounts  to  taking  evil  to  
be  “Good”.    If  (as  Velleman  insists)  there  is  absolutely  no  sense  in  which  evil  is  good  to  Satan,  
then  why  does  not  Satan  simply  declare:  “Evil  be   thou  my  Evil”?     One  natural  answer   to   this  
question  is  that  saying  “Evil  be  thou  my  Evil”  would  fail  to  convey  that  Satan  was  resolving  to  
desire  and  pursue  evil.     On  the  contrary,  had  Satan  declared  “Evil  be  thou  my  Evil”,   it  would  
give  the  misleading  impression  that  Satan  did  not  desire  evil  after  all.    If  this  is  right,  then  it  is  
hard  to  think  of  any  clearer  evidence  of  a  conceptual  connection  between  desire  and  the  good.    
But  if  (as  Velleman  insists)  there  is  no  conceptual  connection  between  desire  and  the  good,  there  
would  be  no  reason  to  think  that  the  declaration  “Evil  be  thou  my  Good”  expresses  a  resolution  
to  desire  evil.    This  suggests  that  there  is  an  internal  tension  in  Velleman’s  analysis.    If  Velleman  
is  correct  in  saying  that  there  is  no  conceptual  connection  between  desire  and  the  good,  then  he  
is  not  entitled  to  say—as  he  in  fact  does—that  the  declaration  “Evil  be  thou  my  Good”  expresses  
a   resolution   to  desire  evil.     But   if  Velleman   is  not  entitled   to  say   that   the  declaration  “Evil  be  
thou   my   Good”   expresses   a   resolution   to   desire   evil,   then   his   would-­‐‑be   counterexample   to  




                                                




5.7.    Conclusion  
In   this   chapter,   I   have   used   the   framework   for   understanding   the   rational   significance   of   an  
attitude   provided   in   chapter   4—namely,   the   Dual-­‐‑Significance   Thesis—to   diagnose   where  
Velleman’s   objection   to   sophisticated   cognitivism   goes   wrong.      Velleman   depicts   the  
sophisticated   cognitivist   as   committed   to   the   claim   that  desires  provide   rational   support.     He  
also  depicts   the   cognitivist   as   committed   to   an  analogy  between  desire   and  belief.     However,  
these  two  characterisations  are  at  odds  with  each  other.    If  the  cognitivist  were  really  committed  
to  an  analogy  between  desire  and  belief,  then  she  would  be  committed  to  saying  that  a  desire  is  
a   commitment-­‐‑incurring   attitude.      But,   by   Velleman’s   own   lights,   the   cognitivist   is   actually  
committed   to   saying   that  desires  provide   rational   support.     This  means   that   the   cognitivist   is  
actually  committed   to  an  analogy  between  desire  and  perception.     However,  once  we  register  
that   a   desire   is   analogous   to   a   perception   rather   than   a   belief,   Velleman’s   objection   to  
sophisticated  cognitivism  lapses.      











6.1.    Introduction  
In   this   chapter,   I   advance   and   defend   an   argument   against   the   claim   that   desires   provide  
rational   support.   Unlike   the   arguments   against   cognitivism   currently   represented   in   the  
literature  (such  as  the  arguments  by  David  Velleman  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter),  which  
attempt   to   show   that   desires   do   not   provide   rational   support   by   impugning   the   claim   that  
desires   represent   their   object   as   good,   the   present   chapter   argues   that   even   if   desires   do  
represent  their  object  as  good,  it  does  not  follow  that  desires  provide  rational  support.    On  the  
contrary,  we  have  good  reason  to  think  that  even  if  desires  did  represent  their  object  as  good,  
desires   would   fail   to   provide   anything   that   could   plausibly   be   called   rational   support.      In  
sections   6.2   and   6.3,   I   present   the   core   of  my   argument.      In   sections   6.4   –   6.7,   I   respond   to   a  
number  of  objections  to  my  argument,  and  in  the  process  of  so  doing  elaborate  on  key  features  
of   my   analysis   of   desire.      In   section   6.8,   I   conclude   by   highlighting   some   of   the   wider  





6.2.    Desire,  Perception,  and  Coin-­‐‑flips  
There  are  two  ways  in  which  one  attitude  may  favour  another  that  are  relevant  to  the  present  
discussion:  
  
Definition  6.1  (Conformatively  Favour):  
X  conformatively  favours  Y  IFF  X  offers  a  verdict  that  coincides  with  the  verdict  of  Y.  
  
Definition  6.2  (Confirmatively  Favour):  
X  confirmatively  favours  Y  IFF  X  offers  evidence  that  corroborates  the  verdict  of  Y.  
  
The   distinction   between   conformatively   favouring   and   confirmatively   favouring   may   be  
illustrated  by  contrasting  guessing  that  P  and  perceiving  that  P.     Suppose  that  I  guess  that  the  
street  is  wet.    My  guess  offers  a  verdict  that  coincides  with  the  verdict  of  the  belief  that  the  street  
is  wet.  As  such,  my  guess  that  the  street  is  wet  conformatively  favours  the  belief  that  the  street  
is  wet.     However,   the   guess   that   the   street   is  wet   fails   to   lend   any   evidential   support   for   the  
belief   that   the   street   is  wet.     As   such,  my  guess   that   the   street   is  wet  does  not   confirmatively  
favour  believing  that  the  street  is  wet.    Contrast  this  with  perceiving  that  the  street  is  wet.    Like  
guessing   that   the   street   is  wet,  perceiving   that   the   street   is  wet  offers   a  verdict   that   coincides  
with  the  verdict  of  the  belief  that  the  street  is  wet.    As  such,  perceiving  that  the  street  is  wet  also  
conformatively  favours  the  belief  that  the  street  is  wet  over  the  belief  that  the  street  is  not  wet.    




street  is  wet.  As  such,  perceiving  that  the  street  is  wet  confirmatively  favours  believing  that  the  
street  is  wet.  
The   fact   that   some   attitude,   X,   conformatively   favours   some   other   attitude,   Y,   is   not  
sufficient  for  X  to  provide  rational  support  for  Y.    For  example,  guessing  that  P  fails  to  provide  
rational   support   for   believing   that   P,   even   though   guessing   that   P   conformatively   favours  
believing  that  P.     This  suggests  that  we  must  add  a  further  requirement  to  the  characterisation  
of   the  kind  of   rational   significance  displayed  by  perceptual   appearances   limned   in   chapter   4.  
Hence,  I  propose  the  following  definition  of  rational  support:  
  
Definition  6.3  (Rational  Support):  
X  provides  S  with  rational  support  for  P  IFF  X  confirmatively  favours   the  adoption  of  an  
attitude  that  rationally  commits  S  to  P.  
  
If   the   cognitivist   is   going   to   succeed   in   showing   that   desires   provide   rational   support   in   the  
same  sense  that  perception  does,  it  is  not  enough  for  her  to  show  that  the  desire  to  bring  about  P  
conformatively   favours   intending   to   bring   about  P.      She  must   show   that   the   desire   to   bring  
about   P   confirmatively   favours   intending   to   bring   about   P.      However,   I   argue   that   the  
cognitivist  is  at  most  entitled  to  say  that  the  desire  to  bring  about  P  conformatively  favours  the  
intention   to   bring   about   P.      This   is   because   the   cognitivist   has   failed   to   rule   out   a   certain  
possibility:   namely,   that   when   it   comes   to   its   rational   significance,   a   desire   may   be   more  
analogous  to  a  guess  than  a  perceptual  experience.    





Example  6.1  (Chocolate  Intention):  
Lin   is  at   the   supermarket  attempting   to  decide  between   two  unfamiliar   flavours  of   ice  
cream:   chocolate   and  vanilla.      Since   she  has   no   idea  what   ice   cream   ingredients  work  
well   together,   she   has   no   evidence   that   either   flavour   is   better   than   the   other.      Lin  
decides  to  flip  a  coin.     She  assigns  the  value  of  head-­‐‑side-­‐‑up  to  the  outcome:  ‘purchase  
chocolate   rather   than   vanilla’,   and   the   value   of   tail-­‐‑side-­‐‑up   to   the   outcome:   ‘purchase  
vanilla   rather   than  chocolate’.     When   the   coin   lands  head-­‐‑side-­‐‑up,   she  proceeds   to   the  
cash  register,  pays,  and  exits  the  supermarket  with  chocolate  in  her  grocery  bag.  When  
Lin  arrives  home,  her  roommate  inquires  into  why  she  bought  chocolate  as  opposed  to  
some   other   flavour.      Lin   responds:   “I   wasn’t   familiar   with   either   of   the   two   flavours  
available,  and  so  I  had  no  reasons  in  favour  of  purchasing  one  flavour  over  another.    So  I  
decided  to  base  my  decision  on  a  coin-­‐‑flip.”  
  
I  take  the  following  to  be  true  of  the  Chocolate  Intention  example:    
  
(1) The   result   of   Lin’s   coin-­‐‑flip   (which   I   am   here   assuming   is   no   better   than   a   guess)  
conformatively  favours  purchasing  chocolate  rather  than  vanilla.  
  






(3) Lin  is  not  liable  to  rational  criticism  for  basing  her  decision  to  purchase  chocolate  rather  
than  vanilla  on  a  coin-­‐‑flip.  
    
(1)   follows   straightforwardly   from   our   definition   of   the   conformatively   favouring   relation.    
When  Lin  assigns  the  value  of  head-­‐‑side-­‐‑up  to  the  proposition  ‘purchase  chocolate  rather  than  
vanilla’,  and  the  value  of  tail-­‐‑side-­‐‑up  to  the  proposition  ‘purchase  vanilla  rather  than  chocolate’,  
the  fact  that  the  coin  lands  head-­‐‑side-­‐‑up  means  that  the  coin-­‐‑flip  offers  a  verdict  that  coincides  
with  the  intention  to  purchase  chocolate  rather  than  vanilla.      (2)  follows  from  the  fact  that  the  
coin-­‐‑flip  fails  to  provide  Lin  with  evidence  (or  anything  remotely  analogous  to  evidence)  that  it  
would  be  good  for  the  outcome  ‘purchase  chocolate  rather  than  vanilla’  to  be  brought  about.  I  
take  (3)  to  be  uncontroversial.  Were  we  in  Lin’s  roommate’s  shoes,  we  wouldn’t  think  that  there  
was  something  rationally  problematic  about  Lin’s  answer.    
Now,  consider  the  following  modified  version  of  the  Chocolate  Intention  example:  
  
Example  6.2  (Chocolate  Belief):    
Lin   is  at   the   supermarket  attempting   to  decide  between   two  unfamiliar   flavours  of   ice  
cream:  chocolate  and  vanilla,   just  as  in  Example  6.1.    However,  in  addition  to  adopting  
the   intention   to   purchase   chocolate   rather   than   vanilla,   let   us   suppose   that   Lin   also  
comes   to   believe   that   chocolate   is   preferable   to   vanilla.  When   her   roommate   inquires  
into   why   she   believes   that   chocolate   is   preferable   to   vanilla,   Lin   responds:   “Since   I  




believe  one  flavour  was  preferable  to  the  other.    So  I  decided  to  base  my  belief  on  a  coin-­‐‑
flip.”  
  
In  contradistinction  to  the  first  example,  Lin’s  response  in  the  second  example   is  unsatisfying.    
This   suggests   an   important   disanalogy   between   rationally   permissible   belief   and   rationally  
permissible  intention.    While  it  is  rationally  permissible  to  adopt  an  intention  to  bring  about  P  
even   though   one   recognises   that   one   has   no   reason   in   favour   of   bringing   about   P,   it   is   not  
rationally   permissible   to   adopt   the   belief   that   P   if   one   recognises   that   one   has   no   reason   in  
favour  of  the  truth  of  P.    In  section  6.8,  I  offer  an  explanation  of  this  disanalogy.    However,  for  
now,   it   is   sufficient   to  note   that   the  disanalogy   exists,   and   to  get   clear   on  how   it   fits   into   the  
rhetorical  structure  of  my  argument.      
Saying  that  an  attitude  is  rationally  significant  means,  inter  alia,  that  it  plays  a  role  that  
cannot   be   played   by   an   attitude   that   lacks   rational   significance.      This   is   easily   illustrated   by  
considering   the   rational   significance   of   perceptual   appearances.      For   example,   suppose   I   am  
looking   out   my   office   window   and   it   perceptually   appears   to   me   as   if   it   is   raining.      Ex  
hypothesi,  this  perceptual  appearance  provides  rational  support  for  the  belief  that  it  raining.    By  
contrast,  consider  the  case  in  which  I  am  in  a  windowless  room  and  I  guess  that  it  is  raining.    Ex  
hypothesi,  my  guess  that  it   is  raining  does  not  provide  rational  support  for  the  belief  that  it   is  
raining.  Part  of  what  this  means  is  that  the  guess  that  it  is  raining  cannot  be  substituted  for  the  
perceptual  appearance  of  it  raining  without  altering  the  rational  standing  of  my  belief  that  it  is  
raining.      The   preceding   point   generalises.      One   cannot   substitute   an   attitude,   X,   which   is  




not  rationally  significant  relative  to  Y,  and  have  the  rational  standing  of  Y  remain  unchanged.    
Call  this  the  non-­‐‑substitutability  principle.  
Consider  once  again  the  Chocolate  Intention  example.    The  situation  Lin  finds  herself  in  
is,   in   a   certain   sense,   unusual.      We   do   not   typically   base   our   practical   decisions   (i.e.,   our  
decisions   about   which   intentions   to   adopt)   on   coin-­‐‑flips.      In   most   real   life   situations,   our  
practical   decisions   are   based   on   desires.   Of   course,   since   Lin   is   unfamiliar   with   the   two   ice  
cream  flavours  (and,  as  a  result,  does  not  have  a  preference  either  way),  she  is  not  in  a  position  
to  base  her  decision  on  a  desire.  This  is  why  Lin  is  forced  to  resort  to  a  coin-­‐‑flip.     And  therein  
lies  the  rub.    In  the  absence  of  a  desire,  a  coin-­‐‑flip  may  be  deployed  to  play  the  same  role  that  
the   desire   would   play.      Moreover,   deploying   a   coin-­‐‑flip   (in   lieu   of   a   desire)   preserves   the  
rational  standing  of  the  relevant  intention.    In  other  words,  one  may  substitute  a  coin-­‐‑flip  (i.e.,  
something  that  provides  no  rational  support)  for  a  desire  without  altering  the  rational  standing  
of  an  intention  based  on  said  desire.    Given  the  non-­‐‑substitutability  principle,  I  take  this  to  show  
that  the  desire  also  fails  to  provide  rational  support.    
Some  may   object   that   the   Lin   example   is   so   unusual   that   the   results   of   the   preceding  
argument  fail  to  generalise.    After  all,  it  has  already  been  acknowledged  that  the  Lin  example  is  
an  atypical  case.    Given  that  we  are  not  typically  in  the  situation  in  which  Lin  finds  herself,  why  
should   we   take   the   Chocolate   Intention   example   as   a   basis   for   a   general   conclusion   about  
desires?   I  believe   that   this  objection  rests  on  a  misunderstanding  of   the  rhetorical   structure  of  
my  argument.  What  the  Chocolate  Intention  example  illustrates  is  that  if  we  take  the  standard  
case   in  which  an  agent  makes  a  decision  based  on  a  desire,   and  we   replace   the  desire  with  a  




standing  of   an   intention  based  on   the  desire.      This,   I   claim,   shows   that   a  desire   has  no  more  
rational  significance   than  a  coin-­‐‑flip.      If  we  are  going  to  assess  whether  or  not   this  conclusion  
generalises,  then  the  question  we  need  to  ask  is  this:  Is  there  some  salient  respect  in  which  the  
practical  decision  with  which  Lin  is  confronted  is  structurally  dissimilar  to  the  range  of  cases  in  
which  an  agent  adopts  an  intention  based  on  a  desire?    I  will  argue  that  the  answer  is  no.      
Let   us   begin   with   the   most   basic   case,   one   in   which   an   agent   is   confronted   with   a  
practical   decision   involving   only   one   course   of   action.      In   such   a   case,   the   choice   is   between  
action  and  inaction.    The  agent  may  either  adopt  an  intention  to  act,  or  adopt  an  intention  not  to  
act.    (Of  course,  there  is  a  third  case,  one  in  which  an  agent  simply  fails  to  adopt  any  intention  
whatsoever.    However,  since  in  such  a  case  there  is  no  intention  that  stands  in  need  of  rational  
support,   it   fails   to   provide   us   with   a   test   case   for   determining   if   desires   provide   rational  
support.    We  may  therefore  ignore  such  cases  for  now.)  We  can  easily  imagine  a  coin-­‐‑flip  being  
substituted   for   a   desire   in   such   cases  without   changing   the   rational   standing   of   the   relevant  
intention.    There  is  therefore  no  reason  to  think  that  the  basic  case  poses  any  special  challenge  
for  my  argument.    All  other  (non-­‐‑basic)  cases  involve  a  choice  between  two  or  more  courses  of  
action.      Moreover,   we   can   easily   imagine   a   coin-­‐‑flip   (or,   in   the   case   of   practical   decisions  
involving  more   than   two   courses   of   action,   some   other   suitable   random   selection   procedure)  
being  substituted  for  the  desire  without  changing  the  rational  standing  of  the  intention.  Given  
that   the  basic   cases   (i.e.,   those   involving  a   choice  between  action  and   inaction)   and  non-­‐‑basic  
cases   (i.e.,   those   involving  a  choice  between   two  or  more  actions)  exhaust   the   logical   space  of  
possibilities  as  far  as  practical  decisions  are  concerned,  and  given  that  a  coin-­‐‑flip  (or  some  other  




without  changing  the  rational  standing  of  the  relevant  intention,   it  follows  that  the  conclusion  
of  my  argument  is  generalizable.  
  
6.3.    The  Juxtaposition  of  Desire  and  Coin-­‐‑flip  
In   the   previous   section,   I   argued   that   the   fact   that   a   desire   can   be   replaced   by   a   coin-­‐‑flip  
(without  altering  the  rational  standing  of  an  intention  based  on  it)  suggests  that  a  desire  offers  
no  more  rational  support  than  a  coin-­‐‑flip.    However,  the  following  example  seems  to  cast  doubt  
on  this  conclusion:  
  
Example  6.3  (Chocolate  Desire):  
Lin  is  at  the  supermarket  trying  to  decide  between  two  flavours  of  ice  cream.    Suppose  
that   Lin   desires   to   ‘purchase   chocolate   rather   than   vanilla’.      But   for   no   reason  
whatsoever,  she  decides  to  disregard  her  desire  and  flip  a  coin.  She  assigns  the  value  of  
head-­‐‑side-­‐‑up   to   the   outcome   ‘purchase   chocolate   rather   than  vanilla’   and   the  value   of  
tail-­‐‑side-­‐‑up   to   the  outcome   ‘purchase  vanilla   rather   than  chocolate’.     She   flips   the  coin  
and   it   lands   tail-­‐‑side-­‐‑up—favouring   the   intention   to   ‘purchase   vanilla   rather   than  
chocolate’.  Lin  then  adopts  the  intention  to  'ʹpurchase  vanilla  rather  than  chocolate'ʹ  based  
on  her  coin-­‐‑flip.  
  
There  seems  to  be  something  problematic  about  Lin’s  decision  to  purchase  vanilla  rather  than  
chocolate   based   on   her   coin-­‐‑flip,   given   that   she   desires   to   purchase   chocolate   rather   than  




putative   irrationality  seems  tied  to   the   fact   that  she  privileges   the  coin-­‐‑flip  over  her  desire.      If  
this   is   right,   then   it  seems  as   though  a  desire  does  have  a  rational  significance   that  a  coin-­‐‑flip  
lacks,  and  that  this  fact  explains  why  Lin  is  irrational  for  acting  on  the  coin-­‐‑flip  rather  than  on  
her  desire.    
Of  course,  we  can  imagine  cases  in  which  Lin  has  independent  reasons  to  disregard  her  
desire  or  independent  reasons  to  flip  a  coin.    In  such  cases,  deciding  to  privilege  a  coin-­‐‑flip  over  
her   desires   is   unlikely   to   be   rationally   problematic.     However,   the  Chocolate  Desire   example  
asks  us  to  consider  a  case  in  which  Lin  has  no  independent  reasons  to  disregard  her  desire  and  
no  independent  reasons  to  flip  a  coin.    This  is  because  if  we  allow  for  the  possibility  that  Lin  has  
independent  reasons  to  disregard  her  desire  or  independent  reasons  to  flip  a  coin,  then  it  may  
turn  out  that  desires  do  provide  reasons,  but  that  the  reasons  in  question  are  outweighed  by  the  
reasons  she  has  for  disregarding  her  desire  or  the  reasons  she  has  for  flipping  a  coin.    In  order  to  
preclude   this   possibility,   we   must   restrict   our   attention   to   cases   in   which   an   agent   has   no  
independent   reasons   to   disregard   her   desire   and   no   independent   reasons   to   flip   a   coin.  
However,   it   is   equally   important   that   the   agent   in   question   has   no   independent   reasons   for  
having  the  desire  she  has,   for   it  may  turn  out   that  she  has  more  reason  to  purchase  chocolate  
rather   than  vanilla   (in  agreement  with  her  desire),  but   that   the  reason   in  question   is  provided  
not  by  the  desire,  but  by  whatever  consideration  provides  her  with  a  reason  to  have  the  desire.    
In  order  to  rule  out  this  possibility,  we  must  restrict  our  attention  to  cases  in  which  there  are  no  
independent   considerations   that   constitute   a   reason   for   Lin   to   desire   to   purchase   chocolate  




a   desire   offers  more   rational   support   than   a   coin-­‐‑flip,   it  must   include   the   stipulation   that   an  
agent  has  no  independent  reasons  for  either  the  desire  or  the  coin-­‐‑flip.    
To   sum   up,   the   claim   of   the   Chocolate   Desire   example   is   this:   when   we   consider   a  
situation  in  which  Lin  has  no  independent  reasons  for  either  her  desire  or  for  flipping  the  coin,  
we   find  ourselves  with   the   intuition   that  Lin   is   rationally   required   to  act  on  her  desire   rather  
than  on  the  coin-­‐‑flip.    This  suggests  that  a  desire  and  a  coin-­‐‑flip  are  not  really  on  par,  rationally  
speaking.    
  
6.4.    The  Juxtaposition  of  Coin-­‐‑flip  and  Coin-­‐‑flip  
It  may  be  argued  that  once  we  begin  to  fill  out  the  Chocolate  Desire  example  in  such  a  way  that  
it  becomes  clear  that  Lin  has  no  independent  reasons  for  her  desire  to  purchase  chocolate  rather  
than   vanilla   and   no   independent   reasons   for   her   decision   to   flip   a   coin,   it   becomes   less  
intuitively  obvious   that  Lin   is  being   irrational  when  she  decides   to  act  on  her   coin-­‐‑flip   rather  
than  on  her  desire.     According  to  this  line  of  thought,  we  are  only  inclined  to  think  that  Lin  is  
being   irrational   when   she   decides   to   act   on   the   coin-­‐‑flip   rather   than   on   her   desire   because,  
under  normal  circumstances,  an  agent  has  reasons  for  her  desires.  Since  whatever  consideration  
speaks  in  favour  of  the  desire  to  bring  about  P  is  also  likely  to  speak  in  favour  of  the  intention  to  
bring  about  P,  it  is  likely  that  whenever  an  agent  desires  to  bring  about  P,  she  also  has  a  reason  
to  intend  to  bring  about  P.    Moreover,  it  is  the  reasons  the  agent  has  for  her  desire,  rather  than  
the  desire  per  se,  that  account  for  the  intuition  that  Lin  is  being  irrational  when  she  disregards  
her  desire  and  acts  on  her  coin-­‐‑flip.    According  to  the  present  analysis  of  the  Chocolate  Desire  




no  consideration  that  speaks  in  favour  of  her  desire  and  that  may  potentially  speak  in  favour  of  
an  intention  based  on  her  desire—the  intuition  that  Lin  is  being  irrational  for  disregarding  her  
desire  and  acting  on  the  coin-­‐‑flip  lapses.      
Unfortunately,   the   above   line   of   reply   is   not   one   that   is   available   to   me   since   it   is  
inconsistent   with   other   features   of   my   view.   Simply   put,   it   confuses   justificatory   and  
explanatory  reasons.     Recall,  by  my  lights,  the  only  kind  of  reasons  one  may  have  for  a  desire  
are  the  kind  that  explain  why  one  has  a  desire,  rather  than  the  kind  that  justify  having  a  desire.    
This   is   because   I   hold   that   a   desire,   like   a   perceptual   appearance,   is   not   a   reason-­‐‑receiving  
attitude.    Consequently,  saying  that  we  have  justificatory  reasons  for  our  desires  is  on  par  with  
saying  that  we  have  justificatory  reasons  for  our  perceptual  appearances.    Both  claims  involve  a  
kind  of   category  mistake.     The   result   is   that,   on  pain  of   inconsistency  with  other  parts  of  my  
view,  I  cannot  argue  that  the  intuition  that  Lin  is  irrational  when  she  acts  on  the  coin-­‐‑flip  rather  
than   on   her   desire   is   rooted   in   the   fact   that   we   typically   have   justificatory   reasons   for   our  
desires.    
Admittedly,  there  is  a  similar  line  of  argument  that  is  available  to  me  (albeit  one  I  find  
less   than  convincing).     Even   if  we  assume  that  one  cannot  have  reasons   for  a  desire,  one  may  
still  have  independent  reasons  for  bringing  about  the  outcome  that  one  desires.    In  other  words,  
one  may  have  a   justificatory  reason  for  the  corresponding  intention.84     Thus,   it  may  be  argued  
that  the  intuition  that  Lin  is  guilty  of  irrationality  for  acting  on  her  coin-­‐‑flip  rather  than  on  her  
desire   is  rooted   in   the  fact   that  we  normally  have   independent  reasons  for  bringing  about   the  
                                                
84  This comports with my claim (in chapter 5) that an intention is a commitment-incurring attitude.  Since I claim 
that the ability of an attitude to incur rational commitments is tied to the fact that it is a reason-receiving attitude, 
then the claim that an intention is a commitment-incurring attitude fits hand in glove with the claim that an intention 




outcomes  we  desire.     While  there  may  be  something  right  about  the  preceding  reply,   I  do  not  
think   it  provides   the   full   or  most   accurate   story.     What   the  preceding   reply  does   seem   to  get  
right  is  that  the  intuition  that  Lin  is  guilty  of  irrationality  when  she  acts  on  the  coin-­‐‑flip  rather  
than  on  her  desire  weakens  once  we  register  that  Lin  has  no  independent  reasons  for  bringing  
about   the   desired   outcome.      However,   it   remains   unclear   that   the   intuition   fails   to   persist  
altogether.      Moreover,   since   the   Chocolate   Desire   example   is   supposed   to   already   take   into  
consideration  the  fact  that  the  Lin  has  no  independent  reasons  for  bringing  about  her  desire,  the  
present  reply  does  little  more  than  stubbornly  insist  that  the  Chocolate  Desire  example  does  not  
really  have  the  force  it  purports  to  have.    
Contra   the   two   preceding   lines   of   reply,   I   wish   to   not   only   grant   that   Lin   is   being  
irrational  when  she  decides  to  act  on  her  coin-­‐‑flip  rather  than  on  her  desire,  but  to  also  provide  
additional   theoretical   motivations   for   thinking   that   she   is   being   irrational.   I   agree   that   the  
intuition   that  Lin   is  guilty  of   irrationality   for  acting  on  her  desire   rather   than  on  her   coin-­‐‑flip  
becomes  less  clear  once  we  fill  in  the  details  of  the  example  to  include  the  requirement  that  Lin  
has  no  independent  reasons  to  bring  about  the  desired  outcome.    However,  I  do  not  take  this  to  
be  evidence  that  the  claim  is  unsound.    Instead,  I  take  it  to  be  evidence  that  our  pre-­‐‑theoretical  
intuitions  are  not  very  firm  on  this  particular  question.    As  such,  the  question  is  not  one  that  is  
best  settled  by  an  appeal  to  pre-­‐‑theoretical  intuitions.    If  I  am  right,  then  we  may  need  to  invoke  
theoretical  motivations  for  thinking  that  Lin  is  in  being  irrational.  This  is  what  I  attempt  to  do  
below.    However,  my  eventual  aim  is  not  to  show  that  a  desire  has  a  rational  significance  that  




conclusion  remains  unestablished.    Instead,  I  will  be  offering  an  alternative  explanation  of  why  
Lin  is  irrational  for  acting  on  her  coin-­‐‑flip  rather  than  on  her  desire.  
To  summarise,  I  wish  to  grant  that  there  is  something  rationally  problematic  about  Lin’s  
decision  to  act  upon  her  coin-­‐‑flip  rather  than  her  desire.     However,   I  will  argue  that   this  does  
not  show  that  desires  have  a  rational  significance  that  a  coin-­‐‑flip  lacks.    To  this  end,  I  invite  the  
reader  to  consider  yet  another  version  of  the  Lin  example:  
  
Example  6.4  (Chocolate  Coin-­‐‑flip):  
Lin  is  at  the  supermarket  trying  to  decide  between  two  unfamiliar  flavours  of  ice  cream:  
chocolate  and  vanilla.     She  assigns  head-­‐‑side-­‐‑up  to  the  proposition   'ʹpurchase  chocolate  
rather   than   vanilla'ʹ   and   tail-­‐‑side-­‐‑up   to   the   proposition   'ʹpurchase   vanilla   rather   than  
chocolate'ʹ.     When   she   flips   the   coin,   it   lands  head-­‐‑side-­‐‑up—favouring   the   intention   to  
purchase  chocolate  rather  than  vanilla.    However,  for  no  reason  whatsoever,  Lin  decides  
to   flip   the   coin   a   second   time.      On   the   second   coin-­‐‑flip,   the   coin   lands   tail-­‐‑side-­‐‑up—
favouring   the   intention   to  purchase  vanilla   rather   than  chocolate.     Lin   then  adopts   the  
intention  to  purchase  vanilla  rather  than  chocolate  based  on  the  second  coin-­‐‑flip.  
  
I  believe  that  the  agent  in  the  preceding  example  is  guilty  of  irrationality.    In  fact,  I  will  
argue   that   she   is   guilty   of   two   separate   instances   of   irrationality.      The   first   instance   of  
irrationality  occurs  when  she  decides  to  flip  the  coin  a  second  time,  and  the  second  occurs  when  
she  adopts  the  intention  to  act  on  the  second  coin-­‐‑flip  despite  having  no  reason  to  disregard  the  




Flipping   the   coin   a   second   time   constitutes   an   instance   of   irrationality   because   doing   so  
amounts  to  the  adoption  of  a  selection  procedure  that  is  poorly  suited  for  its  purpose.     Recall,  
Lin  resorts  to  flipping  a  coin  in  order  to  determine  if  she  should  purchase  chocolate  or  vanilla.    
A  single  coin-­‐‑flip  is  well  suited  for  this  purpose,  since  it  is  an  instance  of  single-­‐‑answer  sortition  
(i.e.,  a  random  selection  procedure  that  yields  one  and  only  one  answer).    However,  by  deciding  
to  flip  the  coin  a  second  time,  Lin  initiates  a  multiple  answer  selection  procedure.    If  the  coin  is  
flipped   twice,   the   space  of  possible   results   is   <heads,  heads>,   <tails,   tails>,   <heads,   tails>,   and  
<tails,  heads>.  This  means   that   there   is  a  50%  chance   (2   in  4)   that   the  coin-­‐‑flips  would  yield  a  
combination  of  both  heads  and  tails,  thereby  failing  to  provide  a  definite  answer  to  the  question  
of  whether  she  should  purchase  chocolate  or  vanilla.    In  fact,  the  Chocolate  Coin-­‐‑flip  example  is  
just   such  a  case.      I   sum,  given   that   flipping   the  coin   twice   is  poorly   suited   for   the  purpose  of  
arriving  at  a  single  definite  answer  of  what   to  do,   I  claim  that  Lin’s  decision  to  flip  the  coin  a  
second  time  is  irrational.    
   The  second  instance  of  irrationality  occurs  when  Lin  decides  to  act  on  her  second  coin-­‐‑
flip,  despite  having  no  reason  to  disregard  the  first  coin-­‐‑flip.    As  I  already  alluded  to  in  chapter  
4,   an   agent   has   a   rational   obligation   to   extricate   herself   from   any   pre-­‐‑existing   forms   of  
irrationality.    For  the  agent  in  the  Chocolate  Coin-­‐‑flip  example,  one  option  would  be  to  switch  
to   a   2-­‐‑out-­‐‑of-­‐‑3   selection   procedure.      This   would   involve   flipping   the   coin   a   third   time   and  
allowing   the   third   coin-­‐‑flip   to   have   the   tie-­‐‑breaking   vote.   A   second   option   would   be   to   un-­‐‑
deputize  one  of  the  two  coin-­‐‑flips.    I  will  have  more  to  say  about  the  notion  of  deputization  in  
the   next   section.      But   to   anticipate   the   discussion   to   come,   deputization   is   the   mental   act   of  




throwing   a   coin   up   in   the   air   and   observing   what   side   it   lands   on,   even   if   intentionally  
performed,   does   not   qualify   as   a   selection   procedure.      A   coin-­‐‑flip   only   counts   as   a   selection  
procedure  if  an  agent  has  decided  to  take  it  as  a  guide  for  her  actions.    This  decision  is  one  an  
agent  may  reverse  by  simply  deciding  to  no  longer  take  the  coin-­‐‑flip  as  a  guide  for  her  actions.    
In   so   doing,   she   strips   it   of   its   standing   as   a   selection   procedure.      Hence,   Lin  may   extricate  
herself   from   the   irrationality   incurred  by  her   reliance  on   a   sub-­‐‑optimal   selection  procedure—
i.e.,  one  that  juxtaposes  two  coin-­‐‑flips—by  stripping  one  of  the  two  coin-­‐‑flips  of  the  authority  to  
guide  her  actions.    Since  Lin  fails  to  take  either  of  the  above  courses—or  any  other  that  would  
extricate  her   from  her  pre-­‐‑existing   irrationality—and  instead  opts   to  simply  act  on   the  second  
coin-­‐‑flip,   despite   the   fact   that   there   is   no   reason   to   privilege   the   second   over   the   first,   Lin   is  
again  guilty  of  irrationality.  
  
6.5.    The  Juxtaposition  of  Coin-­‐‑flip  and  Desire  
It  should  now  be  clear  where  my  argument  is  heading.    I  wish  to  argue  that  the  agent  who  relies  
on  a  selection  procedure  that  juxtaposes  a  desire  and  a  coin-­‐‑flip  is  irrational  for  the  same  reason  
as  an  agent  who  relies  on  a  selection  procedure  that  juxtaposes  two  coin-­‐‑flips.    In  short,  it  is  the  
sub-­‐‑optimality  of  relying  on  a  selection  procedure  that  has  a  50%  chance  of  yielding  conflicting  
results  (when  one  could  just  as  easily  rely  on  one  that  always  yields  a  single  definite  result)  that  
accounts  for  the  intuition  that  there  is  something  irrational  about  Lin’s  decision  to  disregard  her  
desire  in  favour  of  her  coin-­‐‑flip.    She  is  employing  a  multiple-­‐‑answer  selection  procedure  when  




However,   this  reply  will  need  to  be  enriched  further   if   it   is  going  to  provide  us  with  a  
satisfactory  solution  to  the  challenged  posed  by  the  Chocolate  Desire  example.    This  is  because  
the  Chocolate  Desire  example  is  not  simply  meant  to  show  that  an  agent  who  decides  to  flip  a  
coin   even   though   she   already   has   a   desire   is   guilty   of   irrationality,   but   also   that   an   agent   is  
irrational   for   deciding   to   act   on   a   coin-­‐‑flip   when   there   is   a   desire   present.   To   this   end,   it   is  
important   to  emphasise   that   the   temporal  ordering  of   the  desire  versus   the   coin-­‐‑flip  does  not  
matter  to  the  question  of  which  takes  priority.    Even  if  the  desire  comes  after  the  coin-­‐‑flip,  it  still  
seems   to   take   rational  priority.   For   example,   let   us   suppose   that  when  Lin   is   first   confronted  
with   the  decision   to  purchase   chocolate   or   vanilla   ice   cream,   she   finds  herself  with  no  desire  
either  way.    She  therefore  decides  to  flip  a  coin.    But  suppose  that  immediately  after  flipping  the  
coin,  she  finds  herself  with  a  desire  to  purchase  chocolate  rather  than  vanilla.    Suppose  further  
that   Lin   still   decides   to   act   on   her   coin-­‐‑flip.      In   such   a   case,   Lin   is   once   again   guilty   of  
irrationality.    Hence,  it  seems  as  though  Lin’s  desire  always  takes  rational  priority  over  the  coin-­‐‑
flip.  The   takeaway  of   the  Chocolate  Desire   example   is   this:   irrespective  of   temporal  ordering,  
whenever  one  juxtaposes  a  desire  and  a  coin-­‐‑flip,  the  desire  always  takes  rational  priority.    
I   wish   to   grant   that   whenever  we   juxtapose   a   desire   and   a   coin-­‐‑flip,   the   desire   takes  
priority  in  the  manner  just  suggested.    However,  I  will  offer  an  alternative  explanation  of  why  
this   is   so,   one   that   does   not   rely   on   or   entail   the   claim   that   a   desire   has   more   rational  
significance   than   a   coin-­‐‑flip.      Let   us   begin   by   noting   that,   in   the   context   of   the   present  
discussion,   both   a  desire   and   a   coin-­‐‑flip   constitute   a   type  of   selection  procedure   for  deciding  
between  two  options.     That  is,  if  we  assume  that  an  agent  confronted  with  the  choice  between  




chocolate,  then  the  fact  that  she  desires  to  purchase  chocolate  rather  than  vanilla  plays  the  role  
of   a   selection  procedure   for   determining  which   of   the   two   intentions   she   should   adopt.      The  
same  is  true  of  the  coin-­‐‑flip.    However,  an  agent  who  desires  to  purchase  chocolate  rather  than  
vanilla   is   passive  with   respect   to   the   adoption   of   the   selection   procedure   instantiated   by   her  
desire.   That   is   to   say,   the   desire   is   not   something   the   agent   chooses   to   have.      Rather,   it   is  
something  that,   in  a  certain  sense,  happens   to  the  agent.     The  sense  in  question  is  analogous  to  
the   sense   in  which  a  perceptual  appearance   is  not   something  an  agent   chooses   to  have  but   is  
rather  something  that  happens  to  her.        
There  are  a  number  of  ways  to  make  sense  of  the  notion  of  passivity  currently  at  play.    
One  common  (albeit  controversial)  way  is  in  terms  of  a  control  principle,  according  to  which  an  
agent  is  passive  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  her  perceptual  appearances  and  desires  because  they  are  not  under  her  
control.    Apart  from  certain  exceptional  circumstances,  we  do  not  choose  to  have  the  perceptual  
appearances   or   desires   we   do   in   fact   have.      Another   way   of   making   sense   of   the   notion   of  
passivity   currently   at   play   is   in   terms   of   the   distinction   between   agential   and   sub-­‐‑agential  
processes,   according   to   which   an   agent   is   passive   in   relation   to   her   desires   and   perceptual  
appearances  because  they  represent  the  perspective  of  a  sub-­‐‑agential  system  rather  than  that  of  
the  agent  as  a  whole.    Which  (if  either)  of  these  ways  of  making  sense  of  the  claim  that  an  agent  
is  passive  with  respect  to  her  desires  will  not  matter  for  our  present  purposes.    All  that  matters  
is  that  an  agent  is  passive  with  respect  to  her  having  a  certain  desire  in  a  sense  that  is  analogous  
to   how   she   is   passive  with   respect   to   the   having   of   a   perceptual   appearance.     Moreover,   the  




passive  with  respect  to  her  desires  and  perceptual  appearances  in  a  way  that  entails  that  she  is  
not  liable  to  rational  appraisal  for  having  (or  failing  to  have)  a  desire  or  perceptual  appearance.  
By  contrast,  an  agent   is  active  with  respect   to   the  adoption  of  a  coin-­‐‑flip  as  a  selection  
procedure.    As  before,  there  are  a  number  of  ways  we  may  choose  to  make  sense  of  the  notion  
of  “active”  being  presently  being  invoked.    We  may  (albeit  controversially)  make  sense  of  it  in  
terms   of   a   control   principle,   according   to   which   Lin   is   active   with   respect   to   her   coin-­‐‑flip  
because  the  adoption  of  a  coin-­‐‑flip  as  a  selection  procedure  is  under  her  control.    Alternatively,  
we  may  say  that   the  adoption  of   the  coin-­‐‑flip  as  a  selection  procedure   is  an  agent-­‐‑level  rather  
than  sub-­‐‑agential  decision.    That  is  to  say,  while  sub-­‐‑agential  processes  determine  which  desires  
we  happen   to  have,   it   is   agential-­‐‑level  processes   that  determine  whether  or  not  we   employ  a  
coin-­‐‑flip   as   a   selection  procedure.  Whatever   story  we   choose   to   tell,   the   crucial   point   for   our  
present   purposes   is   that   the   adoption   of   a   coin-­‐‑flip   as   a   selection  procedure   is   something   for  
which  an  agent  is  liable  to  rational  appraisal.85    And  therein  lies  the  solution  to  our  puzzle.    Why  
is  Lin  guilty  of  some  irrationality  when  she  decides  to  flip  a  coin  even  though  she  already  has  a  
desire?     Because   she   is   relying  on  a   sub-­‐‑optimal   selection  procedure—i.e.,   she   is   employing  a  
multiple-­‐‑answer  form  of  sortition  when  she  should  be  using  a  single-­‐‑answer  one.    Why  is  it  that  
the  desire  always  takes  priority  over   the  coin-­‐‑flip,   irrespective  of   the   temporal  order   in  which  
they  appear?    Because  of  the  two  selection  procedures,  the  coin-­‐‑flip  is  the  only  one  for  which  the  
                                                
85 I mention these two candidate explanations of why a desire is passive and of why a coin-flip is active in order to 
underscore that the sense in which I am describing a desire as passive is the counterpart to the sense in which I am 
describing a coin-flip as passive.  Presumably, there are many ways in which we can describe a desire or coin-flip as 
active or passive, and so it is important to ensure that the senses are not somehow orthogonal to each other. By 
offering these candidate explanations of why desires are passive and coin-flips are active, I hope to make it clear that 
the candidate explanations are opposite sides of the same coin (no pun intended).  This should give us some reason 
to think that I have identified a single sense of passive versus active, rather than senses that are somehow orthogonal 




agent   is   liable   to   rational  appraisal.     Since  she   is  not   (nor  can  be)  expected   to  stop  having   the  
desire   she  has,   she   can   only   fulfil   her   rational   obligation   to   free   herself   from   the   irrationality  
incurred   by   adopting   a   sub-­‐‑optimal   selection   procedure   by   un-­‐‑deputising   the   coin-­‐‑flip.      This  
means  that  she  will  always  be  rationally  obligated  to  act  on  her  desire  rather  than  on  her  coin-­‐‑
flip,  when  the  two  are  in  competition.  The  takeaway  of  the  present  reply  is  this:  a  desire  takes  
rational  priority  over  a  coin-­‐‑flip  not  because  the  former  has  a  rational  significance  that  the  latter  
lacks,  but  because  the  decision  to  employ  a  coin-­‐‑flip  as  a  selection  procedure  is  something  for  
which  an  agent  is  liable  to  rational  appraisal  while  the  having  of  a  desire  is  not.    
  
6.6.    Passive  versus  Active  Selection  Procedures  
The  conclusion  of  the  immediately  preceding  section  is  that  a  desire  takes  rational  priority  over  
a  coin-­‐‑flip  (qua  competing  selection  procedures)  not  because  desires  have  a  rational  significance  
that   coin-­‐‑flips   lack,   but   because   an   agent   is   active  with   regards   to   the   latter   (in   a   sense   that  
tracks   liability   to   rational   appraisal)   but   passive   with   regards   to   the   former.   However,   the  
following  example  seems  to  pose  a  challenge  to  this  view:  
  
Example  6.5  (Chocolate  Advice):  
Lin  is  at  the  supermarket  with  her  friend,  Aasif,  trying  to  decide  between  two  unfamiliar  
flavours  of  ice  cream.    Since  neither  Lin  nor  Aasif  have  had  ice  cream  before  (and  they  
have  no  idea  what  ingredients  work  well  together)  they  have  no  reason  to  think  that  one  
flavour   is  better   than   the  other.     They  are   in  a  hurry   to   leave  and  Lin,  not  having  any  




a  decision.   In   order   to   speed   things   along,  Aasif   suggests   that   Lin  purchase   chocolate  
rather   than  vanilla.  Moreover,   let  us  suppose   that  Aasif  arbitrarily  picks  chocolate  and  
that   Lin   is   aware   of   this   fact.      It   follows   that   Aasif’s   suggestion   fails   to   evidentially  
favour  purchasing  chocolate  rather  than  vanilla.  (Like  the  coin-­‐‑flip,  this  is  equivalent  to  a  
guess  by  Lin.)  However,  before  adopting  any  intention  and  unrelated  to  Aasif’s  advice,  
Lin   comes   to   have   a   desire   to   purchase   vanilla   rather   than   chocolate.      However,   Lin  
decides  to  disregard  her  desire  and  act  on  Aasif’s  suggestion.    
  
Once  again,  it  seems  that  it  would  be  irrational  for  Lin  to  purchase  chocolate  rather  than  vanilla  
based  on  Aasif’s  advice  and  rational  for  her  to  purchase  vanilla  rather  than  chocolate  based  on  
her  desire.  However,  unlike  the  coin-­‐‑flip,  Lin  is  passive  relative  to  Aasif’s  advice.    Hence,  if  my  
explanation  of  why  desires  take  rational  priority  over  coin-­‐‑flips  is  correct,  Aasif’s  advice  should  
be  rationally  on  par  with  Lin’s  desire.     However,   this  does  not  seem  to  be  case  since  Lin  once  
again  seems  to  be  rationally  obligated  to  act  on  her  desire  (rather  than  on  Aasif’s  advice).    This  
appears   to   show   that   my   diagnosis   of   why   desires   take   rational   priority   over   a   coin-­‐‑flip   is  
incorrect.  
The   present   objection   takes   as   a   premise   the   assumption   that   Aasif’s   advice   (like   a  
desire)  does  not  involve  an  active  expression  of  Lin’s  agency.    In  response,  I  wish  to  argue  that,  
in  all  relevant  respects,  Lin’s  decision  to  act  on  Aasif’s  advice  is  like  deciding  to  act  on  a  coin-­‐‑
flip   rather   than   like  deciding   to   act   on  a  desire.     What   the  present  objection  gets   right   is   that  
there  is  a  sense  in  which  Lin  is  passive  relative  to  Aasif’s  advice—to  wit,  she  has  no  control  over  




sense—to   wit,   she   has   no   control   over   which   side   the   coin   lands   on.      Hence,   there   is   no  
important  difference  between  the  coin-­‐‑flip  and  Aasif’s  advice  in  this  respect.     However,  I  hold  
that  there  is  also  a  sense  in  which  Lin  is  active  relative  to  both  the  coin-­‐‑flip  and  Aasif’s  advice,  
and  that  this  is  the  very  sense  in  which  Lin  is  passive  relative  to  her  desire.      
When  I  say  that  Lin  is  active  relative  to  a  coin-­‐‑flip,  I  am  not  merely  talking  about  her  act  
of   throwing  the  coin  up   in   the  air  and  observing  what  side   it   lands  on.     (Given  that   the  set  of  
bodily  movements  in  question  are  intentionally  performed,  throwing  the  coin  up  in  the  air  and  
observing  what  side  it  lands  on  does  indeed  involve  the  active  expression  of  someone’s  agency.    
However,  this  is  not  what  I  have  in  mind  when  I  describe  Lin  as  active  relative  to  her  coin-­‐‑flip.)  
Rather,   I   am   talking   about   her   deputizing   the   coin-­‐‑flip   with   the   authority   to   guide   her  
actions.    This  deputization  is  an  active  expression  of  Lin’s  agency  and  it  is  analytically  prior  to  
her  adoption  of  the  intention  that  complies  with  what  the  coin-­‐‑flip  says.  Once  Lin  deputizes  the  
coin-­‐‑flip   with   the   authority   to   tell   her   what   to   do,   the   fact   that   the   coin   lands   head-­‐‑side-­‐‑up  
means  that  she  is  committed  to  adopting  the  intention  to  purchase  chocolate  rather  than  vanilla.  
Since  Aasif’s   advice   is   external   to   Lin’s   cognition,   it  must   also   be   deputized   by   Lin  with   the  
authority  to  guide  her  actions.    Thus,  Aasif’s  advice  can  only  guide  Lin’s  action  if  Lin  deputizes  
it   with   the   required   authority,   and   this   deputization   is   something   for   which   Lin   is   liable   to  
rational  appraisal.  
By  contrast,  an  agent’s  desires  do  not  require  deputization  in  order  to  guide  her  actions.    
In  other  words,  while  an  agent  only  counts  as  acting  on  a  coin-­‐‑flip  or  as  acting  on  someone’s  
advice   if   she  deputizes   that  coin-­‐‑flip  or   that  advice,  an  agent  may  count  as  acting  on  a  desire  




count  as  acting  on  a  desire  is  established  by  the  following  consideration:    deputizing  a  coin-­‐‑flip  
or  someone  else’s  advice  with  authority  is  only  something  that  cognitively  sophisticated  agents  
can   engage   in.     For   example,   my   pet   hamster   cannot   do   it.     However,   even   cognitively  
unsophisticated   agents   (like   my   pet   hamster)   can   act   on   a   desire.     Thus,   acting   on   a   desire  
cannot  require  deputizing  it.    I  take  this  to  show  that  there  is  something  extra  that  is  present  in  
the  case  of  acting  on  a  coin-­‐‑flip  or  acting  on  someone’s  advice  that  is  not  present  in  the  case  of  
acting   on   a   desire.     A   detailed   analysis   of  what   this   something   extra   amounts   to   is   a   project  
worth   pursuing.      However,   only   two   points   about   this   something   extra   are   immediately  
relevant.     First,  we   can   safely   say   that   the   something  extra   is   something   that  only   cognitively  
sophisticated   agents   exhibit.     Hamsters   cannot   exhibit   it.      Second,   the   something   extra   is  
something   for  which   an   agent   is   liable   to   rational   appraisal.      For   example,  we   can   rationally  
criticize  someone  for  allowing  inferior  advice  to  factor  into  her  deliberation.    Thus  understood,  I  
refer  to  the  something  extra  as  the  deputization  of  an  extra-­‐‑mental  process  with  the  authority  to  
guide  one’s  actions.    I  claim  that  this  deputization  is  an  active  expression  of  someone’s  agency;  
it  is  something  for  which  an  agent  is  liable  to  rational  appraisal.  
  
6.7.    The  Zero-­‐‑Sum  Structure  of  Intention  
In   section   6.2,   I   highlight   an   important  disanalogy  between   rationally  permissible   beliefs   and  
rationally  permissible  intentions.  I  will  now  attempt  to  offer  an  explanation  of  this  disanalogy.    
Of  course,  the  claim  that  there  is  a  disanalogy  of  the  kind  I  have  identified  may  be  true  even  if  
my  preferred  explanation  of  why   the  disanalogy  exists   is   false.     Hence,   the  arguments   I  have  





and  rationally  permissible  intention  may  be  assessed  independently  of  any  of  the  considerations  
presented  below.    
Let   us   refer   to   any   deliberation   that   involves   the   weighing   of   reasons   in   order   to  
determine  if  P  is  true  as  theoretical  deliberation  and  any  deliberation  that  involves  the  weighing  of  
reasons   in   order   to   determine   if   P   is   to   be   made   true   as   practical   deliberation.   Theoretical  
deliberation  always  involves  a  choice  between  three  doxastic  attitudes:  believing,  disbelieving,  
or   withholding   belief   and   disbelief.      This   means   failing   to   believe   that   P   does   not   entail  
disbelieving  P  and   failing   to  disbelieve  P  does  not  entail  believing  P.     Withholding  belief  and  
disbelief   always   remains   an   option.      (For   simplicity,   I  will   henceforth   refer   to   the   attitude   of  
withholding  belief  and  disbelief  towards  P  as  withholding  P.)    Withholding  P,  as  I  am  using  the  
expression,  is  not  the  same  as  failing  to  adopt  an  attitude  of  belief  and  disbelief  towards  P.    One  
may   fail   to   adopt   an   attitude   of   belief   and   disbelief   towards   P   because   one   has   simply   not  
considered  P.    In  such  a  case,  one  neither  believes  nor  disbelieves  P.    But  one  is  not  withholding  
P  either.      One  simply  has  not  taken  any  attitude  towards  P.    In  short,  withholding  P  is  as  much  
an  attitude  towards  P  as  believing  or  disbelieving  P.      
I   believe   that   the   disanalogy   between   rationally   permissible   belief   and   rationally  
permissible  intention,  highlighted  in  section  6.2,  is  tied  to  the  absence  of  a  practical  analogue  to  







Example  6.6  (Lorry  Driver  Intention):  
A  lorry  driver,  Parvati,  is  driving  down  a  long  stretch  of  road  and  is  trying  to  decide  if  
she  should  stop  for  a  break.  To  put  the  point  in  action  theoretic  terms,  she  is  deliberating  
about  whether  or  not  the  following  outcome  is  to  be  brought  about:  ‘I  am  stopping  for  a  
break’.    After  weighing  all  the  considerations  in  favour  of  stopping  for  a  break  (e.g.,  she  
would  be  able  to  get  some  much  deserved  rest),  and  all  the  considerations  in  favour  of  
not   stopping   for   a   break   (e.g.,   she   is   more   likely   to   make   her   delivery   on   time),   she  
comes  to  the  conclusion  that  the  sum  of  her  reasons  are  inconclusive  either  way.    She  has  
just  as  much  reason  to  stop  for  a  break  as  she  does  for  not  stopping  for  a  break.  Parvati  
decides   to   flip   a   coin:   head-­‐‑side-­‐‑up   representing   ‘stop   for   a   break!’   and   tail-­‐‑side-­‐‑up  
representing  ‘do  not  stop  for  a  break!’.    When  the  coin  lands  head-­‐‑side-­‐‑up,  Parvati  pulls  
the  lorry  off  to  the  side  of  the  road  and  removes  the  key  from  the  ignition.      
  
Parvati’s  decision  has  a  zero-­‐‑sum  structure.  If  she  adopts  the  intention  to  continue  driving,  she  
has  ipso  facto  adopted  the  intention  not  to  stop  for  a  break.    The  same  is  true,  mutatis  mutandis,  
if  she  adopts  the  intention  to  stop  for  a  break.  There  is  no  attitude  of  practical  withholding  that  
she  may  adopt  as  an  end  point  of  her  deliberative  process.  In  sum,  while  there  are  three  possible  
doxastic   attitudes   one   can   take   towards  P—believing  P,   disbelieving  P,   and  withholding  P—
there  are  only  two  possible  volitional  attitudes  one  can  take  towards  an  outcome—intending  to  
bring   about  P   and   intending  not   to   bring   about  P.     On   the  present   analysis,   not   intending   to  
bring  about  P  is  not  an  attitude  towards  bringing  about  P  but  rather  the  absence  of  an  attitude  




The  claim  that  there  is  no  practical  analogue  to  withholding  may  seem  surprising,  if  not  
unsound.    After  all,  isn’t  there  a  difference  between  adopting  the  intention  not  to  bring  about  P  
and  simply  failing  to  intend  to  bring  about  P?    And  is  not  failing  to  intend  to  bring  about  P  the  
practical   analogue   to   withholding  P?      I   answer   yes   and   no,   respectively.      There   is   indeed   a  
difference   between   intending   to   not   bring   about   P   and   not   intending   to   bring   about   P.    
However,   the   latter   is   the   practical   analogue   not   of  withholding,   but   of   failing   to   adopt   any  
doxastic  attitude   towards  P.     We  may  gain  a  better  handle  on  why  this   is  so  by  conceiving  of  
theoretical  deliberation  in  terms  of  the  following  three-­‐‑tier  flowchart:  
  


































The   top   tier   of   Figure   6.1   (i.e.,   the   pre-­‐‑deliberative   phase)   stands   proxy   for   an   agent’s  
thoughts   prior   to   considering   whether   or   not   P   is   true.      It   does   not   designate   an   attitude  
towards  P,  but  rather  the  absence  of  any  attitude  towards  P.  The  middle  tier  of  Figure  6.1  (i.e.,  
the  deliberative  phase)  stands  proxy  for  when  an  agent  is  in  the  process  of  weighing  reasons  in  
order  to  figure  out  the  right  course  of  action.    I  wish  to  remain  non-­‐‑committal  on  the  question  of  
whether  or  not  deliberating  about  P  is  itself  an  attitude  towards  P.86  What  I  do  maintain  is  that  
an  agent  who  is  deliberating  about  P  is  in  a  different  psychological  state,  with  respect  to  P,  than  
an  agent  who  has  adopted  one  of   three  possible  doxastic  attitudes  one  may   take   towards  P—
believing  P,  disbelieving  P  and  withholding  P.  Like  the  pre-­‐‑deliberative  phase,  the  deliberative  
phase  does  not  entail  the  adoption  of  any  particular  doxastic  attitude  towards  P.    It  is  only  the  
bottom  tier  of  Figure  6.1  (i.e.,  the  post-­‐‑deliberative  phase)  that  entails  the  adoption  of  a  doxastic  
attitude  towards  P.      








                                                
86 My suspicion is that deliberating about P involves one or more non-doxastic attitude(s) towards P, but the specific 


























Consider  once  again   the   lorry  driver.     She   is   in   the  process  of  deliberating  about  whether  she  
should  continue  driving  or  take  a  break.    During  this  time,  it  is  true  that  she  has  neither  decided  
to  continue  driving  nor  to  stop  for  a  break.    However,  this  process  of  deliberation,  I  have  been  
urging,  is  the  practical  analogue  not  to  withholding  P,  but  to  deliberating  about  whether  or  not  
P  is  true.    Now,  fast  forward  to  the  point  at  which  the  driver  has  finally  made  a  decision,  or  the  
post-­‐‑deliberative  phase.    It  is  at  this  point  that  the  disanalogy  between  theoretical  and  practical  
deliberation  becomes  apparent.    The  lorry  driver  has  only  two  options.  She  can  either  continue  
driving  or  stop  for  a  break.      If  she  adopts  the  intention  to  continue  driving,  she  has  ipso  facto  
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the  intention  to  take  a  break.  There  is  no  attitude  of  practical  withholding  that  she  may  adopt  as  
an   end   point   of   her   deliberative   process.   In   sum,   while   there   are   three   possible   doxastic  
attitudes   one   can   take   towards  P—believing  P,   disbelieving  P,   and  withholding  P—there   are  
only   two   possible   volitional   attitudes   one   can   take   towards   an   outcome—intending   to   bring  
about  P  and  intending  not  to  bring  about  P.     Not  intending  to  bring  about  P   is  not  an  attitude  
towards  bringing  about  P  but  rather  the  absence  of  an  attitude  towards  bringing  about  P.        
Let   us   consider   once   again   the   example   of   the   practical   analogue   to   a  modus   ponens  
inference  (first  introduced  in  chapter  5,  section  5.6,  and  reproduced  below):  
  
(E):  I  intend  to  make  an  omelette.  
(F):    If  I  intend  to  make  an  omelette,  then  it  is  necessary  that  I  intend  to  break  eggs.  
(G):    I  intend  to  break  eggs.  
  
It   is   clear   that   there   remains   a   need   for   commitment-­‐‑involving   attitudes   (i.e.,   attitudes   that  
display   the   kind   of   rational   significance   displayed   by   belief)   in   the   practical   sphere.      For  
example,   the   intention   to  make   an   omelette   incurs   a   rational   commitment   to   do  whatever   is  
necessary  to  make  an  omelette  (e.g.,  break  eggs),  so  long  as  one  persists  in  intending  to  make  an  
omelette.    Thus,  the  claim  that  intentions  are  rationally  significant  remains  secure.  
However,   it   is   less   clear   that   there   is   a   need   for   an   attitude   that   provides   rational  
support,   of   the  kind  provided  by  perceptual   appearances,   in   the  practical   sphere.  Apart   from  
incurring   rational   commitments   (in   the  manner   that   intentions   do),   the   only   role   we   need   a  




amounts  of  rational  support  both  for  and  against  making  an  omelette.    (This,  of  course,  includes  
cases  in  which  one  has  no  rational  support  either  for  or  against  making  an  omelette.)    According  
to  the  zero-­‐‑sum  view,  one  does  not  require  any  further  rational  support  to  settle  the  question  of  
whether  or  not  one  should  make  an  omelette.  A  coin-­‐‑flip  may  do  the  job.    In  other  words,  while  
there  remains  a  need  for  a  selection  procedure,  the  procedure  in  question  need  not  be  rational.    
It   need  not   represent   the   selected   outcome   as   good.      It   need  not  put   the   agent   in   touch  with  
some  consideration  (independent  of  the  selection  procedure  itself)  that  speaks  in  favour  of  the  
selected  outcome.    
I   believe   that   attitudes   with   imperative   content   play   the   role   of   such   a   selection  
procedure.    They  do  this  not  by  representing  a  certain  outcome  as  good,  but  by  conformatively  
favouring   a   certain   outcome.      Rationally   or   evidentially   speaking,   they   provide   us   with   a  
verdict  when  we  need  one,  and  nothing  more.    This,  of  course,  is  not  to  suggest  that  desires  are  
random   in   same   sense   that   coin-­‐‑flips   are.      There   are   a   host   of   phylogenetic   and   ontogenetic  
factors   that  contribute  to  us  having  the  particular  desires   that  we  have.     Some  of   these  factors  
may  be  known  to  us,  some  may  be  revealed  via  psychoanalysis,  and  some  may  forever  remain  
outside  our  ken;  but  it  seems  mistaken  to  label  them  (or  the  role  they  play  in  giving  rise  to  our  
desires)  random.    Nevertheless,  while  the  aetiology  of  a  desire  may  be  quite  different  from  that  
of  a  coin-­‐‑flip,  the  role  that  the  former  plays  in  practical  deliberation  is  (like  the  role  of  the  latter)  
merely  one  of  sortition.    This  explains  why  the  latter  may  be  substituted  for  the  former,  and  is  






6.8.    Conclusion  
This   dissertation   began   with   the   question:   what   is   the   rational   significance   of   desire?      The  
answer  we   arrive   at   is   little   or   none,   depending   on  whether   or   not   one   thinks   a   coin-­‐‑flip   or  
guess  is  rationally  significant.    More  precisely,  if  we  define  rational  significance  along  the  lines  
suggested   in   chapter   4—i.e.,   X   is   rationally   significant   if   and   only   if   X   plays   a   role   (qua  
psychological  state)  in  generating  a  rational  obligation  to  adopt  or  refrain  from  adopting  a  belief  
or   intention—then  a  desire  has  no  rational  significance.      In  the  present  chapter,   I  have  argued  
that  a  desire  provides  no  more  rational  support   than  a  coin-­‐‑flip.      Insofar  as  a  coin-­‐‑flip   fails   to  
provide  rational  support,  it  follows  that  a  desire  fails  to  provide  rational  support.  However,  this  
conclusion  is  not  as  bleak  as  it  may  initially  seem.    For  I  have  also  argued  that  there  is  no  need  
for  rational  support  (of  the  kind  provided  by  perception)  in  the  practical  sphere.    Specifically,  I  
claim  that  while  it  is  not  rationally  permissible  to  adopt  a  belief  if  one  recognises  that  one  has  no  
rational  support   for   it,   it   is   rationally  permissible   to  adopt  an   intention  even   if  one  recognises  
that   one   lacks   any   rational   support   for   it.   Moreover,   I   have   attempted   to   explain   the  
aforementioned  disanalogy  in  terms  of  the  zero-­‐‑sum  structure  of  intention.  One  implication  of  
this   difference   between   the   practical   and   the   theoretical   is   that   cognitivist   arguments   that  
presuppose  or  exploit  an  analogy  between  desire  and  belief  or  desire  and  perception  are  much  
too  quick.    Specifically,  the  cognitivist  strategy  for  arguing  that  desires  provide  rational  support  
by  appealing   to  an  analogy  between  desire  and  belief  or  perception   suffers   from  a   fatal   flaw,  
since  the  practical  and  theoretical  inferences  are  disanalogous  in  precisely  this  respect:  namely,  




perception)  in  the  practical  sphere.    It  is  this  fact  that  explains  why  a  desire  may  do  all  the  work  
we  need  it  to  do  even  though  it  has  no  more  rational  significance  than  a  coin-­‐‑flip.      










Altham,  J.  E.  J.  [1986],  “The  Legacy  of  Emotivism”,  in  Graham  Macdonald  and  Crispin  Wright,  
eds.,  Fact,  Science  and  Morality:  Essays  on  A.  J.  Ayer’s  Language,  Truth  and  Logic.   (Oxford,  
UK:  Blackwell  Publishing):  275-­‐‑288.  
  
  
Anscombe,  E.  [2000],  Intention.  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press).  
  
  
Audi,  R.  [1986a],  “Acting  for  Reasons”,  Philosophical  Review,  95,  4:  511-­‐‑546.  
  
  
Audi,  R.  [1986b],  “Intending,  Intentional  Action,  and  Desire”,  in  Marks,  J.,  (ed.)  The  Ways  of  
Desire.  (Chicago,  IL:  Precedent  Publishing).  
  
  
Audi,  R.  [1993],  The  Structure  of  Justification.  (Cambridge,  UK:  Cambridge  University  Press).  
  
  
Baier,  K.  [1958],  The  Moral  Point  of  View.  (Ithaca,  NY:  Cornell  University  Press).  
  
  
Blackburn,  S.  [1998],  Ruling  Passions.  (Oxford,  UK:  Oxford  University  Press).  
  
  




Bond,  E.  J.  [1983],  Reason  and  Value.  (Cambridge,  UK:  Cambridge  University  Press).  
  
  






Boyd,  R.  [1988],  “How  to  be  a  Moral  Realist”,  in  G.  Sayre-­‐‑McCord  (ed.)  Essays  on  Moral  Realism.  
(Ithaca,  NY:  Cornell  University  Press):  181-­‐‑228.  
  
  




Brandt,   R.   B.   [1969],   “Rational  Desires”,  Proceedings   and  Addresses   of   the  American   Philosophical  
Association,  43:  43-­‐‑64.  
  
  




Broome,  J.  [1997],  “Reason  and  Motivation”,  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  Supplementary  
Volume,  71:  131-­‐‑46.  
  
  




Broome,  J.  [2001],  “Are  Intentions  Reasons?  And  How  Should  We  Cope  with  Incommensurable  
Values?”  in  C.  W.  Morris  and  A.  Ripstein  (eds.)  Practical  Rationality  and  Preference:  Essays  
for  David  Gauthier.  (Cambridge,  UK:  Cambridge  University  Press):  98-­‐‑120.  
  
  
Broome,   J.   [2002],   “Practical   Reasoning”,   in   J.   L.   Bermudez   and   A.   Millar   (eds.)   Reason   and  
Nature:  Essays  in  the  Theory  of  Rationality.  (Oxford,  UK:  Clarendon  Press):  85-­‐‑112.  
  
  
Broome,   J.,   [2004],   “Reasons”,   in  Wallace,  R.   J.   et   al.   (eds.)     Reasons   and  Value:  Themes   from   the  
Moral  Philosophy  of  Joseph  Raz.  (Oxford,  UK:  Clarendon  Press).  
  
  
Broome,  J.  [2007],  “Wide  and  Narrow  Scope”,  Mind,  116  (462):  359-­‐‑70.  
  
  






Brunero,  J.  (2010).  “The  Scope  of  Rational  Requirements.”  Philosophical  Quarterly,  60  (238):  28-­‐‑49.  
  
  




Byrne,  A.,  [2009],  “Experience  and  Content”,  Philosophical  Quarterly,  59  (236):  429-­‐‑51.  
  
  




Castañeda,  H.  N.  [1975],  Thinking  and  Doing:  The  Philosophical  Foundations  of  Institutions.  (Boston,  
MA:  D.  Reidel  Publishing  Co.).  
  
  
Chellas,  B.  F.  [1971],  “Imperatives”,  Theoria,  37:  114-­‐‑129.  
  
  
Chisholm,  R.  [1980],    “A  Version  of  Foundationalism”  in  Wettstein,  et  al  (eds),  Midwest    
Studies  in  Philosophy  V.  (Minneapolis,  MN:  University  of  Minnesota  Press).  
  
  
Christensen,  D.  [1994],  “Conservatism  in  Epistemology”,  Noûs,  28  (1):  69–89.  
  
  
Collins,  J.  [1988],  “Belief,  Desire,  and  Revision”,  Mind,  97  (387):  333-­‐‑342.  
  
  




Cummins  [1996],  “Dominance  Hierarchies  and  the  Evolution  of  Human  Reasoning”,  Minds  and  
Machines,  6:  463-­‐‑480.  
  
  
Dancy,  J.  [2000],  Practical  Reality.  (Oxford,  UK:  Oxford  University  Press).  
  
  





Darwall,  S.  [1983],  Impartial  Reason,  (Ithaca,  NY:  Cornell  University  Press).  
  
  
Davidson,  D.   [1963],  “Actions,  Reasons,  and  Causes”,   reprinted   in  D.  Davidson,   [1980],  Essays  
on  Actions  and  Events.  (Oxford,  UK:  Oxford  University  Press):  3-­‐‑19.  
  
  
Davidson,  D.  [1969],  “How  is  Weakness  of  Will  Possible?”,  in  Joel  Feinberg  (ed.),  Moral  Concepts.  
(London,  UK:  Oxford  University  Press).  
  
  




Davidson,  D.  [1984a],  “Moods  and  Performances”,  Inquiries  into  Truth  and  Interpretation.  
(Oxford,  UK:  Clarendon  Press):  109-­‐‑122.  
  
  
Davidson,  D.  [1984b],  “Communication  and  Convention”,  Inquiries  into  Truth  and  Interpretation.  
(Oxford,  UK:  Clarendon  Press):  265-­‐‑280.  
  
  
Davidson,  D.  [2001],  “A  Coherence  Theory  of  Truth  and  Knowledge”,  Subjective,  Intersubjective,  
Objective.  (Oxford,  UK:  Clarendon  Press).  
  
  




Davies,  M.  [1992],  “Perceptual  Content  and  Local  Supervenience”,  Proceedings  of  the    
   Aristotelian  Society,  92:  21-­‐‑45.  
  
Dreckmann,  F.  [1999],  “Animal  Belief  and  Their  Contents”,  Erkenntnis,  51:  93-­‐‑111.  
  
  







Dretske,  F.  [2003],  “Skepticism:  What  Perception  Teaches”,  in  Luper  (ed.),  The  Skeptics.  
(Hampshire,  UK:  Ashgate  Publishing,  Limited):  105–118.  
  
  
Dretske,  F.  [2005]  “Is  Knowledge  Closed  Under  Known  Entailment?”  in  Steup,  M.  and  Sosa,  E.  
(eds.)  Contemporary  Debates  in  Epistemology.  (Malden,  MA:  Blackwell  Publishing).  
  
  
Bernard,  L.  C.,  et  al.  [2005],  “An  Evolutionary  Theory  of  Human  Motivation”,  Genetic,  Social,  and  
General  Psychology  Monographs,  131  (2):  129-­‐‑184.  
  
  
Brittan,  G.,  [1999],  “The  Secrets  of  Antelope”,  Erkenntnis,  51:  59-­‐‑77.  
  
  
Edwards,  J.,  [1957],  Freedom  of  Will,  ed.  P.  Ramsey.    (New  Haven,  CT:  Yale  University  Press).  
  
  
Engel,   A.   K.   [2003],   “Temporal   binding   and   the   neural   correlates   of   consciousness”,   in   A.  
Cleeremans  (ed.),  The  Units  of  Consciousness:  Binding,  Integration  and  Dissociation.  (Oxford,  
UK:  Oxford  University  Press):  132-­‐‑152.    
  
  
Engel,   P.   [2004],   ‘Truth   and   the  Aim   of   Belief’,   in   D.   Gillies   (ed.),  Laws   and  Models   in   Science.  
(London:  King'ʹs  College  Publications).  
  
  
Epstein,  S.  and  Pacini,  R.  [1999],  “Some  Basic  Issues  Reagarding  Dual-­‐‑process  Theories  from  the  
Perspective  of  Cognitive-­‐‑experiential  Theory”,   In  Chaiken,  S.  and  Trope,  Y.   (eds.)  Dual  
Process  Theories  in  Social  Psychology.  (New  York:  Guildford  Press):  462-­‐‑82.  
  
  
Erickson,  R.  [1975],  Sound  Structure  in  Music,  (California:  University  of  California  Press).  
  
  
Evans,  D.  [2002],  “The  Search  Hypothesis  of  Emotion”,  British  Journal  of  Philosophy  of  Science,  53:  
497-­‐‑509.      
  
  
Evans,   J.   [2008],   “Dual   Process   Accounts   of   Reasoning,   Judgement,   and   Social   Cognition”,  





Evans,   J.   [2009],   “How  Many   Dual-­‐‑process   Theories   Do   we   Need?   One,   Two,   or  Many?”   in  
Evans,  J.  and  Frankish,  K.  (eds.),  In  Two  Minds:  Dual  Processes  and  Beyond.    (Oxford,  UK:  
Oxford  University  Press):  33-­‐‑54.  
  
  
Fraassen,   B.   C.   [1968],   “Presupposition,   Implication,   and   Self-­‐‑Reference”,   The   Journal   of  
Philosophy,  65  (5):  136-­‐‑152.  
  
  
Frankfurt,  H.  G.   [1978],  “The  Problem  of  Action”,  American  Philosophical  Quarterly,  15   (2):  157-­‐‑
162.      
  
  
Fumerton,  R.  [2007],  “Epistemic  Conservatism:  Theft  or  Honest  Toil?”,  Oxford  Studies  in  




Garrard,  E.  and  McNaughton,  D.  [1998],  “Mapping  Moral  Motivation”,  Ethical  Theory  and  Moral  
Practice,  1:  45-­‐‑59.  
  
  
Grice,  H.  P.    [1957],  “Meaning”,  The  Philosophical  Review,  66  (3):  337-­‐‑388.  
  
  
Hare,  R.  M.  [1963],  Freedom  and  Reason.  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press).  
  
  
Harman,  G.  [1986],  Change  in  View.    (Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press).  
  
  
Harman,  G.  [1990],  “The  Intrinsic  Quality  of  Experience”,  Philosophical  Perspectives,  4:  31-­‐‑52.  
  
  
Hawkins,  J.  [2008],  “Desiring  the  Bad  Under  the  Guise  of  the  Good”,  The  Philosophical  Quarterly,  
58  (231):  244-­‐‑264.  
  
  
Heuer,  U.  [2004],  “Reasons  and  Actions  and  Desires”,  Philosophical  Studies,  121:  43-­‐‑63.  
  
  





Hurley,  S.  [2003a],  “Animal  Action  in  the  Space  of  Reasons,”  Mind  and  Language,  18  (3):  231-­‐‑256.  
  
  
Hurley,  S.  [2003b],  “Making  Sense  of  Animals:  Interpretation  vs.  Architecture”,  Mind  and  
Language,  18  (3):  273-­‐‑281.  
  
  
Kenny,  A.  J.  [1963],  Action,  Emotion  and  Will.  (London,  UK:  Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul).  
  
  
Kolodny,  N.  [2005],  “Why  Be  Rational?”  Mind,  114  (445):  509-­‐‑63.  
  
  
Kornell,  N.  [2009],  “Metacognition  in  Humans  and  Animals”,  Current  Directions  in  Psychological  
Science,  18  (1):  11-­‐‑15.  
  
  
Korsgaard,  C.  [1986],  “Skepticism  about  Practical  Reason”,  The  Journal  of  Philosophy,  83  (1):  5-­‐‑25.      
  
  
Korsgaard,   C.   [1992],   “The   Normativity   of   Instrumental   Reason”,   in   G.   Cullity,   and   B   Gaut,  
(eds).  [1997],  Ethics  and  Practical  Reason.  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press):  215-­‐‑254.  
  
  
Lewis,  D.  [1973],  “Causation”,  Journal  of  Philosophy,  70:  556-­‐‑567.  
  
  
Lewis,  D.  [1988],  “Desire  as  Belief”,  Mind,  97  (387):  323-­‐‑332.  
  
  
Lewis,  D.  [1996],  “Desire  as  Belief  II”,  Mind,  105  (418):  303-­‐‑313.  
  
  




Marcus,  R.  B.  [1990],  “Some  Revisionary  Proposals  About  Belief  and  Believing”,  Philosophy  and  
Phenomenological  Research,  1:  133-­‐‑153.  
  
  





McGinn,  C.  [1982],  The  Character  of  the  Mind.  (Oxford,  UK:  Oxford  University  Press).  
  
  
Meiland,  J.  W.  [1970],  Nature  of  Intention.  (London,  UK:  Methuen  &  Co.  Ltd.).  
  
  
Millar,  A.   [2004],  Understanding  People:  Normativity   and  Rationalizing  Explanation.   (Oxford,  UK:  
Clarendon  Press).    
  
  
Milligan,  T.  [2007],  “Whimsical  Desires”,  Ratio,  20:  308-­‐‑319.      
  
  
Milliken,  J.    [2008],  “In  a  Fitter  Direction:  Moving  Beyond  the  Direction  of  Fit  Picture  of  Belief  
and  Desire”,  Ethical  Theory  and  Moral  Practice,  11:  563-­‐‑571.  
  
  
Moran,  R.  [2001],  Authority  and  Estrangement.  (Princeton,  NJ:  Princeton  University  Press).  
  
  
Moss,   J.   [2010],   “Aristotle’s   Non-­‐‑Trivial,   Non-­‐‑Insane   View   that   Everyone   Always   Desires  
Things  under  the  Guise  of  the  Good,”  in  in  Desire,  Practical  Reason,  and  the  Good.  (Oxford,  
UK:  Oxford  University  Press):  65-­‐‑81.  
  
  
Nagel,  T.  [1978],  The  Possibility  of  Altruism.  (Princeton,  NJ:  Princeton  University  Press).  
  
  
Nerlich,  G.  [1967],  “Presupposition  and  Classical  Logical  Relations”,  Analysis,  27  (3):  104-­‐‑106.  
  
  
Nozick,  R.  [1981],  Philosophical  Explanations,  (Cambridge,  UK:  Cambridge  University  Press).  
  
  
Oddie,  G.  [2005],  Value,  Reality,  and  Desire.  (New  York,  NY:  Oxford  University  Press).  
  
  
Parfit,  D.  [1984],  Reasons  and  Persons.  (Oxford,  UK:  Clarendon  Press).  
  
  
Parfit,  D.  [1997],  “Reasons  and  Motivation”,  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  Supplementary  





Parfit,  D.  [2006],  “Normativity”  in  R.  Shafer-­‐‑Landau  (ed.),  Oxford  Studies  in  Metaethics,  Volume  
1.  (Oxford,  UK:  Clarendon  Press):  325-­‐‑380.  
  
  
Peacocke,  C.  [1992],  A  Study  of  Concepts.  (Cambridge,  MA:  The  MIT  Press).  
  
  
Pettit,  P.  [1987],  “Humeans,  Anti-­‐‑Humeans  and  Motivation”,  Mind,  96  (384):  530-­‐‑533.  
  
  
Plantinga,  A.  [2000],  Warranted  Christian  Belief.  (New  York,  NY:  Oxford  University  Press).  
  
  
Plantinga,  A.  [1993],  Warrant:  The  Current  Debate.  (New  York,  NY:  Oxford  University  Press).  
  
  
Price,  H.  [1989],  “Defending  Desire-­‐‑as-­‐‑Belief”,  Mind,  98  (389):  119-­‐‑127.  
  
  
Prinz,  J.  and  Clark,  A.  [2004],  “Putting  Concepts  to  Work:  Some  Thoughts  for  the  Twenty-­‐‑first  
Century”,  Mind  and  Langauge,  19  (1):  57-­‐‑69.  
  
  
Quine,  W.  V.  O.  [1951],  “Two  Dogmas  of  Empiricism”,  in  From  a  Logical  Point  of  View.    
   (New  York,  NY:  Harper  &  Row).  
  
  
Quinn,  W.  [1993],  Morality  and  Action.  (Cambridge,  UK:  Cambridge  University  Press).    
  
  
Railton,  P.  [1986],  “Moral  Realism”,  Philosophical  Review,  95:  163-­‐‑207.  
  
  
Railton,  P.  [2006],  “Normative  Guidance”,  Oxford  Studies  in  Metaethics,  1:  3-­‐‑34.  
  
  
Raz,   J.   [2010],   “On   the  Guise   of   the  Good”,   in  Desire,   Practical   Reason,   and   the   Good.   (Oxford:  
Oxford  University  Press):  111-­‐‑137.  
  
  






Scanlon,  T.  [1998],  What  We  Owe  to  Each  Other.  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press).  
  
  
Schall  J.  D.  [2001],  “Neural  basis  of  Deciding,  Choosing  and  Acting”,  Nature  Reviews  
Neuroscience,  2:  33-­‐‑42.  
  
  
Schall,  J.  D.  [1999],  “Weighing  the  Evidence:  How  the  Brain  makes  Decisions”,  Nature  Reviews  
Neuroscience,  2:  108-­‐‑109.  
  
  




Schroeder,  M.  [2009],  “Means  End  Coherence,  Stringency,  and  Subjective  Reasons”,  Philosophical  
Studies,  143  (2):  223-­‐‑248.  
  
  




Schueler,  G.  [2003],  Reasons  and  Purposes.  (Oxford,  UK:  Clarendon  Press).  
  
  
Searle,  J.  [1983],  Intentionality.  (Cambridge,  UK:  Cambridge  University  Press).  
  
  
Searle,   J.   R.   [1985],  Expression   and   Meaning:   Studies   in   the   Theory   of   Speech   Acts.   (New   York:  
Cambridge  University  Press).  
  
  
Searle,   J.   R.   and   Vanderveken,   D.   [1985],  Foundations   of   Illocutionary   Logic.   (Cambridge:  
Cambridge  University  Press).  
  
  
Sellars,  W.  [1954],  “Presupposing”,  Philosophical  Review,  63:  197-­‐‑215.  
  
  





Setiya,  K.  [2010],  “Sympathy  for  the  Devil,”  in  Desire,  Practical  Reason,  and  the  Good.  (Oxford:  
Oxford  University  Press):  82-­‐‑110.  
  
  
Sklar,  L.  [1975],  “Methodological  Conservatism”,  Philosophical  Review,  74:  186-­‐‑191.  
  
  
Sloman,  S.  A.  [2002],  “Two  Systems  of  Reasoning”,  In  T.  Gilovich,  D.  Griffin,  and  D.  Kahneman  
(eds.)  Heuristics  and  Biases:  The  Psychology  of  Intuitive  Judgement.  (Cambridge,  UK:  
Cambridge  University  Press):  379-­‐‑98.  
  
  
Smith,  M.  [1988],  “Reason  and  Desire”,  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  88:  243-­‐‑258.      
  
  
Smith,  M.  [1987],  “The  Humean  Theory  of  Motivation”,  Mind.  96:  36-­‐‑61.      
  
  
Smith,  M.   [2004a],   “Humeanism,  Psychologism  and   the  Normative  Story”,   in  Ethics   and   the  A  
Priori.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press):  146-­‐‑154.    
  
  
Smith,   M.   [2004b],   “The   Possibility   of   Philosophy   of   Action”,   in   Ethics   and   the   A   Priori.  
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press):  155-­‐‑177.    
    
  
Soames,   S.   [1989],   “Presupposition”,   in   Gabbay,   D.   and   Guenther,   F.   (eds.),   Handbook   of  
Philosophical  Logic.  (Dordrecht:  Reidel),  4:  553-­‐‑616.  
  
  
Stalley,  R.  F.  [1972],  “Intentions,  Beliefs,  and  Imperative  Logic”,  Mind,  81:  18-­‐‑28.  
  
  
Stalnaker,  R.  [1972],  “Pragmatics”,  in  Davidson,  D.  and  Harman,  G.  (eds.),  Semantics  of  Natural  
Language.  (Reidel:  Dordrecht):  389–408.  
  
  
Stalnaker,  R.  [1973],  “Presuppositions”,  The  Journal  of  Philosophical  Logic,  2:  447–457.  
  
  
Stalnaker,  R.  [1974],  “Pragmatic  Presuppositions”,  in  Munitz,  M.  and  Unger,  P.  (eds.),  Semantics  





Stalnaker,  R.  [1998],  “On  the  representation  of  context”,  Journal  of  Logic,  Language  and  
Information,  7:  3–19.  
  
  
Stampe,  D.  [1987],  “The  Authority  of  Desire”,  The  Philosophical  Review,  96:  335-­‐‑81.  
  
  
Stenius,  E.  [1967],  “Mood  and  Language-­‐‑Game”,  Synthese,  17:  254-­‐‑274.  
  
  








Strawson,  G.  [1994],  Mental  Reality.  (Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press).  
  
  
Strawson,  P.  F.  [1950],  “On  Referring”,  Mind,  59:  320-­‐‑344.  
  
  
Strawson,  P.  F.  [1952],  Introduction  to  Logical  Theory.  (London,  UK:  Methuen).  
  
  
Strawson,  P.  F.  [1954],  “A  Reply  to  Mr.  Sellars”,  Philosophical  Review,  63:  216-­‐‑231.  
  
  
Tenenbaum,  S.  [1999],  “The  Judgment  of  a  Weak  Will”,  Philosophy  and  Phenomenological  Research,  
59  (4):  875-­‐‑911.  
  
  
Tenebaum,  S.  [2003],  “Accidie,  Evaluation,  and  Motivation”,  Weakness  of  Will  and  Practical  
Irrationality.    (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press).  
  
  
Tenenbaum,  S.  [2006],  “Direction  of  Fit  and  Motivational  Cognitivism”,  n  Russ  Shafer-­‐‑Landau  
(ed.),  Oxford  Studies  in  Metaethics.  (Oxford,  UK:  Oxford  University  Press):  235-­‐‑264.  
  
  









Thompson,  M.  [2008],  Life  and  Action.  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press).  
  
  
Travis,  C.  [2004],  “The  Silence  of  the  Senses”,  Mind,  113  (449):  57-­‐‑93.  
  
  
Tye,  M.  [1995],  Ten  Problems  of  Consciousness.  (Cambridge,  MA:  The  MIT  Press).  
  
  
Velleman,  D.  [1992],  “The  Guise  of  the  Good”,  Noûs,  26  (1):  3-­‐‑26.  
  
  
Vahid,  H.  [2004],  “Varieties  of  Epistemic  Conservativism”,  Synthese,  141:  97-­‐‑122.  
  
  
Vranas,   P.   B.   M.   [2008],   “New   Foundations   for   imperative   Logic   I:   Logical   Connectives,  
Consistency,  and  Quantifiers”,  Noûs,  42:  529-­‐‑572.  
  
  




Wallace,  R.  J.  [2001],  “Normativity,  Commitment,  and  Instrumental  Reason.”  Philosophers'ʹ  
Imprint,  1  (4):  1-­‐‑26.  
  
  
Warnock,  G.  [1976],  “Imperatives  and  Meaning,”  in  Lewis,  H.  D.  (ed.),  Contemporary  British  
Philosophy:  Personal  Statements,  Part  4.  (London,  UK:  Allen  and  Unwin):  294-­‐‑304.  
  
  
Watson,  G.  [1987],  “Free  Action  and  Free  Will,”  Mind,  96:  145-­‐‑72.  
  
  
Way,  J.  [2010],  “Defending  the  Wide  Scope  Approach  to  Instrumental  Reason”,  Philosophical  






Zagzebski,  L.  [1996],  Virtues  of  the  Mind.  (Cambridge,  UK:  Cambridge  University  Press).  
  
  









       
  
  
  
